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ABSTRACT 
 
Adam Smith on the Nature and Authority of Conscience 
by 
Albert Shin 
 
Conscience plays a central role in our moral lives. We have all felt the pangs of 
conscience when we fail to obey it; we are terrified by those who lack it; and we look to it as 
a moral guide, often using it to justify our actions. Yet there is little understanding of what it 
is, how it operates, and what justifications we have for obeying it.  
The aim is to provide one plausible account of the nature and authority of conscience, 
that of Adam Smith. According to Smith, conscience, or what he calls ‘the supposed 
impartial spectator’, is the moral agent judging herself from the situation of an impartial 
spectator, just as she would judge others. Under this account, conscience is not an ideal or 
prototypical judge, but rather the agent judging as she would judge others. As a result, 
conscience is liable to all the same errors that any spectator is, especially partiality. Thus, 
there is a need to cultivate our conscience. We do so, I will argue, primarily through 
encountering diversity, which leads to disagreements, which prompt us to reevaluate how we 
judge others. Furthermore, Smith also claims that conscience has authority in virtue of the 
respect we give it. Our respect for conscience is rooted in our recognition that conscience is a 
better moral judge, demonstrated by our appeal to conscience to correct for our immediate, 
unreflective moral judgments. However, this account fails to capture a key feature of our 
phenomenological experience of conscience: conscience presents itself as the moral 
! vii 
authority, not merely a helpful moral guide. I argue that Smith’s theory, though not Smith 
himself, provides an alternative account of the authority of conscience: because conscience is 
our judging ourselves using our own faculties, we are committed to the accuracy of 
conscience’s judgments the same way we are committed to the accuracy of all of our 
judgments.  
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Historical Development of ‘Conscience’ 
 
In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law, as would the rabid 
segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do so 
openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an 
individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly 
accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the 
community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law. 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. from “Letter from Birmingham Jail”1 
 
 
Conscience plays a key role in our moral lives. We view it as a feature of a morally 
developed human being.2 We have all felt the pangs of conscience when we fail to act in 
accordance with its dictates. We are terrified (and maybe even fascinated) by those who lack 
it (e.g. psychopaths).3 And like Martin Luther King, Jr., we look to conscience for moral 
guidance, and appeal to it in justifying our actions. Yet there is great confusion as to what it 
is. We are given images of Jiminy Cricket or little angels on our shoulders, whispering moral 
commands into our ears. Often, these figures are thought to be representatives of God, 
society, or morality. Others are more skeptical, reducing conscience to mere opinion or 
feeling. But all these are merely hinting at a particular phenomenological experience we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Martin Luther King, Jr. “Letter from Birmingham Jail” in Why We Can’t Wait (1963, 68).!
2 For instance, Kohlberg claims conscience is a feature of the later stages of moral development (Kohlberg 
1981, 1984). !
3 Psychopaths are often characterized as lacking a conscience. For example, Robert D. Hare, a central figure in 
psychological research on psychopaths, cites a lack of conscience as one of the identifying characteristics of 
psychopaths (Hare 1999, 2004).!
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have: the seemingly immediate access we have to what is right or wrong to do in a given 
situation, presented to us as authoritative. Given the role that that conscience plays in our 
everyday moral lives, it is important that we gain a better grasp of it nature, and consequently 
its authority over us.  
Our views on conscience have a long history. The term ‘conscience’ comes from the 
Latin term ‘conscientia’, which in turn comes from the Greek term ‘syneidesis’. These terms 
carried a wide range of meaning: “holding of knowledge in common, fact of being privy to a 
crime, complicity, private knowledge, consciousness, moral sense, consciousness of right and 
wrong” (OED “Conscience”). C. S. Lewis divides into two branches: conscience as a state of 
awareness or knowledge (what Lewis calls the ‘weakened’ branch), and conscience as a state 
of shared knowledge (or the ‘together’ branch).4 In the medieval period, ‘conscience’ 
retained its status as knowledge, either of general rules or of the application of those rules. 
The knowledge of general moral rules was thought to be given by the great Author of Nature, 
but its application was vulnerable to mistakes. From the 17th to the 19th Century, we find a 
much more diverse landscape. Some, like Bishop Butler, continued to appeal to conscience 
as an authoritative voice that provided moral knowledge, while others, like Thomas Hobbes, 
questioned its authority, reducing it to the status of mere opinion.5 Alternatively, John Stuart 
Mill viewed conscience as a particular feeling, the sense of duty, which holds little 
connection to reasoning and knowledge. Today, our conceptions of conscience are influenced 
by the work of Sigmund Freud, who, similar to Butler, thought conscience was the function !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 C. S. Lewis, Studies in Words (1960, 182-187). According to Lewis, conscience as shared knowledge often 
carried a negative connotation: the shared knowledge, more aptly described as shared secret, was between 
conspirators of some crime. But this was not always so, for instance, in the case of Hobbes, which I will 
demonstrate later in this chapter. 
5 I discuss their views in detail below. A helpful starting point for discussions on conscience in this period is 
Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700 (Braun, Harald E. & Vallance, Edward, eds., 
2004). Synderesis, which was closely tied to conscience and widely discussed in the medieval period, also 
remained in discussions in the Early Modern period, though not to the same extent (see Greene 1991).!
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of a distinct faculty, the super-ego. But generally, we often speak of conscience in all these 
various ways (as a source of knowledge, as a feeling, and as a distinct faculty), which may 
explain the appeal of C. D. Broad’s definition of conscience as a multifaceted phenomenon 
that involves cognitive, affective, and conative components. 
The general aim of this dissertation is to give what I take to be the most plausible and 
fruitful account of conscience, that of Adam Smith, and to show its significance in moral 
discourse. But to fully appreciate Smith’s account, it will be helpful to compare his account 
to alternatives. And the historical backdrop, along with some contemporary views, will be 
especially helpful because in many ways Smith is addressing the same issues with his own 
account of conscience. Ultimately, our interest is the authority of conscience and the degree 
to which we ought to follow its guidance. But to address its authority, we need to first 
explain what it is, how it functions, and how reliable it is in providing moral knowledge. So I 
will present these differing views by how they addressed the following questions: 
 
[A] What is conscience? 
[B] Does it provide moral knowledge, and if so, how reliable is it as a source of 
moral knowledge? 
[C] Does conscience have authority over us, i.e. should we follow the dictates of 
conscience? 
 
Though the presentation here is a more general overview, I will focus on discussions of 
conscience in the 17th and 18th century for two reasons: 1) the primary aim of this overview is 
to set the stage for a discussion of Adam Smith (18th-century); and 2) with the exception of 
Butler’s account, discussions of conscience in this period have garnered little attention, even 
though it was during this period that ideas of conscience began to diverge in important ways. 
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I will try to highlight some of these developments, and in the next chapter, place Smith 
within that context.6 
 
1.1 The Medieval Period: Bonaventure and Aquinas7 
Conscience was not discussed widely until the medieval period, during which 
conscience was used to explain akrasia: how is it that we fail to act in accordance with what 
we know to be good? The thought was that we had knowledge of general principles or rules 
about what is good to do, but in any particular situation, we failed to apply those rules 
correctly. Conscience, it was generally thought, was involved in this process of practical 
reasoning, from the general rules to the particular application of that rule. The debate was on 
exactly how conscience was involved in this process, and in particular the relationship 
between conscience and synderesis. 
In Commentary on the Sentences, Book II, distinction 39, Bonaventure describes 
conscience (conscientia) as a disposition of practical, not theoretical, reason. Conscience first 
provides us with innate knowledge of very general moral principles (e.g. obey God’s 
commands, do not steal). Conscience then takes that knowledge, and coupled with some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 In summarizing these accounts in chronological order, I do not intend to present any positive thesis about how 
our understanding of conscience changed over time. I simply pick out these particular accounts because they 
represent the wide range of views that have been considered. And in my discussion of Adam Smith, these 
accounts will primarily be used as points of contrast. The exceptions will be the views of those with whom 
Smith was, or plausibly was, familiar, like Butler. But I will be explicit if I think Smith is drawing directly from 
any other writers.  
 For an interesting interpretation of the historical development of ‘conscience’, see Langston 2001. 
According to Douglas Langston, the lack of contemporary discourse on conscience results from the dominance 
in the 19th and 20th century of the view that conscience is a distinct faculty, and the subsequent dismissal of 
theories holding such a view, such as Freud’s (Langston 2001). I hold some reservations about Langston’s 
explanation because, as I will discuss, I do not think that Freud believed conscience is a faculty, and that this 
misunderstanding of Freud reflects a failure to appreciate Freud’s subtle distinction between conscience and the 
superego.!
7 Much has already been written on accounts of conscience in the medieval period, so I shall keep the review 
here brief. For a more thorough overview of views of conscience in the Medieval period, see Timothy Potts’ 
Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (1980), Langston’s Conscience and Other Virtues (2001), and Karen 
Feldman’s Binding Words (2006).  !
! 5 
beliefs (e.g. God commands you to pray, taking a penny from this jar is stealing), applies that 
general moral principle to come to a less general claim (e.g. I should pray, I should not take a 
penny from this jar).8 In this way, conscience provides knowledge, specifically practical 
knowledge, i.e. knowledge of what to desire or what to do:  
 
[C]onscientia is a disposition perfecting our thought to the extent that it is practical, 
or to the extent that it directs us towards deeds…. Such a disposition is, accordingly, 
not just called ‘knowledge’ (scientia), but ‘conscientia’, so as to signify that this 
disposition does not in itself perfect the theoretical potentiality, but does so as joined 
in some way to desire and deed (Bonaventure 111).9 
 
Bonventure is using the ‘con’ in ‘conscientia’ to distinguish conscience from theoretical 
knowledge; unlike theoretical knowledge, conscience provides knowledge that directs us 
toward (i.e. joins us to) some action. But conscience provides this knowledge by first 
discovering very general moral principles, then applying them to form less general ones. 
But this practical knowledge is not itself motivating. Conscience actualized potential 
knowledge through practical reasoning. So it provided knowledge of what one should do in a 
particular situation. And though this knowledge directs us toward the right action, it alone 
does not move one to act accordingly; it does not make one want to do what conscience 
directs us to do. To explain our motivation to do good, Bonaventure appeals to synderesis, a 
disposition that drives us towards the good: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Langston draws out this distinction (between conscience as that which gives us access to the innate, general 
moral principles and that which applies those general principles to situations) more clearly in Conscience and 
Other Virtues (2001). He labels the former “potential conscience” and the latter “applied conscience”.  
According to Potts, the relevant distinction for Bonaventure is not between general and particular 
deontic propositions, but rather between necessary and contingent deontic propositions. He also draws some 
connections to the a priori/a posteriori distinction (Potts 1980, 61-64). For simplicity’s sake, I will set aside both 
the necessary/contingent and the a priori/a posteriori distinction. But I will note that the innate general moral 
principles are the first principles, i.e. principles from which all other deontic propositions are derived. !
9 All quotes by Bonaventure and Aquinas are Potts’ translations in Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Potts 
1980). I will cite by indicating the original author (Bonaventure, Aquinas, or Potts) and the page number in 
Potts 1980. !
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[S]ynderesis is a disposition with respect to good and bad in general, conscientia a 
disposition with respect to good or bad in particular, and natural law is related 
indifferently to either. But because, as was argued above, conscientia is an 
intellectual disposition, either it is necessary to suppose that there is something over 
and above conscientia and synderesis which directs us, or it is necessary to suppose 
that synderesis is in the desiring part [of the soul] (Bonaventure 116). 
 
So conscience (in the reasoning faculty) tells us to what is good to do, and synderesis (in the 
desiring faculty) motivates us to do good generally. Synderesis never motivates us to any 
particular action (e.g. stealing this candy bar in front of me right now), but just to do good, 
whatever it may be.  
Though conscience provides moral knowledge, it can be mistaken from time to time. 
Errors, however, do not result from the general moral principles, which are infallible. Errors 
occur in the applying of the general principles to particular cases:  
 
And thus, although conscientia is always right so long as it sticks to the general and is 
moved by simple inspection, it can become mistaken when it descends to particulars 
and brings things together, because the actualization of deliberative reason is mixed 
with it. This will be clear from the following. The conscientia of the Jews first told 
them itself by natural pronouncement that God is to be obeyed, and they assumed 
henceforth that God now directs circumcision and keeping [certain] foods separate. 
From this their conscientia is formed in the particular [matter], that they should 
circumcise themselves and abstain from [certain] foods. This mistake does not come 
from the first premiss, which was indeed true, but comes from adding the minor 
premiss, which was not from consientia as a natural tribunal, but rather from 
mistaken reason, which has regard to free choice (Bonaventure 120).  
 
We are infallible in our knowledge of the general rules, like “God is to be obeyed”. But we 
believe, mistakenly, that God commands circumcision and keeping certain foods separate. So 
! 7 
when this belief is combined with the general rule, we come to a false conclusion that we 
ought to circumcise and keep certain foods separate.10 
Since conscience gives us knowledge of the laws of God, we ought to follow its 
dictates. The authority of conscience, then, is derived from conscience’s role as the 
representative of God. We are bound to the dictates of conscience the same way we are 
bound to the laws of God. But given that conscience can err and command us do that which 
is against the laws of God, should we always follow its commands? Bonaventure thinks we 
should, even if conscience commands us to act against the laws of God. His reasoning is that 
though in disobeying a mistaken conscience we are acting in accordance with God’s 
commands, we are acting with the wrong intention. And acting with the wrong intention is 
sin (Bonaventure 1980, 115). Of course, Bonaventure is not claiming we are justified in 
acting against the laws of God. Rather, we are bound to change our conscience whenever it is 
mistaken in its dictates. But given we are unaware of the mistake we must still act in 
accordance with its dictates.  
 
Thomas Aquinas gives a similar account of how we come to form practical moral 
knowledge: we have innate knowledge of general moral rules and we apply them to specific 
situations. However, Aquinas provides a different division between conscientia and 
synderesis.11 Whereas Bonaventure associated conscientia with both general moral principles 
and their applications, and synderesis with the desire to do what is good, Aquinas associated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Similarly, synderesis is never mistaken since it does not issue any commands of what we should do in a 
particular situation. Rather, it is the spark that motivates us; it “murmurs back against evil and prods us to good” 
(Bonaventure 1980, 120).!
11 Aquinas adopts his distinction between conscientia and synderesis from Philip the Chancellor. For those 
interested in the details of Philip’s account, see Potts 1980 (12-31; 94-109).!
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conscientia strictly with the applications of the general principles, and synderesis with the 
general innate principles:  
 
Accordingly, just as there is a natural disposition of the human mind by which it 
apprehends the principles of theoretical disciplines, which we call the understanding 
of principles, so too it has a natural disposition concerned with the basic principles of 
behaviour, which are the general principles of natural law. This disposition relates to 
synderesis; it exists in no other potentiality but reason (Aquinas 124-5). 
 
For the noun ‘conscientia’ signifies the application of knowledge to something, so 
that to be conscious of something (conscire) is, as it were, to know simultaneously 
(simul scire). But any knowledge can be applied to something, so ‘conscientia’ 
cannot name some special disposition, or some potentiality, but names the 
actualisation which is the application of some disposition or other, or of something or 
other known, to a particular actualization (Aquinas 130-1).  
 
Conscientia simply denotes the application of the general moral principles, grasped by 
synderesis, to narrower cases. What is interesting about Aquinas’ account is that as we apply 
general principles through reasoning, we become aware or conscious of what is right to do. 
For Aquinas, consciousness from applying knowledge is itself a kind of knowledge. 
For Aquinas, all knowledge requires first principles: the principles from which all other 
knowledge is derived: 
 
Nature, in all its works, aims at what is good and at the maintenance of whatever 
comes about through the working of nature. Hence, in all the works of nature, its first 
principles are always permanent and unchangeable and conserve right order, because 
first principles must endure, as Aristotle says (Physics 1.6, 189a19). For there could 
be no stability or certainty in what results from the first principles, unless the first 
principles were solidly established. Anything which is variable goes back, 
accordingly, to some first fixed thing (Aquinas 127). 
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We must have some starting point that grounds that knowledge because without any such 
starting point, all supposed knowledge is merely unfounded conjectures. Knowledge can only 
proceed from knowledge, and so for anyone to have knowledge, there must be some starting 
point, some piece of knowledge that is not derived from any other piece of knowledge. That 
starting point is the first principles. Moral knowledge is no different. If we are to be capable 
of doing any good, we need to have first principles that direct our actions toward good rather 
than evil. And these first principles are grasped by synderesis:  
 
Hence, in order that there can be some rightness in human deeds, there must be some 
enduring principle which has unchangeable rightness and by reference to which all 
deeds are tested, such that this enduring principle resists everything evil and gives 
assent to everything good. This is what synderesis is, whose job is to murmur back in 
reply to evil and to turn us towards what is good. Hence, it is to be admitted that it 
cannot do wrong (Aquinas 128).  
 
We are born with certain general moral principles, first principles, which need not be derived 
from any other piece of knowledge. For Bonaventure, these first principles were contained in 
conscience; for Aquinas, they are contained in synderesis. 
Of course, it is unclear exactly what these first moral principles are. As Potts rightly 
notes, though first principles are general deontic propositions, not all general deontic 
propositions are first principles. For instance, “Do not murder for profit” is a general deontic 
proposition, but Aquinas may not consider this proposition one of the first principles. Though 
it is not quite clear what Aquinas considers a first principle, Aquinas seems to treat the first 
principles as something more general from which “Do not murder for profit” can be derived. 
So Aquinas seems to think of first principles as something closer to Bonaventure’s first 
! 10 
principles, e.g. “Only do what is good and never what is bad”, “Obey God”, “Do not 
murder”, and “Do not steal”.12 
As for what motivates us to do what is good, Aquinas, like Bonaventure, believes it is 
synderesis. However, Aquinas thinks that synderesis is part of the reasoning faculty that 
gives us access to the first principles. And among the first principles is “Obey God” and 
“Only do what is good and never what is bad”. These principles alone, part of the reasoning 
and not the desiring faculty, motivate us to do what is good. Hence, it is reason, not desire, 
that motivates one to do good, but it does so by means of general commands of what is right 
and wrong. 
 Like Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks we are infallible in our knowledge of the first 
moral principles:  
 
[N]o conscientia can mistakenly judge: ‘God is not to be loved by me’ or ‘Something 
bad ought to be done’. This is because in both kinds of judgment, the theoretical as 
much as the practical, the major premiss is known per se, as existing in the general 
judgment” (Aquinas 133).  
 
As stated earlier, Aquinas thinks that all knowledge requires first principles. So if we have 
any moral knowledge at all, there must be first principles about which we are not mistaken. 
Supposing we have this knowledge of first principles, if we do make mistakes, it must then 
be in the applying of these first principles: 
 
Mistakes can occur in two ways in this application: first, because what is applied 
contains a mistake; second, because it is not applied properly. In the same way, 
mistakes in reasoning can occur in two ways: either because some false [premiss] is 
used, or because one does not reason correctly (Aquinas 132). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 I leave it open exactly what level of generality would count as first principles for Aquinas. However, it is 
clear that he has in mind propositions that do not specify any particular situation or particular end.!
! 11 
 
So if I come to a false judgment, like “I should exclude information on a loan application to 
increase my chances of getting the loan”, either I have a false belief, e.g. that excluding 
information is not lying, or I made an error in reasoning. What I was not, and cannot be, 
mistaken about was the first principle “do not lie”. And so with diligent care, i.e. coming to 
true beliefs and using proper reasoning, we can correct for errant moral judgments.  
 Like Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks that conscience is binding in virtue of God’s 
commandments. And like Bonaventure, Aquinas thinks that, in general, even mistaken 
conscience is binding because conscience is what we take to be God’s commands, and to act 
against one’s conscience is to act with the intent of disobeying God. Moreover, one cannot be 
bound to some command if one does not know that command. And so generally we are 
excused when we obey our conscience. The exception, however, is when we have a second-
order duty to know God’s command, in which case, we are not excused because we failed to 
follow a command that we should have known even though we did not.13 As Potts points out, 
since we cannot be mistaken about the first principles, any failure to fulfill this second-order 
duty must be a failure in deriving the correct general deontic propositions from the first 
principles (Potts 1980, 59). But Aquinas does not specify which commands are those that we 
have a second-order duty to know, so it is unclear how lenient Aquinas is in excusing 
mistaken conscience.  
In summary, the general picture for both Bonaventure and Aquinas is that conscience 
is an aspect of practical reasoning that provides us with moral knowledge, specifically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 “Hence no one is bound by an injunction except by means of knowledge of that injunction and, therefore, 
anyone who is not capable of being informed, is not bound by the command; nor is someone who is ignorant of 
an injunction of God bound to carry out the injunction, except in so far as he is obliged to know the injunction” 
(Aquinas 135). !
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knowledge of what we ought to do in particular cases, derived from our knowledge of what is 
good and bad. Conscience can be mistaken because though we cannot be mistaken about the 
first moral principles, we can misapply those principles to come to the wrong conclusions. 
However, if we apply the general principles to particular cases correctly, then we have moral 
knowledge. The authority of conscience is derivative; we are bound to conscience’s dictates 
because conscience gives us access to God’s commands and we are bound to obey God’s 
commands.  Since conscience is representing God’s commands, to act against one’s 
conscience is wrong to do even if we are mistaken because to do so is to act with the 
intention of violating God’s commands.14 As we shall see, each of these points has come 
under attack through the years. Some question whether conscience is a reliable source of 
moral knowledge; others whether we must follow the dictates of our conscience. Moreover, 
whether our motivation for acting in accordance with conscience is located in the affective 
faculty (as Bonaventure claims) or in the rational one (as Aquinas claims) remains a point of 
contention today. 
 
1.2 Thomas Hobbes and the Security of the State 
Though conscience was not prominently discussed in the 17th and 18th century, it 
remained of concern for various reasons. Thomas Hobbes was especially concerned with a 
corrupted use of ‘conscience’ used as grounds for disobeying the sovereign, resulting in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 In “Four Conceptions of Conscience” (1998), Thomas Hill characterizes one conception of conscience, which 
he labels the “popular religious conception”, in terms of its connection to God as the source of an “instinctual 
access to moral truth” (Hill 1998, 17; for more on religious conception of conscience, see Kelly 1967 and Lyons 
2009). Though many of the Medieval conceptions, including those of Bonaventure and Aquinas, can be 
characterized in this manner, doing so simply overlooks the most crucial aspect of these conceptions: 
conscience provides moral knowledge through reasoning from first principles. We can accept that aspect of 
these views without adopting a divine command theory or God as the source of our grasping of first principles. 
We can instead take “God’s command” to mean commands of moral law. The same applies to Butler’s account 
(§ 1.3). I will return to this point in my discussion of Adam Smith, whose account of conscience need not rely 
on any connection between God and morality, though he does speak of conscience as a representative of God. !
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dissolution of the commonwealth. I want to discuss Hobbes’ account in more detail because 
his discussion highlights the various uses of ‘conscience’ in this period.15 
In Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes three uses of ‘conscience’, one proper 
(corresponding to shared knowledge), one metaphorical (corresponding to private 
knowledge), and one corrupted (corresponding to mere opinion). ‘Conscience’, properly 
defined, signifies shared knowledge of some fact: 
 
When two or more men know of one and the same fact, they are said to be 
CONSCIOUS of it one to another, which is as much as to know it together. And 
because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third, it was and 
ever will be reputed a very evil act for any man to speak against his conscience, or to 
corrupt or force another so to do, insomuch that the plea of conscience has been 
always hearkened unto very diligently in all times (L vii.4).16 
 
Hobbes is returning to one meaning of conscience: conscience as awareness of some moral 
fact. But he is understanding conscience as a shared awareness, not some private judgment. 
Later, Hobbes sometimes refers to this (proper) use of conscience as ‘public conscience’ to 
distinguish it from other uses of conscience. But unlike those before him, Hobbes thinks 
conscience is an awareness that is shared because it is nothing more than the civil law in a 
commonwealth. His thought is that when we enter into a commonwealth, we agree to bind 
ourselves to the commands of the sovereign. We essentially give the power to judge to a 
sovereign, who by civil law dictates what is good and bad. I will say more about this point in 
discussing the authority of conscience. But for now, I want to highlight the significance of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 For my purposes here, I will not discuss Calvin’s influence on Hobbes regarding conscience, which 
admittedly is significant. Hobbes often cites Calvin in discussions on conscience. And much of the influence of 
Medieval thought on Hobbes’ account of conscience may have come by way of Calvin. For more on Calvin’s 
influence, see Domanique Weber’s “Thomas Hobbes’s Doctrine of Conscience and Theories of Synderesis in 
Renaissance England” (2010, 56-66).  !
16 Leviathan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1651/1994). Passages from Leviathan will be referred to by chapter and 
paragraph number, prefaced by L. !
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this development. Though prior to Hobbes, ‘conscience’ was used to refer to a shared 
awareness, it was primarily shared in the sense that everyone has access to the same piece of 
knowledge through their own reasoning. For Hobbes, private judgment is excluded altogether 
from conscience; instead, everyone has access to the same piece of knowledge because it is 
the decree of the sovereign.  
Though one might worry that as civil law, public conscience may not always be true, 
Hobbes thinks that it has the status of knowledge. He treats ‘conscience’ as derivative of 
‘science’, which is a kind of knowledge. And given Hobbes’ understanding of science, his 
account of conscience is quite similar to that of Aquinas:  
 
And therefore, when the discourse is put into speech, and begins with the definitions 
of words, and proceeds by connexion of the same into general affirmations, and of 
these again into syllogisms, and end or last sum is called the conclusion, and the 
thought of the mind by it signified is that conditional knowledge, or knowledge of the 
consequences of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE (L vii.4). 
 
Aquinas thought we had infallible knowledge of first moral principles. These building blocks 
were necessary for knowledge to even be possible. From these first principles, through 
correct reasoning, we are able to come to more particular moral knowledge. Similarly, 
Hobbes thinks knowledge must begin with the basic building blocks: not first principles (as 
Aquinas maintained), but rather definitions of words. And through correct reasoning, we 
derive knowledge of other truths. Conscience in its proper use, however, is not merely 
knowledge, but knowledge that is shared, in that multiple individuals are aware of that piece 
of knowledge.  
 Hobbes also points out that some used ‘conscience’ metaphorically to refer to private 
knowledge:  
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Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of 
their own secret facts and secret thoughts; and therefore it is rhetorically said that the 
conscience is a thousand witnesses (L vii.4). 
 
This metaphorical use treats conscience as self-awareness, in which we are witnesses to 
ourselves, the same way that others can be witnesses to us. Hence, in some sense we share 
knowledge, not with different individuals, but rather with ourselves. As we shall see, Hobbes 
is not primarily concerned with this use of ‘conscience’. So for now, I will leave discussions 
of is aside. But we will return to this use in discussions of Butler, Kant, Freud and Smith, all 
of whom, as we shall see, use ‘conscience’ in a similar fashion.17  
 Of greater concern for Hobbes is the corrupted use of ‘conscience’ (or what he calls 
‘private conscience’ elsewhere), in which one simply uses the name ‘conscience’ to elevate 
the status of one’s private opinion to that of knowledge: 
 
And last of all, men vehemently in love with their own new opinions (though never so 
absurd), and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that 
reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful to change or 
speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know, at most, 
but that they think so (L vii.4). 
 
The first two uses of ‘conscience’ (as shared knowledge and as a metaphor) both use 
conscience to refer to knowledge. Even the metaphorical use referred to knowledge, just 
shared with oneself, not with others. But this third use is corrupted because it takes what is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 In Binding Words, Karen Feldman claims “conscience may be seen as the most dangerous metaphor for both 
Hobbes’ nominalism and his political philosophy as a whole, for it is precisely the metaphoric shift in our 
understanding of conscience that, in Hobbes’s account, corrupts knowledge into opinion, making error and 
deception possible” (Feldman 2006, 20). Though I do not disagree with the overall claim about the threat of 
metaphors, I think the use of Hobbes’ discussion of ‘conscience’ as a prime example might be an overstatement. 
Hobbes distinguishes between the metaphorical use of ‘conscience’ and the corrupted use, and he only attacks 
the corrupted use, never the metaphorical one, throughout Leviathan. In fact, apart from the initial distinction, 
he never again mentions the metaphorical use in Leviathan.!
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not knowledge but opinion and gives it the misleading status of knowledge.18 Hobbes may be 
responding here to multiple figures who treated conscience as private to an individual, 
including Calvin and some of the Medieval tradition he draws on (see Weber 2010) and 
philosophers like Locke (see Andrews 1999). But it may also be that he finds this corrupted 
use to simply be prevalent in his time. 
Not surprisingly, the reliability and authority of conscience depends on the particular 
use of ‘conscience’. Public conscience is a kind of moral knowledge, since it is derived from 
definition. But then we might be a bit suspicious here because public conscience is derived 
from definitions that the sovereign sets. The sovereign decides what is good and bad, instead 
of leaving the decision up to individuals. And by defining what is good and bad, public 
conscience cannot be mistaken, at least in the definitions. And if we derive any propositions 
from these definitions through sound reasoning, then we are not mistaken about those 
propositions and have knowledge of them. Private conscience, on the other hand, is mere 
opinion. And though our private opinion may be correct, our private opinions are often 
mistaken. Moreover, private opinion is not derived from definitions the way that knowledge 
is. Consider Hobbes’ definition of opinion, contrasted with his definition of science (given 
earlier): 
 
But if the first ground of such discourse be not definitions, or if the definitions be not 
rightly joined together into syllogisms, then the end or conclusion is again OPINION, 
namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senseless 
words (L vii.4).  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 In my presentation here, I am primarily drawing on Hobbes’ discussion of conscience in Leviathan. 
However, in Elements of Law (EL), Hobbes simply presents the corrupted use of ‘conscience’ in which 
conscience is a mere opinion that one takes to be knowledge grounded on some evidence (EL vi.8). In 
Leviathan, Hobbes is much more careful in distinguishing the three different uses. I am taking Leviathan to 
contain Hobbes’ more considered account of ‘conscience’. !
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Though not always false, opinions are by their very nature different from knowledge because 
they are either not the products of definitions, or not the products of sound reasoning. So 
even if an opinion happens to be true, it cannot be granted the status of knowledge.  
Public conscience has authority over us, demanding that we act in accordance with it. 
But its authority stems from our entering into a commonwealth. Public conscience is civil 
law, the laws passed by the sovereign, but civil law only exists in a commonwealth. Hence, 
Hobbes distinguishes between acting against our conscience in the state of nature and doing 
so in a commonwealth:  
 
In the second place, I observe the diseases of a commonwealth that proceed from the 
poison of seditious doctrines, whereof one is: That every private man is judge of good 
and evil actions…. Another doctrine repugnant to civil society is that whatsoever a 
man does against his conscience is sin; and it dependeth on the presumption of 
making himself judge of good and evil. For a man’s conscience and his judgment is 
the same thing; and as the judgment, so also the conscience may be erroneous. 
Therefore, though he that is subject to no civil law sinneth in all he does against his 
conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason, yet it is not so 
with him that lives in a commonwealth, because the law is the public conscience, by 
which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise, in such diversity as there 
is of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth must 
needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power farther than it shall 
seem good in his own eyes (L xxix.6-7). 
 
Whether or not the doctrine “whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin” is a 
“repugnant” one depends on whether or not one is acting on private conscience without a 
commonwealth or is acting on private conscience within a commonwealth. If without a 
commonwealth, then it is sin to act against private conscience, because a person would then 
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be acting against her own laws of reason and sin is the violation of law.19 So it would be a 
mistake to say that private conscience has no authority over us. Rather, private conscience 
without a commonwealth, i.e. within the state of nature, is authoritative. However, if within a 
commonwealth, then it is not a sin to act against private conscience because in a 
commonwealth, a person leaves the power to judge what is good or bad to the sovereign. So, 
if a person violates private conscience, but is following public conscience, then she does not 
sin.20 In other words, within a commonwealth, it is public conscience that has authority over 
us. Regardless of our private judgment of what we ought to do, we are required to do what 
public conscience dictates.21  
 It should be noted that Hobbes thinks the sovereign’s authority is limited to actions, 
not thoughts:  
 
There is another error in their civil philosophy, which they never learned of Aristotle 
(nor Cicero, nor any other of the heathen): to extend the power of the law, which is 
the rule of actions only, to the very thoughts and consciences of men, by examination 
and inquisition of what they hold, notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and 
actions…. [T]o force him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions are not by 
law forbidden, is against the law of nature (and especially in them, who teach that a 
man shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments if he die in a false opinion 
concerning an article of the Christian faith) (L xlvi.37).22 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 “A sin is not only a transgression of a law, but also any contempt of the legislator. For such contempt is a 
breach of all his laws at once” (L xxvii.1). It may be that Hobbes thinks that violating the laws of reason without 
a commonwealth is to show contempt for the legislator of Nature, i.e. God. !
20 EL xxv.12!
21 I am admittedly setting aside Hobbes’ account of what we ought to do when the sovereign’s laws contradict 
the laws of nature and laws of God, if such is even possible. But even if there were a conflict, Hobbes appears 
to hold up the authority of public conscience, at least over action within a commonwealth: “For [violating the 
sovereign’s laws] is always a violation of faith, and consequently against the law of nature, which is the eternal 
law of God” (L xlii.131). For more in-depth discussion on conscience within and without the commonwealth, 
see Edward Andrew’s “Hobbes on Conscience within the Law and without” (1999). Andrew also provides a 
useful discussion of the views and criticisms of conscience around Hobbes’ time in his book Conscience and is 
Critics (2001).!
22 Also see EL xxv.3. “Conscience” in this instance should be read as private conscience.!
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So even though we ought to act in accordance with public conscience, even when doing so 
contradicts our private conscience, civil law can never extend to anything beyond the action. 
Thoughts and intentions are only considered insofar as they lead to some action. But one 
cannot be said to violate public conscience by simply thinking or intending alone, since 
public conscience only extends to actions.  
Hobbes in some ways retains the Medieval account of conscience as knowledge, in 
the form of shared awareness. But he understands it in the context of a commonwealth in 
which people have given their power to judge what is good and bad to the sovereign, who, 
through civil law, form a public conscience. So conscience is shared knowledge in that it is 
civil law, open and available to all within a commonwealth. At the same time, Hobbes 
recognizes that some have begun to corrupt the use of ‘conscience’ to refer to their private 
judgments. It is this corrupted use that has led to much suspicion of those who justify their 
actions by appealing to their conscience. If conscience is nothing more than one’s private 
judgment, there is ground for questioning the reliability and authority of conscience, resulting 
in the reinforcement (or dislocation) of the original motive. 
  
1.3 Bishop Butler and the Voice of God 
Commentators have long been aware of Bishop Butler’s influence on Smith’s work, 
and especially with regards to conscience. According to Butler, conscience is a distinct part 
of human nature that has the role of judging other faculties and principles, and so by nature 
holds authority over them. Smith’s discussion of our moral faculties is strikingly similar to 
that of Butler’s. And so it is tempting to view Smith as simply adopting Butler’s account of 
conscience. I think doing so is a mistake. But to see why, we first need to understand Butler’s 
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account of conscience, which I present here. In Chapter 2, I will present Smith’s account, and 
highlight the various points of agreement and disagreement between Butler and Smith.  
Butler’s fullest illustration of conscience comes in the preface and the first three 
sermons of Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1729).23 According to Butler, 
human nature consists of several parts: “[a]ppetites, passions, affections, and the principle of 
reflection” (Sermons Pr.14). The ‘principle of reflection’ is what Butler elsewhere calls 
‘conscience’ (e.g. Sermons Pr.14, Pr.19, Pr.25, 1.8, 2.3, 2.8). However, using ‘conscience’ 
and ‘principle of reflection’ interchangeably is misleading. Appetites, passions, and 
affections are genuine principles, i.e. motive for action: “We are plainly constituted such sort 
of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes 
within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects, and 
in such degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon” (Sermons 1.8, emphasis 
added; also see Sermons 2.8, 2.9, 2.14, and 2.15).24 And in Sermons 1, Butler covers two key 
principles (“tendencies”, “propensions”, “instincts”): self-love and benevolence. But 
conscience is not, strictly speaking, a motive for action. Rather, it is a faculty, “a capacity of 
reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thoughts” (Analogy 
Diss.II.1). This capacity is not one of the other principles mentioned earlier: “There can be no 
doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several principles in the heart of man, carry 
him to society, and to contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which no 
inward principle leads him to evil. These principles, propensions, or instincts which lead him !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel in The Works of Bishop Butler (Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, 1729/2006). Passages from Fifteen Sermons will be referred to by sermon, or preface (‘Pr’), 
and paragraph number, prefaced by Sermons. Passages from The Analogy of Religion (1736/2006) will be 
referred to by chapter, or dissertation (‘Diss’), and paragraph number, prefaced by Analogy. !
24 “Ground of action; motive – e.g. ‘As no principle of vanity led me first to write it, so much less does any such 
motive induce me now to publish it.’ (Wake)” (from Johnson’s Dictionary, 7th ed., 2:201). Samuel Johnson’s 
Dictionary is available in electronic form through the Eighteenth Century Collections Online (ECCO) from 
Gale Digital Collections (gdc.gale.com).!
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to do good are approved by a certain faculty [i.e. conscience] within, quite distinct from these 
propensions themselves” (Sermons 2.2, emphases added). Conscience, then, is properly 
speaking a faculty, and not a principle.25 
Of course in forming judgments, this faculty does motivate a particular course of 
action, but it does so by adding to an existing motive, i.e. an existing appetite, passion, or 
affection. In judging an action right (or wrong), conscience simply affirms (or condemns) a 
motive, resulting in a settling (or unsettling) the original motive: 
 
And that this faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and 
leads them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus, a parent has 
the affection of love to his children: this leads him to take care of, to educate, to make 
due provision for them; the natural affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is 
his proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to do; 
this, added to the affection, becomes a much more settled principle, and carries him 
on through more labor and difficulties for the sake of his children, than he would 
undergo from that affection alone (Sermons 1.8). 
 
The motive to care for one’s child is originally one’s natural affection. Conscience simply 
affirms this motive, to the degree or strength that it is, by judging it to be good. As a result, 
one is assured in moving forward with that original motive, with acting on that natural 
affection. The same is the case if conscience disapproves of an original motive. If one is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 In interpreting conscience as a faculty, and not a principle, I am agreeing with the interpretations of D. D. 
Raphael (1949) and Douglas Langston (2001), among others. It is unclear whether Terence Penelhum (1985) 
and Stephen Darwall (1995) interpret conscience as a faculty. Penelhum primarily uses ‘principle’, and Darwall 
explicitly describes conscience as one of the several motives of action, while at several other times referring to 
it as a faculty. But neither seems to consider the distinction between principle and faculty that I present here. 
There were two primary uses of ‘faculty’ in his time, the former broad and the latter narrow: “[t]he 
power of doing anything; ability; whether corporal or intellectual” and “Powers of the mind, imagination, 
reason, memory” (from Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary, 7th ed., 1:383). In presenting Butler as adopting 
conscience as an “unerring faculty”, Douglas Langston may be understanding ‘faculty’ in the latter, narrower 
sense, what Langston calls ‘substantial entity’ (see Langston 2001). But there is evidence that Butler is using 
faculty in the broader sense. At one point, he compares conscience to the many other ‘natural facult[ies] or 
power[s]’, and does not limit his discussion to distinct ‘Powers of the mind’, including the faculty of speech 
(Sermons 4.7-8). It may be that he moves back and forth between the two uses. I remain neutral on the issue. !
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motivated by excessive self-love to inflict harm on another, conscience would disapprove. 
And in disapproving of this particular motive, one finds discomfort in moving forward with 
this excessive self-love. Thus, through its approving and disapproving, conscience motivates 
actions indirectly by motivating one to change the motive from which one acts. 
Butler’s primary aim in the Sermons is to show that we ought to follow our 
conscience as dictated by our natural constitution. Butler does not say much regarding the 
accuracy of conscience in forming judgments of our other faculties and principles. It is easy 
to think Butler simply assumes that conscience cannot err, given he thinks conscience always 
directs us towards what is good and should always be obeyed (to be discussed below). But as 
we saw with both Bonaventure and Aquinas, we can draw distinctions here between the 
general drive towards the good (which Bonaventure called ‘synderesis’), general (first) moral 
principles, and particular moral judgments derived through reasoning from the more general 
moral principles. And we can hold that conscience provides a general drive towards the good 
and is infallible about the general moral principles without accepting that conscience is 
infallible in the particular moral judgments formed. Butler does not discuss conscience in 
these terms, but may have a picture like this in mind. He recognizes that people do come to 
different moral judgments. They approve and disapprove differently in the same cases. And 
unless Butler is a relativist about moral judgments (which he is not) then at least some of 
these judgments must be erroneous. But Butler attributes these errors not to conscience, but 
rather to the “peculiarities in their own temper” or “the effect of particular customs”, both 
distinct from conscience itself (Sermons 2.1). He also points to inattentiveness as a source of 
differences (Sermons 2.1), which may be akin to errors in reasoning in Bonaventure’s and 
Aquinas’ accounts. But even so, it is unclear whether conscience is erring since, in all these 
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cases, the source of error is something distinct from conscience. In the least, Butler thinks the 
first moral principles, including the imperative that we ought always to obey our conscience 
(see Sermons Pr.26), given by nature, cannot err.26  
Butler continually stresses that conscience by its nature has authority over the other 
faculties and principles.27 This authority is not mere power, which is simply the strength of 
the motive, the way it is for the various appetites, passions, and affections. For instance, right 
now my self-love is much stronger than my benevolence, and so I act out of self-love rather 
than benevolence. But conscience does not necessarily overpower the other motives in this 
manner. Authority is not a matter of the strength; it is a matter of superintendency. 
Conscience has authority the same way that a government has authority over a country, 
regardless of its power to exercise that authority. Conscience is to be considered: 
 
as being superior, as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all 
others: insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without 
taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, 
that is, of the faculty itself: and, to preside and govern, from the very economy and 
constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it 
had manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world (Sermon 2.14). 
 
Each part of the constitution of humans has by its nature a particular role or function.  And 
the role of conscience is to judge other faculties, principles, and actions. (‘Judging’ here 
should be understood broadly to include directing, superintending, presiding, and governing. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The discussion here is limited to creatures with all the different faculties and principles common to “the bulk 
of mankind”. Butler recognizes that there may be individuals who simply lack certain capacities or principles, 
like those “who are in great measure without the natural affections toward their fellow-creatures” and those 
“without the common natural affections to themselves” (Sermons 1.13). Likewise, a person may lack the 
capacity for reflection, i.e. conscience, altogether. But the concern here is explaining the apparent differences in 
judgments of those that seem to have all the same faculties and principles. !
27 Though Butler’s approach in the Sermons is to appeal to human nature to show that we have an obligation to 
obey our conscience, he also thinks we can come to the same conclusion by considering the abstract relations of 
things, similar to Hobbes’ approach (see Sermons Pr.12). !
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By approving and disapproving, conscience is telling, metaphorically, what the other 
principles and faculties to do.) In being placed in this role, conscience is placed in a position 
of authority, just as someone appointed to the position of a judge, in virtue of that 
appointment, has the authority of that office. Because conscience has this function, we cannot 
make sense of it without viewing it as authoritative.28 
Of course, as Stephen Darwall rightly notes, that conscience has this role alone does 
not answer the more important question of whether or not we should obey conscience at all 
times (Darwall 1995, 267-269). Conscience simply has the function of approving and 
disapproving. But why should we change our motives and actions to align with conscience’s 
approvals and disapprovals? Why are we obligated to obey conscience always? The answer 
is that we have an obligation to obey the law of our nature, and the law of our nature is that 
conscience guides and directs us for nature has given conscience that role. Thus, we have an 
obligation to make conscience our guide, i.e. to obey it.29 But this answer needs some 
unpacking. 
First of all, Butler distinguishes between three senses of ‘natural’, from broad to narrow: 
 
[i] “some principle in man, without regard either to the kind or degree of it” 
(Sermons 2.5) 
[ii] “those passions which are strongest, and most influence the actions” (Sermons 
2.6) 
[iii] “What that is in man by which he is naturally a law to himself is explained in 
the following words: Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, 
their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile 
accusing or else excusing one another” (Sermons 2.8) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Admittedly, I am glossing over an important distinction between constitutional order and teleological/ 
functional order (see Darwall 1995, 244-270). It is unclear whether Butler holds this distinction, or if he does 
whether he feels justified in collapsing the two. !
29 Butler summarizes the argument in Sermons 3.9.!
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Under the first sense, anything that is a principle of humans would count as natural. So 
disobeying conscience by acting on a different principle of action would not be unnatural in 
this sense. Under the second sense, whichever principle of action is strongest, and hence the 
one from which we act, would count as natural. But once again, disobeying conscience 
would not be unnatural if the principle of action was simply strong enough. Instead, Butler is 
concerned with giving an account of how following conscience is ‘natural’ in the third sense, 
“in the strictest and most proper sense” (Sermons 2.10). The third sense is a claim about how 
what we ought to do, how we ought to function, as intended by the Author of Nature. It is in 
this sense that disobeying conscience is unnatural, for conscience was intended to guide, 
judge, and direct the other faculties and principles.  
Next, Butler distinguishes between the nature (in this third sense) of the different 
parts of humans and the whole nature of humans. We can speak of each faculty or principle 
as intended for some purpose. For instance, self-love is intended for the preservation of self, 
and benevolence for the benefiting of others. Conscience is intended for judging other 
faculties and principles. But when Butler speaks of an obligation to obey the law of our 
nature, he is referring to our whole nature, which consists not only of the individual parts and 
their roles but also of their relations to one another. And given the parts and their roles, our 
whole nature includes conscience’s exercising authority over the other faculties and 
principles, to adjust and correct for those principles. It is when conscience and the other 
faculties and principles interact in this manner that we are acting in accordance with our 
nature, as the Author of Nature intended, and hence virtuously (Sermons 2.4).  
Finally, Butler assumes that we have an obligation to “act agreeably to the 
constitution of our nature” (Sermons 2.15). He is drawing on teleological accounts of ethics 
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of Ancient philosophers, most explicitly in Sermons 2.4: “And yet the ancients speak of 
deviating from nature as vice, and of following nature so much as a distinction, that 
according to them the perfection of virtue consists therein”. What we ought to do is follow 
our nature, understood in the third sense of what nature has intended for human beings. He is 
also drawing on the writings of St. Paul, who asserts that our moral (or divine) obligations 
are embedded in our human nature (see Sermons 2.4, 2.8). So what Butler means by his 
repeated claims that humans are a law to themselves is that our moral obligations are written 
into our nature, in not only the roles given to each part and their relations to one another, but 
also the way that conscience judges. Like Aquinas and Bonaventure, moral principles are 
innate (though we may not always be aware of them). And for Butler, these principles are 
written in the way that conscience judges, in the fact that conscience approves of some 
motive and not others in various circumstances. Our obligation to our conscience, then, stems 
from our obligation to nature. And so Butler says in response to the question of why we 
should obey our conscience: “Your obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your 
nature. That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of action, is itself alone 
an obligation” (Sermons 3.5).30 
 
1.4 Immanuel Kant and Self-Awareness 
 Though conscience was not a central feature of Kant’s moral theory, he did give 
conscience an important role in our everyday moral life. Conscience is how we recognize 
whether or not we are living up to our duties. And in doing so, it serves as motivation for 
doing what is right. Moreover, a feature of a virtuous person is a highly developed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 I have drawn my interpretation of Butler on the authority of conscience primarily from Raphael (1949) and 
Darwall (1995), but my interpretation is consistent with most others, e.g. O’Brien (1991), Penelhum (1985), 
Sturgeon (1976). !
! 27 
conscience. His account is particularly of interest here because as we shall see it is 
remarkably similar to Smith’s, maybe more so than Butler’s is.31  I will present Kant’s 
account here, which will draw heavily from the most comprehensive presentation of Kant on 
conscience, “Four Conceptions of Conscience” (1998); I will highlight the points of 
divergence between Kant and Smith in the next chapter.32  
In Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines conscience as the “[c]onsciousness of an 
internal court in man (‘before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another’)” (MM 
6:438).33 Kant is drawing on the familiar metaphorical use of conscience as self-awareness, 
in which we are witnesses to ourselves.34 This court includes three figures: the prosecutor, 
the advocate (defense attorney), and the judge. So, it would be a mistake to identify 
conscience with any one of these figures.35 To avoid contradiction, Kant thinks the agent, the 
one under trial in this court, is distinct from the court, and all the figures in the court.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 See Fleischacker 1991. Fleischacker also argues that Kant may have been familiar with Smith’s work in 
ethics. There is clear evidence that Kant was at least familiar with Wealth of Nations, but the extent of his 
familiarity with Smith is unclear. !
32 A similar overview is provided by William Lyons in “Conscience – An Essay in Moral Psychology” (2009). 
He also provides his own model of conscience, one that is similar to Kant’s account in many respects.!
33 Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1797/1996). Passages from Metaphysics of 
Morals will be referred to by volume and page numbers in the Akademie edition, prefaced by MM; and 
passages from Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason by Religion. 
Kant’s account of conscience is dispersed throughout several works: Metaphysics of Morals 6:233-5, 
6:394, 6:400-1, and 6:437-41; Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (6.185-187); Groundwork on the 
Metaphysics of Morals (4:422 and 4:404), and Second Critique (5:98).  I will draw primarily from Metaphysics 
of Morals, and refer to other texts when helpful.!
34 As mentioned earlier, Hobbes recognized this metaphorical use, but did not see it as the proper definition of 
‘conscience’. Thomas Hill, who provides the most comprehensive account of Kant on conscience, gives Kant’s 
account of conscience the title of the “Kantian conception” of conscience. I think this way of labeling Kant’s 
account is grossly misleading, since Kant is adopting a use of ‘conscience’ that was not all too uncommon in the 
17th and 18th centuries. Kant’s account is also remarkably similar to Smith’s, as we shall see later, and there is 
evidence that Kant was familiar with at least some of Smith’s writings. A better way of characterizing Kant’s 
account is as one that was commonplace but adopted to fit into Kant’s wider moral project.!
35 Hence, anytime Kant speaks of conscience as judging, as acquitting and condemning, one should interpret 
Kant as speaking of the judgments rendered by the tribunal after all figures play their role. Hill should be read 
similarly in his presentation of Kant, e.g. “[C]oncience as “an inner judge” that condemns (or acquits) one for 
inadequate (or adequate) effort to live according to one’s best possible, though fallible, judgments about what 
(objectively) one ought to do” (Hill 1998, 16).  
Kant also at times treats conscience as the tribunal instead of a consciousness of this tribunal, for 
instance, when he speaks of conscience as administering a verdict or when he states “the moral self-awareness 
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Now, this original intellectual and (since it is the thought of duty) moral 
predisposition called conscience is peculiar in that, although its business is a business 
of a human being with himself, one constrained by his reason sees himself 
constrained to carry it on as at the bidding of another person…. But to think of a 
human being who is accused by his conscience as one and the same person as the 
judge is an absurd way of representing a court, since then the prosecutor would 
always lose. – For all duties a human being’s conscience will, accordingly, have to 
think of someone other than himself (i.e., other than the human being as such) as the 
judge of his actions, if conscience is not to be in contradiction with itself. This other 
may be an actual person or a merely ideal person that reason creates for itself (MM 
6:438-9). 
 
The court will always conclude in favor of the accused if the accused is also the judge. The 
court, then, must be represented as independent of the accused. Hence, the judge must be a 
projection of an actual or ideal person. This projecting is what leads to our treating the judge 
as an internal representative of God.36 So our awareness of the court is not awareness from 
our playing the role of the various figures in the court, but rather as the accused witnessing 
the court. 
The internal court does not form any moral judgments. Instead, the court takes an 
agent’s moral judgments, whatever it may be, lays them before the her, and determines 
whether or not she lived up to her own standards. As Hill puts it, “[C]onscience presupposes 
but is not the same as ‘moral judgment’ in the sense of ‘drawing from the moral law a more 
determinate specification of our duties’” (Hill 1998, 35). So in being aware of this court, an 
agent is aware of her own moral judgments as well as the court’s verdict on whether or not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of conscience” (MM 6:439). I think these are mere slips, but I am giving greater weight to his formal definition 
of ‘conscience’. But given that Kant is not always consistent in his use of ‘conscience’, it is understandable why 
Hill does not distinguish between conscience as the court and conscience as consciousness (awareness) of this 
court. !
36 “Now since such a moral being [i.e. the projected judge] must also have all power (in heaven and on earth) in 
order to give effect to his laws (as is necessarily required for the office of judge), and since such an omnipotent 
moral being is called God, conscience must be thought of as the subjective principle of being accountable to 
God for all one’s deeds” (MM 6:439).!
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she lived up to her own standards. And this awareness is involuntary: “this authority 
watching over the law in him is not something that he himself (voluntarily) makes, but 
something incorporated into his being” (MM 6:438). Hence, conscience should be 
disconnected from any moral deliberation, reasoning, or judgment (Hill 1998, 23). 
 Under this picture, one can say that conscience can provide us with moral knowledge 
in the sense that we become aware of our own moral judgments and whether or not we lived 
up to those judgments. But presenting conscience as such is not quite accurate. For one, 
conscience is not involved in making the moral judgment, as it was for Bonaventure and 
Aquinas. Conscience does not assent to nor reject any deontic proposition. The moral 
judgment is already made, and conscience simply makes us aware of it. Since conscience 
does not form any moral judgments, conscience cannot err in making moral judgments.37 
Any mistake would be in the forming of the moral judgment, in practical reason, distinct 
from conscience. But more importantly, conscience makes us aware of our moral judgment 
within a process of assessing whether or not we lived up to that judgment. Insofar as 
awareness is a form of knowing, we know our own moral judgments as a byproduct of 
coming to know whether or not we lived up to that those moral judgments. We may have 
already known what is right or wrong, assuming our moral judgment is correct, prior to our 
conscience determining whether or not we have lived up to those standards. So what 
conscience actually provides is not moral knowledge, i.e. knowledge of any deontic 
proposition, but rather knowledge of some empirical fact, of whether or not we acted in 
accordance with our own moral judgment. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Hill notes that there is one way in which we might have an erroneous conscience: “Errors of conscience, if 
there were any, would have to be a matter of failing, even after we raised the question, to recognize either the 
fact that what we intentionally did was (or was not) against our best moral judgment or the fact that we had (or 
had not) exercised due care to determine whether our act was right” (Hill 1998, 35). But Kant does not seem to 
consider this possibility (see MM 6:401).!
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Whether or not we come to the correct moral judgment, conscience motivates us to do 
the right action by inflicting psychological discomfort when we fail to live up to our duties. 
At the same time, this motivation is a mere psychological fact; we are not obligated to obey 
our conscience. For one, conscience is not the proper motive for doing the right action. If we 
do what is right out of fear of our conscience, then we are doing the right action for fear of 
the psychological discomfort resulting from the tribunal’s decision. However, such a motive 
would be no different from obeying the law for fear of criminal prosecution, which would be 
the wrong motivation for Kant. It is true that conscience makes us aware of our duties in 
assessing whether or not we lived up to those duties. So, conscience often, if not always, 
comes with awareness of one’s duties. But there is a difference between doing what is right 
for the sake of those duties and doing what is right for the fear of psychological sanctions by 
conscience (Hill 2002, 352). If by “acting from conscience”, one is acting from a desire to 
avoid the pangs of conscience, then one is not acting for the right reason. But if by “acting 
from conscience”, one is acting out of respect for the moral law which one is aware of 
through conscience, then one is acting for the right reason. But then the motive is not 
conscience, but rather a respect for the moral law. 
Also, if we had a duty to obey our conscience, then we would need some mechanism 
for determining whether or not we lived up to such a duty. But conscience is that mechanism. 
What we would need, then, is a second conscience to determine whether or not we lived up 
to the duty to obey our conscience, and yet a third conscience to determine whether or not we 
lived up to the duty to obey our second conscience, and so on (MM 6:401). Conscience 
simply does not operate in this manner. It speaks “involuntarily and unavoidably”, and we 
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can choose whether or not to heed to its judgment by acting from duty. But there is no 
additional duty to obey conscience, only a duty to obey the moral law.  
Though we have no duty to obey our conscience, Kant thinks we have a duty to 
cultivate our conscience, “to sharpen one’s attentiveness to the voice of the inner judge and 
to use every means to obtain a hearing for it” (MM 6:401). Why might this be? According to 
Kant, we have a more general duty to cultivate virtue. Virtue is “the strength of man’s 
maxims in fulfilling his duty”, but done freely, “in accordance with a principle of inner 
freedom, and so through the mere representation of one’s duty in accordance with its formal 
law” (MM 6:394). In other words, virtue is based on “the capacity to master one’s 
inclinations when they rebel against the law” (MM 6:383). Conscience is crucial for 
cultivating this capacity for free self-constraint because it lays our duties before us and shows 
us when we have failed to live up to them so that we can better ourselves by freely correcting 
for our failings and aligning ourselves with our duties.38 And thus, the first command of all 
duties to oneself is “know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself”, your “heart” or the maxim from 
which you act (MM 6:441), because it is only when we know whether or not we are living up 
to our duties that we are able to improve ourselves and cultivate virtue. Kant, then, thinks 
that though conscience is not authoritative in that we have no obligation to obey it, we still 
have an obligation to cultivate our conscience so that we can fulfill our duty to cultivate 
virtue.  
Kant, then, takes conscience to be the judging of oneself, restricted to whether or not 
one has acted in accordance with one’s duties. And unlike Aquinas, Bonaventure and Butler, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Kant makes a similar claim in Religion when he states the one who seeks comfort from “moral sufferings, the 
reproaches of their conscience” should have one’s conscience “stirred up and sharpened, in order that whatever 
good yet to be done, or whatever consequences of past evil still left to be undone (repaired for), will not be 
neglected, in accordance with the warning” (Religion 6:78 footnote). !
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Kant does not think we have a duty to obey our conscience. However, we have a duty to 
cultivate our conscience, to sharpen it and make it more attentive, because doing so is 
necessary for cultivating virtue. As we shall see, this connection between conscience and 
virtue is an ever-present theme in Smith’s moral theory.  
 
1.5 John Stuart Mill and the Sense of Duty 
In Chapter 3 of Utilitarianism, Mill provides a brief account of conscience and its 
authority. The aim of this chapter is to give a general account of the binding force of the 
moral duties (i.e. the principle of utility) laid out in the earlier chapters: “What is its 
sanction? what are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, what is the source of its 
obligation? whence does it derive its binding force?” (U 3.1).39 There are external sanctions 
like the disapprobation of others and punishment under the law that motivate us to do our 
duty. But he spends most of his energy on the internal sanction of duty: 
 
The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the 
same—a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation 
of duty, which in properly-cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, 
into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and 
connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, 
or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience (U 
3.4). 
 
Once we understand our duties, we tend to feel pain whenever we violate those duties. And 
when this pain is from the simple recognition that we violated a duty (generally, not any 
particular duty), then that feeling is conscience. For instance, suppose that according to the 
principle of utility, I have a duty to give $100 to Oxfam, but I decide to buy a new pair of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1863/1998). Passages from Utilitarianism will be referred 
to by chapter and paragraph number, prefaced by U. !
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shoes. But when I realize that I did not do my duty, I feel terrible. This feeling is connected 
to the thought that I violated a duty, not the duty to give to Oxfam in this particular situation 
but rather any duty; this feeling is conscience. Conscience, then, is nothing more than a 
“subjective feeling in our own mind” associated with the idea of duty. So Mill is equating 
conscience to the pangs of conscience, the feelings of guilt or remorse we have when we 
realize we did not do what we ought to do.40 
 For Mill, conscience is not necessarily the source of moral knowledge. Though 
conscience relies on an awareness, belief, or knowledge of one’s duty, conscience itself is a 
particular kind of feeling in response to the recognition of violating one’s duty. This affective 
response can bring to awareness various duties of which we were previously unaware. But 
conscience is not the awareness nor does it need to provide awareness. It is rather a particular 
kind of feeling in response to what we take to be our duties. In this way, his account is 
similar to Bonaventure’s synderesis: that spark of conscience that moves us towards what is 
good. Moreover, like Bonaventure, who thought synderesis motivated in virtue of its being a 
dictate of practical reason (which instructs a person on what to do), Mill thinks conscience 
motivates because it is an affective response to the violation of one’s duty. However, for 
Bonaventure, the dictate of practical reason itself is the motivating force, whereas for Mill, 
the affective response to such a dictate is the motivating force. Furthermore, whereas !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 In a letter to W. G. Ward (1859), Mill draws a distinction between two similar feelings based on whether or 
not the feeling is caused by something internal to oneself: 
The pains of conscience are certainly very different from those of dread of disapprobation; yet it might 
well be, that the innumerable associations of pain with doing wrong which have been riveted by a long 
succession of pains undergone, or pains feared or imagined as the consequence of wrong things done, 
or of wrong things which we have been tempted to do (especially in early life), may produce a general 
and intense feeling of recoil from wrongdoing in which no conscious influence of other people’s 
disapprobation may be perceptible (Mill from The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill Vol. 15 Letter 
423).  
The “pains of conscience” is distinct from the “dread of disapprobation” because the former is essentially an 
internal sanction, caused by one’s recognition of one’s own violation of a duty, whereas the latter is an external 
sanction, caused by the presence of external observers. !
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Bonaventure thought synderesis was innate and can never be extinguished, Mill leaves open 
the question of whether or not conscience is innate or acquired (see U 3.7-8), and believes 
that some may not have this feeling. 
In the early accounts of conscience, we are bound to the dictates of conscience 
because it is or provides knowledge of what we ought to do, which are commandments of 
God or morality. In other words, the authority of conscience is derived from its providing 
moral knowledge. But for Mill, conscience does not necessarily have any connection to 
moral knowledge. Whether what we take to be duties align with our actual duties (in 
accordance with the principle of utility) depends on our training.41 Furthermore, even if 
conscience provides awareness of what to do, its authority is not derived from providing 
awareness of our duties. Rather, its “binding force” is derived from its being a feeling: 
 
Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must 
be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we 
do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards 
in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of 
conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it (U 3.4) 
 
The binding force of conscience is no different than the external sanctions of punishment. 
We are bound to do our duty because doing otherwise is difficult: we are faced with (the 
prospect of) strong negative feelings. Conscience serves to prevent us from acting against our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 “Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural 
outgrowth from it; capable, like them, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously; and susceptible 
of being bought by cultivation to a high degree of development. Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient 
use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction: 
so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of these influences, be 
made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience” (U 3.8). So what we take to be our duties 
will be more or less accurate depending on our upbringing. But Mill also thinks that there is a “powerful natural 
sentiment” that directs our moral development toward the acceptance of the principle of utility: “the social 
feelings of man; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in 
human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from 
the influences of advancing civilization” (U 3.10).  
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duty through its intensely negative feeling that we would rather avoid. The stronger this 
feeling is, the more binding force we feel when considering acting against our duty. Of 
course, this force is only felt by those who actually have this negative emotion: “this sanction 
has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to” (U 3.5). So if 
a person lacks a conscience, in Mill’s sense, then she feels no remorse in violating her duty, 
and will not feel bound to do her duty in the way that someone with a conscience would. 
Now, we might find this account problematic. Since there is no binding force on those 
who do not have a conscience, then there is nothing we can say to them when they ask why 
they should do their duty. We can point to external sanctions, like fines or imprisonment, but 
nothing beyond that, nothing internal to the agent. But for Mill, this is not a problem. For 
one, he seems to treat these cases as limited in scope. Most people do have this feeling. At 
one point, he refers to it as “the conscientious feelings of mankind”, and then points out “the 
feelings exist, a fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the great power with which 
they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are proved by 
experience (U 3.5, emphasis added). He also thinks that this feeling is founded in a powerful, 
shared natural sentiment: “the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our 
fellow creatures” (U 3.8). Mill is speaking specifically of the principle of utility, but he is 
also pointing out in this section that as a generalization, people share this social sentiment. 
This sentiment is the source of the feelings of duty, i.e. conscience. So even if there are 
instances in which people are devoid of conscience, he thinks these are the exceptions.  
Furthermore, Mill thinks he is in no worse position than any other moral theory 
because for people without conscience, no internal sanction will motivate: “On them morality 
of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions” (U 3.5). If upon recognizing her 
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duty however understood, an agent does not feel bound to do her duty, then there is no 
internal sanction at all regardless of whatever moral theory she adopts, utilitarianism or 
otherwise. Since conscience is a feeling connected to the thought of duty generally, if an 
agent lacks this feeling, then she lacks any motivational force to do her duty generally. Like 
Hume, Mill thinks that feelings are required for someone to be motivated to act; reason alone 
cannot motivate. If reason alone could motivate, then conscience, a feeling, would not be 
necessary; the recognition that some action is required by duty is sufficient for motivating 
action. But it is clear that Mill thinks some feeling is necessary to motivate action. And 
because conscience is a feeling associated with duty generally, apart from the particular 
moral theory one holds, failing to have a conscience means one just does not have that 
internal sanction, no sense of duty, no feeling ‘binding one’ to do one’s duty. 
 There is also a slightly different worry that Mill recognizes. If we realize that moral 
obligations are not rooted in some “transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging to the 
province of ‘Things in themselves’”, but rather in a mere feeling, then we might not be 
motivated to do our duty (U 3.6):  
 
[I]f a person is able to say to himself, This which is restraining me, and which is 
called my conscience, is only a feeling in my own mind, he may possibly draw the 
conclusion that when the feeling ceases the obligation ceases, and that if he find the 
feeling inconvenient, he may disregard it, and endeavour to get rid of it (U 3.6). 
 
So then for conscience to be effective in motivating us to do our duty, we cannot be aware 
that conscience is a mere feeling. By realizing that conscience is but a feeling, we might then 
come to question its authority and fail to be motivated to do our duty. But Mill is quite 
skeptical that realizing that conscience is a feeling somehow reduces its efficacy:  
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Does the belief that moral obligation has its seat outside the mind make the feeling of 
it too strong to be got rid of? The fact is so far otherwise, that all moralists admit and 
lament the ease with which, in the generality of minds, conscience can be silenced or 
stifled. The question, Need I obey my conscience is quite as often put to themselves 
by persons who never heard of the principle of utility, as by its adherents. Those 
whose conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow of their asking this question, if 
they answer it affirmatively, will not do so because they believe in the transcendental 
theory, but because of the external sanctions (U 3.6). 
 
Even if we recognize that our conscience is a feeling, we cannot simply turn it off. We still 
feel guilt and remorse when we realize we did not do our duty. And those feelings continue 
to motivate us to act in a particular way, even if we realize that they are but feelings. In fact, 
for Mill, the only ones who can even question their consciences are those with weak, or non-
existent, consciences. Now this claim might be an overstatement; those with strong 
consciences can still doubt whether they should act in accordance with them on the grounds 
that they recognize that their consciences are but feelings. But Mill’s point is that it is a 
mistake to think that conscience would somehow fail to be motivating if we did not also 
believe that moral obligation is a transcendental fact.  
 Mill, then, is focusing on conscience as a negative feeling, an internal punishment, 
that arises when we consider acting against our duty or when we recognize that we have not 
done our duty. In this way, conscience motivates us, just like punishments (or threat of 
punishments) by law or the disapprobation of others motivates us, to do our duty. There is 
nothing that binds us to our duties other than our feelings arising in response to these 
potential or actual sanctions. By treating conscience as a particular kind of feeling, Mill 
represents break from prior accounts that attempt to ground conscience strictly in practical 
reason. For Mill, though conscience relies on practical reason, insofar as practical reason 
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provides awareness or knowledge of our duties, it is part of the affective faculty that 
responds to practical reason.  
 
1.6 Sigmund Freud and Psychoanalytics 
In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud provides a detailed account of conscience. 
He does so in two stages: he first presents the origins of conscience, and then specifies some 
subtle distinctions between ‘conscience’, ‘super-ego’, and other related terms.42 If one 
focuses on the first description of conscience, one will be led to think that conscience is the 
super-ego, a faculty of the mind. But in his second explanation, Freud recognizes that he has 
been far too loose with his remarks, and so highlights some subtle differences between these 
concepts, including conscience, which is a function of the superego, not the superego itself. 
In what follows, I will try to elaborate on the subtle, yet important, distinction that has so 
often been overlooked in the literature to bring a more accurate picture of what conscience is 
in Freud’s theory.43 
At the beginning of Chapter 7 of Civilization and its Discontents, Freud claims his 
aim in the chapter is to give “the history of the development of the individual” (Civ 83-84), 
but he is essentially giving an account of the development of the superego and conscience. 
The question he is trying address is: “What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit 
the aggressiveness which opposes it, to make it harmless, to get rid of it, perhaps?” (Civ 83). 
By ‘aggression’, Freud is referring to sadism, in which one desires the exercising of power, 
of control and mastery, over another. Such a desire, if fulfilled, would be harmful to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Civilization and its Discontents (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1930/1989). Passages from 
Civilization and its Discontent will be referred to by page number, prefaced by Civ. !
43 More recently, Langston (2001) interprets Freud as stating conscience is a faculty. Langston then claims the 
decline in the discussion of conscience is a result of the failure to locate this faculty.!
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sustaining of a civilization, which requires that people live, to a large extent, in harmony. 
Now, initially, civilization uses external force to keep individuals from being aggressive. In 
the civilization’s inhibiting aggression in individuals, those individuals begin to turn their 
aggression, which can no longer be directed toward others, in toward themselves. To do so, 
one sets aside a part of one’s ego to become the ‘super-ego’, “in the form of conscience”, 
which exercises aggression against the ego.44 The aggression that was once directed at others 
to satisfy the ego is now directed at oneself so as to exercise control over oneself. Thus, the 
civilization need not exercise control for one now controls oneself such that one’s aggression 
is not directed outward endangering others (Civ 84).  
 With the forming of a super-ego, we are now faced with internal tension whenever 
our ego conflicts with our super-ego. The super-ego demands one course of action, while the 
ego desires another. The result of such tension is the sense of guilt, which “expresses itself as 
a need for punishment” (Civ 84). Now all tensions between the super-ego and the ego will 
require that one did or intended to do something that one recognizes as ‘bad’ or ‘sinful’ (Civ 
84). And so the sense of guilt “presupposes that one has already recognized that what is bad 
is reprehensible, is something that must not be carried out” (Civ 84). So the moral judgment 
is presupposed, and the sense of guilt is merely a product of the tension between the super-
ego, which presents that judgment, and the ego, which fails to act or to intend to act in 
accordance with that judgment. Freud’s account of the sense of guilt, then, resembles Kant’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 “His aggressiveness is introjected, internalized; it is, in point of fact, sent back to where it came from – that 
is, it is directed towards his own ego. There it is taken over by a portion of the ego, which sets itself over against 
the rest of the ego as super-ego, and which now, in the form of ‘conscience’, is ready to put into action against 
the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous 
individuals (Civ 84). 
 Given that the super-ego is a product of the development of an individual and not innate, one might 
think that the super-ego is not what I call a Faculty. Though it is true that historically, Faculty is often thought 
to be one of several innate Powers of the mind, it need not be. The Powers may be cultivated to some degree 
through experience. But I will leave this discussion to the side, and use ‘faculty’ to refer to any capacity.!
! 40 
account of conscience, in which conscience simply makes one aware of whether or not one 
lived up to one’s own moral standards. The difference is that for Freud, this awareness only 
occurs when there is a tension or conflict between the ego and super-ego. Thus, the process 
only involves the negative feeling of guilt and never the corresponding positive feeling, 
praise, when one does live up to one’s own moral standards.  
 At this stage, the super-ego simply controls the ego out of the fear of punishment 
from civilization. So, the super-ego is only concerned with controlling the ego insofar as one 
is able to avoid punishment. If one can avoid punishment, then the super-ego does not control 
and prevent the ego from exercising aggression. The internal tension that results in the sense 
of guilt only arises when the super-ego recognizes that the ego is driving one to do something 
that will result in external punishment. Moreover, because the super-ego is checking the 
aggression of the ego to avoid the punishment from civilization, what is ‘bad’ or ‘sinful’ that 
is presupposed by the sense of guilt is merely ‘bad’ or ‘sinful’ according to civilization.  
 But the super-ego does not stop at this stage:  
 
A great change takes place only when the authority is internalized through the 
establishment of a super-ego. The phenomena of conscience then reach a higher 
stage. Actually, it is not until now that we should speak of conscience or a sense of 
guilt. At this point, too, the fear of being found out comes to an end; the distinction, 
moreover, between doing something bad and wishing to do it disappears entirely, 
since nothing can be hidden from the super-ego, not even thoughts (Civ 86, emphasis 
added). 
 
When the super-ego is initially formed, the super-ego controls the ego so as to avoid external 
punishment. Because the civilization only has direct access to what one does, the super-ego 
initially shows aggression based on what the ego does. But because the super-ego has access 
to all the intentions of the ego as well, eventually, the super-ego shows aggression toward the 
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ego for the intention alone. Thus, though the super-ego reflects the standards of civilization, 
it acts apart from civilization, enacting aggression when civilization would not. And it is only 
when the super-ego gains this independence from civilization, enacting aggression on the ego 
regardless of the possibility of external punishment, that we have conscience, and the sense 
of guilt, proper.  
 Thus, we conclude Freud’s initial presentation of conscience and its formation. The 
discussion so far presents conscience as the super-ego, a faculty formed from a part of the 
ego to direct aggression inward, and one that eventually gains independence from the fear of 
external punishment. Freud, then, seems to hold an account quite similar to Butler’s, in which 
conscience is the capacity to reflect on one’s own intentions and actions and approve and 
disapprove of them. But unlike Butler, conscience is not an innate faculty, but rather obtained 
through experience with the rest of society. But as Freud himself recognizes, he has been, 
thus far, too loose with his language.45 And so he tries to clarify his account of conscience 
and all the related concepts: 
 
The super-ego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a 
function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function 
consists in keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging 
them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the super-ego, is 
thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the 
ego has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the tension between its 
own strivings and the demands of the super-ego…. We ought not to speak of a 
conscience until a super-ego is demonstrably present. As to the sense of guilt, we 
must admit that it is in existence before the super-ego, and therefore before 
conscience, too. At that time it is the immediate expression of fear of the external 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 “Though it cannot be of great importance, it may not be superfluous to elucidate the meaning of a few words 
such as ‘super-ego’, ‘conscience’, ‘sense of guilt’, ‘need for punishment’ and ‘remorse’, which we have often, 
perhaps, used too loosely and interchangeably. They all relate to the same state of affairs, but denote different 
aspects of it” (Civ 100).!
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authority, a recognition of the tension between the ego and that authority (Civ 100-
101).46 
 
This passage makes a few things clear. For one, conscience is not the same as the super-ego. 
Conscience is a function of the superego. And this function is to watch over the ego and to 
judge it. Thus, we should not speak of a conscience unless the super-ego is “demonstrably 
present”, i.e. functioning. The sense of guilt, a feeling, is the perception of the tension 
between the ego and the (what once was external, but now) internal authority, i.e. super-ego. 
The greater the gap between the super-ego’s demands and the ego’s intent, the stronger the 
sense of guilt will be. But the sense of guilt is a product of conscience, not the conscience 
itself.  
 Freud’s primary aim is not to give a moral theory, and so has nothing to say about the 
reliability of conscience in obtaining moral knowledge. But he does give an explanation for 
how we do form moral judgments. Unlike Bonaventure and Aquinas, Freud rejects the 
existence of any innate access to the first principles of morality, from which one can come to 
more particular moral judgments (Civ 84). Rather, the super-ego is influenced by something 
external to it that shapes its standard of judging what is good or bad to something different 
from the ego’s. This influence is civilization. Hence, the super-ego is influenced by and often 
simply adopts the moral standards of civilization, whatever they are. But this account of the 
origin of conscience alone says nothing of the reliability of conscience as a moral guide, as a 
source of moral knowledge. So unless Freud is a cultural relativist, his account of conscience 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Though Freud is most explicit of these subtle distinctions here, he does make some attempt to draw them 
earlier in his work. For instance, he distinguishes conscience from the sense of guilt when he says “conscience – 
the readiness to feel guilty” (Civ 94). But Frued is right to note that he has been inaccurate in his usage of these 
terms throughout, e.g. “For it tells us that conscience (or more correctly, the anxiety which later becomes 
conscience)” (Civ 90).!
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does not determine whether or not conscience is a reliable way of obtaining moral 
knowledge.47 
 More interesting is Freud’s description of the authority of conscience. Like Mill, 
Freud thinks there is nothing more to the authority of conscience than its motivational force. 
Though, like Mill, Freud takes the motivating force of conscience to be the sense of guilt, 
Freud thinks the sense of guilt is grounded in a more general feeling: the fear of the loss of 
love, specifically the love of those with the power to protect or to punish. Externally, this 
being would be other individuals with greater power, including the governing body and the 
rest of civilization. Internally, it would be the super-ego, which through conscience can 
punish with a strong sense of guilt.48 So we are motivated to obey conscience because we are 
afraid of its punishment, i.e. guilt, but we fear this punishment because we want to retain the 
love of conscience. The punishment, guilt, is an indication that we have or will lose the love 
of conscience. Moreover, like Mill, the sense  of guilt influences action only to the degree 
that it is felt. The greater the tension between the ego and super-ego, the greater the sense of 
guilt will be because the greater threat to the loss of love is. And the greater the sense of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Freud’s account is more or less what Hill calls the ‘Extreme Cultural Relativist (ECR)’ conception of 
conscience, except under ECR, conscience is identified as the feeling, i.e. the sense of guilt, and not the function 
of a faculty (Hill 1998, 21-23). In a footnote, Hill points to Ryle’s account (Ryle 1940) as an example of ECR 
(Hill 1998, 44 fn. 16), but one can just as easily point to Freud. To be careful, though, it is unclear whether 
Freud is a cultural relativist, a moral nihilist, or neither. And though he sees the function of ethics as a way to 
maintain civilization, to protect it from the aggressiveness of individuals, he avoids making any value 
judgments about whether or not we should maintain civilization in this way, or whether or not some 
civilizations or the species as a whole is suffering from a kind of ‘neurosis’ (Civ 110-112). !
48 “Since a person’s own feelings would not have led him along this path, he must have had a motive for 
submitting to this extraneous influence. Such a motive is easily discovered in his helplessness and his 
dependence on other people, and it can best be designated as fear of loss of love. If he loses the love of another 
person upon whom he is dependent, he also ceases to be protected from a variety of dangers. Above all, he is 
exposed to the danger that this stronger person will show his superiority in the form of punishment. At the 
beginning, therefore, what is bad is whatever causes one to be threatened with loss of love. For fear of that loss, 
one must avoid it. This, too, is the reason why it makes little difference whether one has already done the bad 
thing or only intends to do it. In either case the danger only sets in if and when the authority discovers it, and in 
either case the authority would behave in the same way” (Civ 85).!
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guilt, the more likely one is to act in accordance with the super-ego to avoid guilt, and hence 
avoid the threat of loss of love. 
 But as I said, Freud is not giving a moral theory, and so has nothing to say on whether 
or not we should follow our conscience and act to avoid the sense of guilt. He just claims that 
we do and to varying degrees depending on the strength of the super-ego. However, Freud 
does note that we identify the virtuous person with the one that has a more vigilant super-
ego, which produces a stronger sense of guilt: 
 
For the more virtuous a man is, the more severe and distrustful is its behaviour, so 
that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness furthest who 
reproach themselves with the worst sinfulness. This means that virtue forfeits some 
part of its promised reward; the docile and continent ego does not enjoy the trust of its 
mentor, and strives in vain, it would seem, to acquire it. The objection will at once be 
made that these difficulties are artificial ones, and it will be said that a stricter and 
more vigilant conscience is precisely the hallmark of a moral man (Civ 86-87). 
 
The mark of (what people or society consider to be) a virtuous person is a “stricter and more 
vigilant conscience”. This characterization of a virtuous person is the same as that of Kant 
(and as we shall see, of Smith as well). 
 
1.7 C. D. Broad and Contemporary Psychology 
Conscience is still discussed today in both psychology and philosophy. But there is 
still little consensus on exactly what conscience is. More recent approaches draw on C. D. 
Broad’s view of conscience as a multifaceted phenomenon, which tries to capture the wide 
array of claims we make about conscience.49 Broad thinks it is more helpful to focus on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 See Koops, Brugman, and Ferguson (2010) for an overview of the use of Broad’s conception of conscience in 
contemporary psychology. Alternatively, Grusec applies Freud’s account of conscience in contemporary 
psychology (Grusec 2006). 
! 45 
conscience as it is experienced by people. He therefore aims to describe the phenomenology 
of conscience: 
 
To say that a person “has a Conscience,” when this phrase is used in its widest sense, 
is equivalent to asserting the following three closely connected propositions about 
him. (1) That he has and exercises the cognitive power of reflecting on his own past 
and future actions, and considering whether they are right or wrong; of reflecting on 
his own motives, intentions, emotions, dispositions, and character, and considering 
whether they are morally good or bad; and of reflecting on the relative moral value of 
various alternative ideals of character and conduct. (2) That he has and exercises the 
emotional disposition to feel certain peculiar emotions, such as remorse, feeling of 
guilt, moral approval, etc., towards himself and his own actions, dispositions, etc., in 
respect of the moral characteristics which he believes these to have. (3) That he has 
and exercises the conative disposition to seek what he believes to be good and to shun 
what he believes to be bad, as such, and to do what he believes to be right and avoid 
what he believes to be wrong, as such (Broad 1940, 118).  
 
This experiencing of one’s conscience involves various dispositions: cognitive, affective, and 
conative. These dispositions can work in conjunction with one another or in sequence by 
influencing one another. Conscience, then, is “a system of cognitive, emotional, and conative 
dispositions, and it is only when these dispositions are in operation that we have 
‘conscientious action’ (Broad 1940, 125). Conscience, then, is not a distinct faculty (in 
Butler’s sense), nor does it involve particular faculties at any given time. Rather, conscience 
is a complex system of dispositions, in which at different times these dispositions are active 
in different sequences and combinations to different degrees. Hence, conscience is 
experienced in different ways depending on the specific dispositions active at that particular 
time.50 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Langston adopts Broad’s definition and uses it to explain why conscience is central to virtue (see Langston 
2001).  
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In this chapter, I have presented different accounts of conscience and did nothing in 
the way of assessing their viability. And I do not wish to do so in any great detail here. But I 
do want to point out a general worry with these multifaceted approaches because it explains 
my motivation for abandoning contemporary approaches and tracing the history of 
conscience to find a more viable alternative. My worry is not novel. As Peter Fuss pointed 
out in his response to Broad, if we define ‘conscience’ in this broad sense, the term covers 
too much. Instead of denoting a feature of a human’s moral psychology, it would seem to 
refer to the general capacity to be a moral being (Fuss 1964, 114). Conscience is responsible 
for moral judgments, moral feelings, and resulting moral actions. But discussion of 
conscience was not and is not aimed at capturing such a wide spectrum of experiences. 
Rather, the different approaches to characterizing conscience were attempts to capture a more 
particular phenomenon: our immediate awareness, knowledge, or belief of what is right to do 
in a particular situation, which also seems to strongly motivate us to act in accordance with 
that awareness, knowledge, or belief. 
Of course, conscience is associated with a wide range of experiences. Most medieval 
thinkers thought that though conscience was a part of practical reason, it was also closely tied 
to the general desire to do what is good. But conscience did not include both reason and 
sentiments. Rather, conscience was a part of reason, and interacted with certain desires to 
give rise to right action. Freud thought that conscience was closely connected to feelings of 
guilt. But he distinguished between conscience and the feelings that resulted from 
conscience. What we need, then, is not a definition that simply includes cognitive, affective, 
and conative elements and leaves open the relationship among them as well as the degree to 
which each is active. We need a more systematic approach that explains exactly how each 
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element is connected to the other and where conscience is in the midst of these components, 
like the accounts provided by Aquinas, Bonaventure, Kant, and Freud. If the argument is that 
conscience involves all three components, then we need a better account of exactly how these 
components come together to form conscience, distinct from other components of a mature 
moral psychology.  
 
1.8 Core Features of Conscience 
As varied as these account are, we can notice a set of features that all accounts are 
attempting explain. Conscience was first and foremost thought to be something, whether a 
function or a special faculty, that provided moral knowledge. Conscience “tells” us what is 
right or wrong to do, what we ought or ought not to do. Even skeptics of conscience as a 
(reliable) source of moral knowledge, like Freud, attempt to explain why it at least seems to 
an agent that her conscience is providing moral knowledge.  
Moreover, the moral knowledge that conscience gives is not of general principles, but 
rather of the particular case at hand. Though a few, like Bonaventure, claim conscience also 
provides moral knowledge of general moral principles, all are in agreement that conscience 
speaks to our present situation. For Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Hobbes, this process involved 
applying general moral principles to a particular situation. For Butler, conscience judged 
other faculties for how it functions in that specific instance. For Kant, conscience presents us 
with how we failed in some particular action to live up to our own moral standard. Even if 
we reduce conscience to some feeling, e.g. the feeling of guilt, that feeling is a response to a 
particular situation and a particular deed, e.g. I feel guilty about stealing money from my 
parents yesterday. 
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We can also see that among those who thought conscience provided moral 
knowledge, conscience was always believed to be fallible in its assessment of particular 
situations. All of the medieval writers thought conscience can err. Their primary struggle was 
in explaining why it is that we should or should not follow conscience in those cases in 
which conscience errs. Similarly, Hobbes thought that we can err in our moral judgments of 
particulars because we can err in reasoning from general principles to particular applications, 
from definitions to particular instances of those definitions. The notion that conscience must 
be inerrant simply does not fit with the historical development of conscience.  
Though conscience is thought to be possessed by most people, each person only has direct, 
privileged access to her own conscience. Just as I cannot experience your feelings of pain 
directly, but must assume them based on your behavior or your situation, I cannot experience 
your conscience as you experience it. I can of course infer that you are experiencing 
conscience, say in your behavior or in my conversations with you. But I cannot experience 
your pangs of conscience; I cannot experience your awareness of what you ought to do the 
way you are experiencing it. Conscience is a kind of private consciousness; it is a 
phenomenological experience that only the one with that conscience can experience. It is this 
feature of conscience that gave rise to skepticism about conscience as a source of moral 
knowledge, e.g. for Hobbes and Freud.51 
Conscience also makes us aware of what we have done with respect to some moral 
standard. Kant’s account of conscience reduces conscience to making us aware of how we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 An example of an account of conscience that allows both an agent and a spectator to have the same access to 
the agent’s conscience is Lynn Stout’s definition of conscience as “unselfish prosocial behavior” (Stout 2010, 
12, emphasis added).There is no privileged access that the agent has to her own conscience, for if her 
conscience is her behavior, then others have the same access to her behaviors (e.g. by seeing what she does) as 
she does to her own behaviors. But this account strays far too much from any common conception of 
conscience, in which conscience is a private experience. Behavior may be one way we can infer the presence 
and operation of another’s conscience, but under no common conception of conscience do we have the same 
access to another’s conscience the way we do have to our own. !
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have done or what we should do with respect to our own moral standard. But all other 
accounts present us with conscience as a consciousness, either in the form of knowledge or 
feeling, of what is right and wrong, and whether we are in fact doing what is right and wrong. 
For instance, according to Mill, our sense of duty makes us aware of what is right to do, and 
that if we do otherwise, we are violating that standard. For Freud, conscience makes us aware 
of our shortcomings in abiding by the moral code through the feeling of guilt.  
Finally, conscience motivates behaviors. Often, this motivation comes through the 
feelings of guilt or shame, or feelings of tranquility and self-content. And the motivation can 
be of varying degrees, sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker. But if one has a 
conscience, it cannot simply be ignored because it directs us to a particular course of action 
over another; it motivates because it prescribes. Even under an account in which conscience 
simply provides knowledge, this knowledge is of what we ought to do or what we should 
have done in a given situation.  
So, to summarize, the core features of conscience that any account of conscience 
must address are: 
 
[1] Conscience at least seems to provide moral knowledge, i.e. knowledge of what 
is good, right, or proper.  
[2] Conscience involves judgments of particulars, that some particular feeling, 
intention, or action is good, right, or proper in some particular instance.  
[3] Conscience is not infallible; we are capable of doubting our own conscience, 
and admit that our conscience can be mistaken, at least with regard to 
particular moral judgments. 
[4] Conscience is private in that one has direct access only to one’s own 
conscience. 
[5] Conscience is like a judge or witness in that it makes us aware of what we 
have done with respect to some moral standard. 
[6] Conscience motivates certain behaviors, specifically through emotions like 
guilt and shame, as well as tranquility and self-content. 
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In the following chapters, I present Smith’s account of conscience; one that I will argue 
plausibly includes all of these features. Smith’s account is interesting for several reasons. 
First, like Butler, he places conscience at the center of his moral theory and at the center of a 
virtuous person. But Smith provides a more plausible account of the source of conscience’s 
authority and why conscience is crucial for the virtuous person. Second, there were a variety 
of uses of ‘conscience’ during Smith’s time, and Smith in many ways brings these divergent 
views together. So prior to C. D. Broad, Smith brought together the cognitive, affective, and 
conative aspects associated with conscience. But Smith did so in a way that allows for a 
useful working definition, one that is not overly-inclusive in the way Broad’s definition is. 
Finally, Smith is in many ways returning to the original dual-meaning of ‘conscience’ as both 
a private and a shared consciousness. In one sense, conscience is private in that the agent 
only has direct, privileged access to her own conscience. But in another sense, conscience is 
shared, not only in that (most) all have a conscience, but also in that our consciences operate 
similarly, coming to similar moral judgments or arising in response to similar actions in 
similar situations. It is because of the shared nature of conscience that we are able to assess 
the quality of another’s conscience, even though we do not have direct access to it. 
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2 
 
 
From Judging Others to Judging Ourselves: Conscience as Reflective Agent 
 
In everything do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and 
the prophets. 
 
Matthew 7:12 (NRSV)  
 
 
 Conscience is often characterized as an inner voice that speaks to us. And this 
speaker, it is claimed, is independent of the agent. It is an angel on our shoulder, speaking on 
behalf of God; it is Jiminy Cricket; it is the Freudian superego, an internalization of our 
parents or society. Some interpret Adam Smith along similar lines: conscience (or what 
Smith calls ‘the supposed impartial spectator’52) is an internalized prototype of the ideal 
impartial spectator. This prototype is built up from our experiences of our judging others and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 In his writings, Smith does not explicitly state that ‘conscience’!refers to the supposed impartial spectator. 
However, he does use ‘conscience’!and ‘supposed impartial spectator’!interchangeably (e.g. TMS 3.1.3.1 and 
3.1.2.32). Some commentators seem to imply some distinction between conscience and the supposed impartial 
spectator. For instance, at one point, Raphael equates conscience to “the approval and disapproval of oneself”, 
whereas the ‘supposed impartial spectator’!is “a creation of my imagination”!that makes the approval or 
disapproval (Raphael 2007, 34-35). Charles Griswold makes a similar claim: “Conscience is the voice of the 
impartial spectator addressing the agent and motivates us to do that which is praiseworthy and avoid that which 
is blameworthy”!(Griswold 1999, 194, emphasis added). Also see Broadie (2006, 181) and Forman-Barzilai 
(2006, 93).  
In general, I think these are merely unintended slips. Raphael seems to move between ‘supposed 
impartial spectator’!and ‘conscience’!throughout his presentation of Smith’s moral theory (see Raphael 2007, 
chapter 5).  Griswold explicitly equates conscience and the supposed impartial spectator: “Conscience, which is 
the internalized ‘impartial and well-informed spectator’”!(Griswold 1999, 133). Similarly, Broadie later equates 
the impartial spectator and conscience: “the impartial spectator, considered as our conscience”!(Broadie 2006, 
182). So these slips may be merely a reflection of the wide variance in the use of ‘conscience’. But it is 
particularly important to be consistent in its use when discussing Smith’s moral theory, which primarily uses 
‘conscience’!in a narrower sense. !
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of others judging us from an impartial stance.53 Under such an account, conscience’s 
judgments may be our own in that they are products of our psychology, but they are not our 
own in that they are formed from principles that we do not necessarily endorse. 
In this chapter, I argue that such an interpretation of Smith is mistaken. For Smith, an 
agent’s conscience just is that agent when she is judging herself by placing herself into the 
situation of an impartial spectator. We judge ourselves using the same mechanism and 
principles we use to judge others. And so conscience gives us the flip side of the Golden 
Rule: judge yourself as you judge others. Our judgments of others and of ourselves are thusly 
intimately bound. The judgments of conscience are not the judgments of some independent 
prototype, but rather our judgments as the agents that author the judgment. 
My interpretation is not wholly novel. Among others, D. D. Raphael (2007) and Jon 
Rick (2007) provide similar interpretations. But I want to highlight two elements of Smith’s 
theory. For one, there is a close connection between us as conscience and us as spectators of 
others. This connection is lost in interpretations that treat conscience as a prototype that 
operates on principles distinct from those we employ as spectators generally. And second, 
conscience is an operation of the imagination, distinct from reason. This point is crucial for 
properly understanding how Smith distinguishes moral judgments from other kinds of 
judgments, and for recognizing the unique place of Smith’s theory in the history of 
conscience.  
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 For example, see Broadie (2006), Campbell (1971), Darwall (1999), Evensky (1987), Griswold (1999), 
Hanley (2009), Heilbroner (1982), and Kennedy (2008).!
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2.1 The Sympathetic Mechanism 
To understand how we judge others and ourselves, we first need the proper account of 
how we come to sympathize with another, for it is through sympathizing (or not) that we, as 
spectators, judge others. The process is as follows: 
 
By the imagination we [the spectator] place ourselves in [the agent’s] situation, we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, 
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea 
of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not 
altogether unlike them (TMS 1.1.1.2). 
 
We observe a situation involving some agent that is to be judged, and by imagination, enter 
into the agent’s situation to imagine what we would feel in the same situation. The result of 
this imaginative exercise is sympathy, a fellow-feeling or agreement with any sentiment 
between the spectator and the agent (TMS 1.1.1.5). I will call this mechanism by which we 
come to sympathize the ‘sympathetic mechanism’, which is not to be confused with the 
sympathy that results from the operation of this mechanism. 
What is crucial to Smith’s account of how we sympathize is that in entering into the 
agent’s situation, in imagining what it is like ‘to be the agent’, so to speak, we are not taking 
on any features particular to the agent herself. Rather, we only consider the situation of the 
agent, and from that situation consider how we would think and feel, not how the agent 
would. Jon Rick (2007) provides a helpful distinction between two ways in which spectators 
“get into another person’s shoes”. One way in which the spectator enters into another’s 
situation, what Rick calls ‘spectator-partiality’, is for the spectator to project herself into the 
situation of the agent. The spectator “loses no sense of herself and maintains all of her 
particular values, commitments, and affective dispositions”. Moreover, the spectator 
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“acquires no sense of the agent’s practical identity” (Rick 2007, 148). In other words, the 
spectator feels as the spectator generally would in that situation, given the spectator’s 
dispositions. Alternatively, the spectator can enter into the situation of the agent and consider 
how the agent would feel, given the agent’s dispositions, what Rick calls ‘agent-partiality’. 
In this case, the spectator not only enters into the situation of the agent, but also takes on the 
agent’s “practical identity and psychological economy” (Rick 2007, 148). Smith, as both 
Rick and I interpret him, endorses the ‘spectator-partiality’ account of how we sympathize 
with others. When we engage in this imaginative exercise, we hold steady the situational 
factors of the agent, and displace the agent with ourselves, the spectators. So what Smith 
means when stating “[we] become in some measure the same person with him” is that we 
imagine ourselves in the same situation as the agent. Hence, sympathy need not arise in 
response to the agent’s actual sentiments, but rather her situation (TMS 1.1.1.10).54 
To be clear, when we as spectators project ourselves into the situation of the agent, 
we are imagining ourselves as if we were in that situation, running a first-person simulation 
to come to some conclusion about what we would feel. We are not determining what we 
would feel by forming generalizations about how we feel in certain kinds of situation and 
deducing what we would feel. Also, we are not determining what we would feel by 
imagining how someone “like us”, someone with our psychological profile, would feel in 
that situation; in other words, we are not simply viewing some image or representative of us 
as we do when passively viewing ourselves in a video. Rather, we imagine ourselves as 
living through that situation, as participants in that situation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 I am using Rick’s terms here, but his distinction between agent-partiality and spectator-partiality is not novel, 
particularly in discussions of mindreading or simulation theories of mind, which interestingly attribute their 
origin to Adam Smith’s TMS. Robert Gordon, for instance, distinguishes between!“just imagining being in X’s 
situation”!and “imagin[ing] being X in X’s situation”!(Gordon 1995, 741-742; also see Gordon 1986, Goldman 
1989 and 2008, Stueber 2006 and 2009, and Oxley 2011).!
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The sympathetic mechanism gives us awareness of what we, as spectators, would feel if we 
were in the same situation as the agent. But Smith claims that it does more: 
 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of 
the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should 
feel in the like situation (TMS 1.1.1.1). 
 
The sympathetic mechanism is supposed to give us some idea of what the agent feels as well. 
But how can this be, given that we are imaginatively entering into the situation of the agent 
to determine how we, and not the agent, would feel? One possibility is that the sympathetic 
mechanism does not, in fact, give us any understanding of what the agent feels. Instead, we 
infer what the agent feels by observing their facial, bodily, and verbal expressions. Smith 
seems to recognize such means as not only a way to know what an agent feels but also a way 
to sympathize, for by observing another’s expressions of joy and pain, we as spectators come 
to feel something similar:  
 
The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to 
another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in 
the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in 
the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a 
like painful or agreeable emotion. A smiling face is, to every body that sees it, a 
cheerful object; as a sorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy one 
(TMS 1.1.1.6).55  
 
So Smith recognizes that we might simply feel a corresponding emotion upon seeing 
someone visibly in distress or in joy, without any knowledge of the situation of the agent. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Smith is referring to Hume’s account of sympathy, first presented in THN 2.1.11.3: “When any affection is 
infus’d by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and 
conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such 
a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any 
original affection.”!
! 56 
 However, it is clear that Smith thinks that sympathizing by inferring from various 
expressions is an inadequate account of how we understand and judge others. That 
instantaneous fellow-feeling from observing the agent’s expressions of pain is, for Smith, 
quite limited in scope. Only certain kinds of feelings seem to excite a fellow-feeling simply 
from observation, namely feelings whose effects are restricted to the agent and no one else, 
like grief and joy in response to the agent’s bad or good fortune. But other kinds, like anger 
towards another person, we generally do not sympathize with unless we know why that 
person feels the way she does (TMS 1.1.1.7) because someone else is affected by that anger, 
i.e. the person to which the anger is directed (TMS 1.1.1.8). Also, even with feelings like 
grief and joy, we only have an “extremely imperfect” sympathy. Until we know more about 
the details of the situation, we can only feel “general lamentation”, and not grief to the same 
degree over the particular misfortune (TMS 1.1.1.9). So Smith acknowledges that we can and 
do infer what another feels by observing various expressions. However, he thinks that such 
inference leaves us with an incomplete understanding of the agent’s sentiments and an 
incomplete assessment of the propriety of those sentiments (TMS 1.1.1.10).56  
 Smith, instead, seems to rely heavily on the situation to accurately identify the agent’s 
sentiments. For instance, we do not need to see any expression of fear to conclude that the 
agent feels fear. It is enough that we “see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or 
arm of another person” (TMS 1.1.1.3). We do not need to observe a person with “sores and 
ulcers” scratch themselves to know that they would feel itchy. It is enough that we see those 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 For instance if we do sympathize by in this way, we only do so because the agent’s emotions “suggest to us 
the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person”, and we are able to enter into that 
situation through the sympathetic mechanism (TMS 1.1.1.8). And even then, since we are not fully informed of 
the cause of that person’s emotions, the feelings of the agent “create rather a curiosity to inquire into his 
situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any actual sympathy that is very sensible”!
(TMS 1.1.1.9, emphasis added). !
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sores and ulcers, to see what situation that person is in (TMS 1.1.1.3). This reliance on the 
situation to understand the agent’s sentiments suggests the following: we assume that the 
agent shares some basic human faculties and principles, which give rise to certain sentiments 
to a certain degree in certain situations. Because you and I share these faculties, I can 
understand what you feel by simply considering what I would feel. However, this assumption 
is often how we make our initial assessment of the agent’s sentiments. We can adjust that 
assessment based on observation of physical expressions, or some indication that the agent 
has lost some faculty (e.g. TMS 1.1.1.11 and 1.1.1.13). However, Smith seems to think that 
we often do not and need not rely on inferences from physical expressions to understand how 
an agent feels. 
 So far, I have stressed that for Smith, we sympathize by holding the situation of the 
agent fixed, and considering what we as spectators would feel if we were in that situation. 
We have yet to address what it is that we are holding fixed as part of the situation. Smith 
provides a couple of examples that might help clear up what he understands to be a part of 
the situation. One example is of a person who has lost the capacity to reason: “the poor 
wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery” 
(TMS 1.1.1.11). In sympathizing with this person, we place ourselves into the situation which 
does not include the complete insensibility that this person has of his own condition. In other 
words, just as we do not consider the agent’s feelings as part of the situation, we do not 
include the agent’s obliviousness to her situation.57 Similarly, we do not consider a dead 
person’s lack of any mental activity as part of the situation. In sympathizing with the dead, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 A similar conclusion can be drawn from Smith’s example of an imprudent and rude person who is unaware of 
the impropriety of his behavior. In such a case, we do not include as part of the situation his ignorance, and we 
feel embarrassed for him because we know that we would feel embarrassed were we in his situation (TMS 
1.1.1.10).!
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we hold as part of the situation being “deprived of the light of the sun; to be shut out from 
life and conversation; to be laid in the cold grave, a prey to corruption and the reptiles of the 
earth; to be no more thought of in this world, but to be obliterated, in a little time, from the 
affections, and almost from the memory of their dearest friends and relatives” (TMS 
1.1.1.13). So the situation includes not only the physical state of the corpse, but also the lack 
of thoughts and feelings others have about the agent.58 What the situation does not include is 
the agent’s ability to feel and reason. If these capacities were part of the agent’s situation, the 
spectator would not feel any feeling since the situations would then strip the spectator of the 
capacity to feel (also see the example in TMS 1.1.1.11). 
 
2.2 How We Judge Others: Propriety/Impropriety and Merit/Demerit 
The sympathetic mechanism is used to make two kinds of judgments: 1) judgments of 
propriety and impropriety, and 2) judgments of merit and demerit.59 Though the two are 
different in kind, the latter is built up from the former. So it will be appropriate to begin with 
an account of judgments of propriety.  
What exactly are judgments of propriety? It is the approving or disapproving of 
another’s sentiments in a given situation by considering what we would feel in the same 
situation, and recognizing the correspondence of sentiments. To form this judgment, we need 
to use the sympathetic mechanism to determine what we would feel in the same situation as 
the agent. We engage in spectator-partiality, in which we enter into the agent’s situation to 
determine how we, the spectator, would feel. We also need to determine what the agent in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Several others have remarked on how ‘situation’, for Smith, includes more than just physical elements, 
extending to certain psychological features as well (e.g. Nanay 2010: 91-92; Darwall 1999: 141-142; 
Fleischacker 2006: 4).!
59 For simplicity, I will from time to time use ‘propriety’!to refer to both propriety and impropriety, and ‘merit’!
to refer to both merit and demerit. The context should disambiguate the two usages.!
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fact feels in that situation. We might infer that the agent simply feels as we would in the 
same situation. But if that were all that we used to determine what the agent feels, then we 
would never be any disagreement with the agent. Instead, we also make inferences using 
some combination of cues, including facial expressions, verbal cues, and body language. The 
strength of the cries of a child indicates how much pain the child is in. The flare in the 
nostrils, the tenseness of the muscles, and verbal assaults indicate the height of the agent’s 
anger. We might also engage in some agent-partiality, in which we as spectators enter into 
the agent’s situation as the agent, embodying the agent’s particular dispositions as we 
understand them given our experiences with that agent. 
The spectator then compares the sentiments of the agent with the spectator’s own 
upon entering into the agent’s situation. If the two sentiments are similar, then the spectator 
approves of the agent to the degree that the two are similar; if the two are dissimilar, then the 
spectator disapproves to the degree that they differ. Judgment of propriety is not the 
correspondence of sentiments itself, but the observing of this correspondence (TMS 1.1.3.1), 
i.e. a “perception of this coincidence” (TMS 1.1.3.3). And so if you feel what I would feel in 
the same situation, but I fail to recognize this agreement, I do not make a judgment of 
propriety. The key here is that we do not need to actually feel the corresponding feeling. We 
only need to observe that we would generally feel the same, though at the moment. Hence, 
Smith says the judgment is dependent not on the observation of an actual agreement in 
sentiment, but rather the “consciousness of this conditional sympathy” (TMS 1.1.3.4, 
emphasis added).  
Though the judgment of whether or not the agent has felt and acted properly depends 
on this correspondence in sentiments, the standard of propriety is always determined by the 
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spectator. The spectator does not judge by deferring to others, but always takes her reference 
point to be her own faculties and principles, never those of others: 
  
Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in 
another. I judge of your sight by my sight, and of your ear by my ear, of your reason 
by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I 
neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them (TMS 1.1.3.10). 
 
In other words, when I judge an agent, I do not consider the situation nor do I consider the 
judgment of any other spectators to make my judgment. Thus, my judgment of propriety is 
not formed by considering what the society approves or what spectators generally feel. My 
judgments can be informed by such considerations. For instance, if a person faces 
disagreement with another, he might attempt to reassess his own judgment by entering more 
fully into the situation of the man with whom he disagrees, “to bring home to himself every 
little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer” (TMS 1.1.4.6), so that 
he might account for situational factors that he initially did not sufficiently account for.60  
Also, I may come to recognize that I am not my usual self, that my faculties and principles 
are not operating the way they normally do: “We may often approve of a jest, and think the 
laughter of the company quite just and proper, though we ourselves do not laugh, because, 
perhaps, we are in a grave humour, or happen to have our attention engaged with other 
objects” (TMS 1.1.3.3). So I may adjust my judgment accordingly, based on my knowledge 
that I would judge differently were I in a more normal situation or one more conducive to 
reacting as others normally react in the situation facing the agent under review. But in all 
such cases, I am not judging what is proper based on how others judge, but rather, I take their 
judgments to give me grounds for reconsidering how I would judge were my reactions not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Broadie (2006, 175-176).!
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affected by factors peculiar to my mood or circumstance. I revise my understanding of the 
situation, or take into account peculiarities in the operations of my own faculties and 
principles, and form a new judgment that now takes into account these considerations. 
Judgments of what is proper are always determined by my faculties and principles. 
It is important to highlight that judgments of propriety involve the effects of an 
agent’s actions only in a very narrow way. The judgment of propriety is concerned primarily 
with an agent’s response to some object, whether it is human or not. In entering into the 
situation of the agent, we are only considering how we would respond in the same situation. 
Hence, the effects on the agent may be considered, as part of the situation, e.g. the pain 
inflicted on the agent. Any consideration of the effects of the agent’s motives or actions on 
others is not involved in judgments of propriety. Consider a situation in which my friend hits 
a stranger, breaking the stranger’s nose. When I judge the propriety of my friend’s motive 
and action, I am not concerned with the fact that the stranger was affected by my friend’s 
actions. Rather, I am concerned with whether or not I would have felt and done the same as 
my friend in the same situation. The same holds if it turns out that my friend hit me and not a 
stranger. I am clearly affected by my friend’s actions. But these factors are not part of the 
judgment of propriety. All that is considered in judgments of propriety is whether or not I 
would have felt the same. Because I am affected by it, I might be more motivated to come to 
an agreement in sentiment. But in such a case, the effects influence my motivation for 
coming to an agreement, for trying harder to enter into my friend’s situation and taking into 
account all the details of his situation. What the effects do not do is factor into the 
sympathetic process through which I come to judge my friend’s motives proper.61 As we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 That Smith limits the role of effects of the motives and actions of the agent to the motivation of those affected 
is further evidenced by his discussion of the two kinds of situations in which we judge propriety. In the first, the 
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shall see, that judgments of propriety do not involve consideration of effects of the agent’s 
motives on others is important for distinguishing judgments of propriety from judgments of 
merit.  
 
In Part II, Smith presents a different kind of judgment: merit and demerit. And to give 
an account of this kind of judgment, he leaves aside the dyadic relationship between the 
spectator and the one judged in Part I, and instead shifts to a triadic relationship in which the 
spectator approves or disapproves of the person judged (agent) given the effects on another 
(recipient).62 In this triadic relationship, the spectator imagines being in the situation of both 
the agent and the recipient. But the spectator does so in a particular order. The spectator first 
enters into the situation of the agent and determines whether the agent’s motives are proper. 
The spectator then enters into the situation of the recipient to figure out how the spectator 
would feel in the same situation. If the spectator judges the agent’s motives proper and feels 
gratitude upon entering into the recipient’s situation, then the spectator judges the agent 
meritorious, i.e. deserving of reward. If the spectator judges the agents’ motives improper 
and feels resentment upon entering into the recipient’s situation, then the spectator judges the 
agent demeritorious, i.e. deserving of punishment. And if the spectator does not enter into the 
situation of either the agent or the recipient, the spectator does not make a judgment of merit. 
Merely entering into the situation of the recipient and feeling gratitude or resentment is not 
enough to come to a judgment of merit or demerit, respectively. In fact, if the spectator does 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
agent’s sentiments do not affect the agent or us. And in such cases, we are not very motivated to come to any 
sort of agreement in sentiment (TMS 1.1.4.1). But in the second, the agent’s sentiments do affect either the 
agent or us, and so we are more motivated to enter more fully into the situation of the agent to come to more of 
an agreement in sentiment (TMS 1.1.4.1). In neither case are the effects of the agent’s motives and actions part 
of the judgment of propriety. !
62 I am adopting Broadie’s terminology, ‘agent’!and ‘recipient’!(Broadie 2007, 178).!
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not first approve of the agent’s motives, the spectator cannot deem the recipient’s gratitude 
proper, and if the spectator does not disapprove of the agent’s motives, then the spectator 
cannot deem the recipient’s resentment proper (see TMS 2.1.3.2-3). Interestingly, in this 
imaginative exercise, the spectator need not assess the propriety of the recipient, though the 
spectator can do so. What is important is not the recipient’s actual feeling, but rather what the 
spectator feels upon placing himself in the situation of the recipient.63  
The key difference between judgments of merit and those of propriety is that 
judgments of merit do not focus on the response of the agent, but rather on the response of 
the recipient, since we are assessing the effects of the agent’s motives on other people, i.e. 
the recipient. Judgments of propriety simply assess whether the agent’s response is of the 
appropriate kind and degree given “the cause or object which excites it” (TMS 2.1.1.2). The 
judgment is strictly in response to the agent’s sentiments or actions. And depending on 
whether we, as spectators, sympathize with those sentiments or actions, we either deem the 
agent deserving of approval or disapproval. Judgments of merit, however, are not grounded 
in considerations of the agent’s response to the situation. Rather, they are grounded in our 
considerations of the effects of the agent’s motives on other people. In making judgments of 
merit, what we are really doing is finding the motive of the agent improper and as a 
consequence attempting to change the effects resulting from those improper motives through 
the use of rewards and punishments. Hence, judgments of merit and demerit are judgments of 
the deservedness of reward or punishment, not approval or disapproval. So although 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 TMS 2.1.5.11. This point is highlighted in Broadie (2007, 179). If the spectator is attempting to determine the 
propriety of the recipient, then the spectator would need to sympathize with the recipient to determine the 
recipient’s response proper. But in such a case, it is not the agent that is judged, but rather the recipient. !
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judgments of merit make use of judgments of propriety, they are distinct in substantial ways 
from the judgments of propriety that we use to make them.64 
Furthermore, judgments of merit and demerit, unlike those of propriety and 
impropriety, are grounded in specific sentiments, namely gratitude and resentment, 
respectively. Recall that to make judgments of propriety we simply need to employ our 
capacity for fellow-feeling once we have executed the imaginative exercise of entering into 
an agent’s situation. Exactly what the agent felt does not play a determinative role in 
determining the propriety of the reaction under review. However, for judgments of merit and 
demerit, the spectator must enter into the situation of the recipient and determine that the 
spectator would feel gratitude and resentment, respectively.65 Other sentiments will not give 
rise to judgments of merit and demerit because other sentiments do not prompt a response of 
deservedness, a response of obligation or owing another, notions which are central to reward 
and punishment. As Smith writes: “To reward, is to recompense, to remunerate, to return 
good for good received. To punish, too, is to recompense, to remunerate, though in a 
different manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done” (TMS 2.1.1.4). Punishment 
and reward is only satisfied when the recipient gives the agent what the agent deserves. 
Though there are other sentiments that might want to prompt us to give to or receive from the 
agent, “there are none [besides gratitude and resentment] which so directly excite us to be the 
instrument of either” (TMS 2.1.1.5, emphasis added). Only gratitude and resentment satisfies 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Haakonssen makes the slip of collapsing the two kinds of judgments into one in his introduction to the 
Cambridge Press edition of TMS (2002, xvi): “The central concept is that of propriety. We first of all judge an 
agent, whether oneself or another, in terms of whether a motive or action is proper to the given situation of that 
agent; if it is, we say that the motive or action has moral merit, otherwise demerit”.!
65 I am leaving open the possibility that the spectator makes a judgment of merit and demerit without feeling 
gratitude and resentment, but instead judges that she would feel gratitude and resentment under normal 
circumstances. !
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the proper exchange between the recipient and the agent, in which the recipient is the one 
that is giving what the agent deserves.66 
Exactly which sentiments might we mistake to produce judgments of merit and 
demerit? Smith distinguishes gratitude from “[t]he love and esteem which grow upon 
acquaintance and habitual approbation” (TMS 2.1.1.5), and resentment from “[t]he hatred 
and dislike… which grow upon habitual disapprobation” (TMS 2.1.1.6). The distinction is 
meant to show that gratitude and resentment, unlike these other sentiments, are ones that not 
only prompt us to want benefit and harm, respectively, to come upon the agent, but also that 
we are the source of that benefit and harm. For instance, in TMS 2.1.1.5, Smith points out 
that like gratitude, the “love and esteem which grow upon acquaintance and habitual 
approbation, necessarily lead us to be pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the 
object of such agreeable emotions, and consequently, to be willing to lend a hand to promote 
it”. But unlike gratitude which gives rise to a desire to thank or in some way repay the person 
to whom we are grateful, love and esteem do not demand that we be the source of the good 
fortune that falls on the object of our love and esteem. The same distinction holds true 
between resentment and hatred that arises from habit. Unlike resentment which gives rise to a 
desire to blame, scorn or in some way punish the person we resent, hatred does not demand 
that we be the source of the bad fortune that falls on the object of our hatred.67   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 There is an issue here as to whether one can sympathize with another’s resentment only within a triadic 
relationship, or whether one can do so within a dyadic relationship as well. There are passages in Part I that 
seem to indicate that one can directly sympathize with another’s resentment without considering any third party. 
However, these passages can be read as a rhetorical tool, which Smith often makes use of, which is to begin 
with a more loose discussion and then to refine his concepts as he delves into the topic more deeply. Of course, 
Smith might simply think that one can sympathize with another’s resentment in both the dyadic and triadic 
relationship, and that only the latter is a judgment of demerit. I do not think it makes much of a difference for 
my discussion. All that is needed is that judgments of demerit rely on a particular kind of resentment, one that 
must be assessed in the context of a triadic relationship.!
67 I have discussed two means by which we form moral sentiments: “First, we sympathize with the motives of 
the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefits of his actions”!(TMS 7.3.3.16). 
! 66 
2.3 How We Judge Ourselves: The ‘Supposed Impartial Spectator’ 
 Smith begins Part III of TMS by summarizing what has done thus far, which is 
consider the “origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the sentiments and conducts 
of others” (TMS 3.1.1.1, emphasis added). He then turns to the main aim of Part III: consider 
the origin and foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conducts. 
Unfortunately, we are incapable of judging ourselves directly, for judging requires some 
comparing between the spectator’s sentiments and the agent’s. Hence, we need to 
imaginatively remove ourselves from our own situation (as agent), and view ourselves from 
the situation of a spectator: 
 
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any 
judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own 
natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we 
can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other 
people, or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever judgment we can form 
concerning them, accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to what 
are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to 
be the judgment of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine 
any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in 
his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influenced 
it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable 
judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it. (TMS 3.1.1.2) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
There are two more principles that give rise to moral sentiments: “thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been 
agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider 
such actions as making a part of a system of behavior which tends to promote the happiness either of the 
individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to 
any well-contrived machine”!(TMS 7.3.3.16). The third principle is that with experience, we begin to form 
general rules that correspond to how spectators, ourselves included, judge the motives and actions of others. 
Once we form these general rules, we begin to look to these rules with reverence, “what is properly called a 
sense of duty”!(TMS 3.1.5.1). I will discuss this principle in greater detail in the next chapter. The fourth 
principle, which Smith discusses in detail in Part IV, is that acting from this sense of duty is approved if a 
spectator does or would feel the same sentiment in the same situation. In a like manner, though we find some 
action useful, when we approve of such an action, we do not in the first instance approve of it because a 
spectator appreciates its utility, but rather because a spectator sees the action as beautiful, or pleasurable. 
Though in some sense both the third and fourth principle have their origin in the sympathetic mechanism, 
neither requires the use of the sympathetic mechanism at the moment at which we execute a moral judgment. !
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We act as a spectator to ourselves by imagining how we would judge ourselves were we an 
impartial person observing our actions in full knowledge of our motives and the situation to 
which we are reacting in formulating those motives. If I imaginatively enter into this 
different situation or at least think of things from a more impartial perspective, I will find 
myself with two sentiments, my original sentiments as agent, and the less violent sentiments I 
will experience after thinking of my motives and actions as a spectator would.68 When these 
two sentiments coincide, then I approve of myself, and when these two sentiments do not, I 
disapprove of myself. So, as Alexander Broadie puts it, though conscience is “the product of 
an act of imagination… [i]n so far as the agent is imagining how he would be judged by an 
impartial spectator, the judgments he is imagining are his own” (Broadie 2006, 181).  
We need to be careful about how we understand this process. The passage above 
states that in entering into the situation of a spectator, we are “endeavouring to view them 
with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them,” “as we imagine any 
other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.” It seems as if Smith is claiming that we 
are imagining how other people would judge us. However, this is not the case. Though we 
change situations in thought or imagination and view ourselves from the situation of an 
impartial spectator, we continue to exercise our own faculties to judge as we would judge, 
not exercise our faculties to judge as others would judge:  
 
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence 
upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I 
divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, 
represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is 
examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard 
to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 The latter sentiment differs not only in degree but also in kind from the original sentiment since the latter is a 
sentiment arising from the imagination.!
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by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of 
view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose 
conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. 
(TMS 3.1.1.6) 
 
Even though in judging ourselves we enter a different situation, that of an impartial spectator, 
I am still the judge entering into the situation of the agent and exercising my faculties to 
judge the agent: “by considering how it would appear to me.” What Smith means, then, in 
referring to viewing ourselves “with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to 
view them” is that because we have no “immediate experience” of what another feels, we are 
limited to imagining how we would feel from the same situation: “We begin, upon this 
account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how these must appear to 
them, by considering how they would appear to us if in their situation” (TMS 3.1.1.5).69 
 Finally, conscience is necessarily a judge of oneself.70 We might be able to 
imaginatively enter into the situation of an impartial spectator to form moral judgments of 
others, but such a spectator would not be conscience. Smith is not explicit on this point, but 
he only discusses conscience in the context of self-approbation and self-disapprobation and 
the view accords with common sense or ordinary usage of the term. ‘Conscience’ is initially 
introduced to explain how we judge ourselves (TMS 3.1.1). Even afterwards, conscience is 
only discussed as a means for correcting the sentiments of and cultivating virtues in the 
bearer of that conscience, not anyone else (TMS 3.1.2-3). Smith provides other means for 
correcting our judgments of others: we enter more fully into the agent’s situation by taking 
into account factors we did not as a result of our partiality or we take into account the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Cf. TMS 1.1.1.1. !
70 The exception is Carrasco, who claims that any moral sentiment, whether of oneself and of others, must 
appeal to the supposed impartial spectator (Carrasco 2004).!
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perspective of other spectators to identify our own errors as spectators (TMS 1.1.4.6). So 
even though it is possible that we judge others by imaginatively entering into the situation of 
an impartial spectator, Smith would not consider this imagined judge to be conscience. 
 
2.4 Alternative Interpretation: Conscience as Prototype? 
 There is a common alternative interpretation of Smith’s account of conscience: 
conscience is a prototype of an idealized impartial spectator. The general thought is that 
through experience, we build up an idea of how impartial people tend to evaluate different 
situations, or an idea of how impartial people would judge the actions and motives of another 
were they privy to all the relevant information about the situation of the person under review. 
Once we have formed this prototype in our mind, we use it as the standard by which we 
judge ourselves. Conscience, then, is our judging ourselves as we imagine how an ideal 
judge, who embodies all impartial judges, would think of us, based on what we know of how 
impartial people judge those they judge. 
The key to this interpretation is that conscience, “the supposed impartial spectator”, is 
supposed (or imagined) and impartial in a very particular way. Conscience is not an actual 
(living, breathing) spectator, the way that Jiminy Cricket, for instance, is an actual spectator. 
Yet conscience is distinct from us as agent. It forms moral judgments on principles different 
from ours, for it represents a different spectator, an ideal spectator. Conscience is ‘imagined’ 
in that we are thus creating a spectator using our imagination, which I refer to as imagined in 
the [S-Other] sense: 
 
[S-Other]  Conscience is ‘imagined’ in that the agent considers what another 
spectator would judge, using the spectator’s own faculties and 
principles. 
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Conscience, then, is not imagined in that it is a reflection of the agent’s faculties and 
principles. Rather, what we are imagining is a spectator that forms moral judgments in a 
manner different than our own. 
Furthermore, what we are imagining is not just any spectator, but rather an impartial 
one. Impartiality is an essential feature of conscience. If we are imagining how a partial 
spectator, like our parents or friends, would judge, then we are not appealing to conscience at 
all, because conscience must be an impartial spectator. And because conscience is an ideal, 
and part of this ideal is complete impartiality, some have gone further to claim that 
conscience must be a fully impartial spectator.  
Several prominent commentators adopt this interpretation. For instance, T. D. 
Campbell claimed that conscience was an internalization of outside spectators that we 
encounter:  
 
[Conscience] does not therefore embody the reactions of any particular person, but is 
an empirical ideal type who may be said to represent all those aspects of human 
nature which are brought into play in the development of moral judgments. The 
spectator is “ideal” in the sense that he excludes all those features of actual spectators 
which relate to their special interests as particular individuals involved in the actual 
situation which they are observing; he is “empirical” in the sense that, once this 
abstraction is made, the responses of the spectator are identified with the consensus 
towards which any actual group of persons can be observed to approximate in their 
attitudes to the behaviour of their fellows (Campbell 1971, 127). 
 
Conscience, then, does not reflect any particular spectator or impartial spectator. Rather, it is 
a being that represents an ideal in the sense that it reflects generalizations we believe to hold 
for impartial spectators, devoid of any particular details of particular spectators. The agent 
herself, of course, is not such a being. In other words, in imagining conscience we are 
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imagining a being wholly different from us as agent. Conscience is impartial to the degree 
that we often are not. It also judges as impartial spectators generally do, which we do not 
always coincide with how we judge. We are, in essence, imagining a being distinct from us, 
one that operates differently using different faculties and principles, and ultimately coming to 
moral judgments different from our own.  
Similarly, Stephen Darwall claims: “Moral judgments involve an impartial projection 
into the agent’s or patient’s standpoint. We imaginatively project, not as ourselves, but 
impartially, as any one of us” (Darwall 1999, 142). For Darwall, all moral judgments are 
made by projecting an impartial self, and that the appeal to impartiality is a feature embedded 
into the sympathetic mechanism. Whether we are judging others or ourselves, we are not 
projecting ourselves, but rather some prototype, an impartial spectator that embodies how 
“any one of us” would judge. In some sense, we are this prototype, for we are doing the 
projecting and imagining from the agent’s situation. But strictly speaking we are not this 
prototype, for this prototype does not reflect our own faculties and principles, but rather those 
of any impartial spectator.  
Charles Griswold also presents conscience as a prototype that embodies 
generalizations a person embraces about how spectators judge when judging impartially:  
 
Moral self-consciousness requires that I “divide myself, as it were, in two persons” 
(TMS  3.1.1.6). The internalized or idealized judge is still a spectator. The 
imagination preserves the privileged position of this spectator – the stand-in for “the 
public.” The theatrical relation is thus internalized; we become our own public 
(Griswold 1999, 108).  
 
When we judge ourselves, we are appealing to a judge that reflects the community as a 
whole, i.e. “mankind”. We are still judging ourselves, in that we are dividing ourselves and 
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entering into the situation of a spectator. But in entering into the situation of this spectator, 
we are judging as the public would. Conscience, then, does not apply our principles, which 
may not be ideal in any way, but rather apply the principles of the general community of 
impartial spectators, “the stand-in for ‘the public’.” 
 There are several reasons for interpreting conscience as a prototype. For one, Smith 
often speaks of how we are attempting to judge ourselves as any other impartial spectator 
would judge. So in judging ourselves, we make reference to how others judge, not to how we 
judge: 
 
We must, here as in all other cases, view ourselves not so much according to that light 
in which we may naturally appear to others…. When he views himself in the light in 
which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is but one of 
the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so as that the 
impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is what of all 
things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all other occasions, 
humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other 
men can go along with (TMS 2.2.2.1, emphases added). 
 
In judging ourselves, we are considering how we appear to other spectators, and whether they 
would approve (or disapprove) of us in accordance with those judges’ sentiments, not our 
own. He repeats this notion that we are judging ourselves as others would judge us elsewhere 
in Part III:  
 
We can never survey our own sentiments and motive, we can never form any 
judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own 
natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we 
can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other 
people, or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever judgments we can form 
concerning them, accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to what 
are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to 
be the judgment of others (TMS  3.1.1.2, emphases added; also see TMS 3.1.1.5). 
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According to Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Smith in this passage is claiming that we are not 
simply entering into the situation of others to “[step] outside ourselves and [cool] ourselves 
off” (Forman-Barzilai 2010, 90). Rather, Smith’s claim about the “secret reference” to the 
judgments of others suggest that we are entering into the situation of another to judge 
ourselves as they would judge us, using their principles of action. As Darwall puts it: “We 
imaginatively project, not as ourselves, but impartially, as any one of us” (Darwall 1999, 
142). The implication is that though we are, as conscience, judging ourselves in some sense, 
we are doing so as other (impartial) spectators would judge, not as we would judge. 
Another reason for the prototype interpretation is that Smith refers to conscience as an 
‘abstract’ being, a ‘representative’ of impartial spectators: 
 
The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and 
conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence 
of the real spectator… (TMS 3.1.3.38, emphasis added). 
 
[T]he prudent man is always both supported and rewarded by the entire approbation of the 
impartial spectator, and of the representative of the impartial spectator, the man within the 
breast. (TMS 4.1.1.11, emphases added).71 
 
Conscience, thus, is not a matter of taking the perspective of any particular impartial 
spectator, including the agent herself; rather, it is adopting an abstract perspective, distinct 
from the perspective of any real spectator. The same is true of Smith’s reference to ‘the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Smith makes several more references to both the ‘abstact’!spectator and the ‘representative’!in prior editions 
of TMS 3.1.2.32-37, e.g.”This inmate of the breast, this abstract man, the representative of mankind, and 
substitute of the Deity, whom nature has constituted the supreme judge of all their actions, is seldom appealed 
to by them”!(TMS 3.1.2.37). !
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representative of the impartial spectator.’ ‘The impartial spectator’ (or other times, ‘the 
indifferent spectator’) is not some particular impartial spectator. Smith uses this term when 
providing tendencies, generalizations, of impartial spectators.72 So in referring to the 
‘representative’ of the impartial spectator, Smith is appealing to some abstract spectator who 
embodies all the generalizations the agent endorses about impartial spectators that he or she 
has built up from her experiences of being judged by impartial people and of judging others 
impartially.  
So then my conscience is a reflection of what I as agent believe impartial spectators 
generally to be, a prototypical impartial spectator built up from my experiences with 
impartial spectators. This prototype is the ‘ideal’ judge within the breast (e.g. TMS 3.1.3.27-
29, 3.1.3.38, 3.1.4.4). In part, it is ideal in that it is an impartial spectator, for as Smith writes, 
when we align ourselves with this ideal judge, we become “the impartial spectator of his own 
conduct” (TMS 3.1.3.28, emphasis added). Moreover, some suggest that conscience is also 
ideal in that it informed of all the details of the situation and is perfectly impartial so as to 
render the correct moral judgment. This ideal spectator is in stark contrast to how we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 For instance, in TMS 2.2.2.1, he writes: “To disturb his happiness merely because it stands in the way of our 
own, to take from him what is of real use to him merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to 
indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own 
happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with.”!Often, however, Smith 
presents generalizations without any explicit reference to ‘mankind’, ‘the spectator’, or ‘the impartial spectator’. 
For instance, in TMS 1.1.3.1, Smith summarizes how we approve or disapprove of one another: by the actual 
correspondence (or lack thereof) of sentiments. But he then goes on to qualify this account by recognizing 
alternative means for approving, which, though grounded in the correspondence of sentiments, need not require 
actual correspondence (TMS 1.1.3.3). In other words, his initial account was a generalization of how we tend to 
approve. 
Many have used the term ‘the impartial spectator’!to refer to conscience. So as D. D. Raphael suggests, 
we need to distinguish between two senses of ‘the impartial spectator’: the “more mundane sense of an actual 
spectator of the conduct of other persons”!(Raphael 2007, 42 fn. 12), and the imagined spectator, “the man 
within”, that judges oneself (Raphael 2007, 36). The latter, as Raphael puts it, is “a creation of my imagination. 
He is indeed myself, though in the character of an imagined spectator, not in the character of an agent”!(Raphael 
2007, 35). Hence, Raphael distinguishes the “special concept of the impartial spectator”, i.e. the projected 
spectator that judges the agent (Raphael 2007, 33), from the more mundane “man without”!(Raphael 2007, 36). 
Generally, though, Smith himself is often quite clear in distinguishing the two, for he refers to the “special 
concept of the impartial spectator”, i.e. conscience, not as ‘the impartial spectator’!but rather the ‘representative 
of the impartial spectator’!or the spectator ‘within’. !
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generally are as agents and spectators. We are often not ideal in these ways: we are often 
unaware of our biases like excessive self-love and uninformed about various details of the 
situation. So when we appeal to this ideal spectator, we come to a very different judgment 
than we would were we not trying to be completely impartial and fully informed. 
Finally, the progression of Smith’s discussion in TMS suggests that conscience is the 
product of our moral sentiments shaped by our experience with others. Prior to his discussion 
of conscience, Smith discusses how we form judgments of propriety and merit, of how we 
correct for our sentiments by becoming more impartial in our judgments, and of how we 
form a better understanding of how impartial spectators tend to judge. If conscience is the 
next step in this progression, then conscience is not just our judging ourselves from a 
different perspective. Rather, it is our judging ourselves as we imagine impartial spectators 
would judge us, given our experience as impartial spectators and as the object of the 
judgments of impartial spectators. So then to judge ourselves, we appeal to an understanding 
of impartial spectators that extend beyond ourselves. We appeal to an ideal spectator, one 
that holds qualities that actual spectators, including the one judging oneself, do not, including 
complete knowledge of the situation and complete impartiality.  
In what follows, I will argue that this interpretation of conscience is mistaken. The 
main point of contention is the sense in which conscience is supposed and impartial. Treating 
conscience as an idealized prototype is, I think, inconsistent with Smith’s overall theory, 
particularly his understanding of the sympathetic mechanism and its limits. So when we 
consider the whole of Smith’s theory, we will see that:  
 
[A] When we judge ourselves, we do not ‘imagine’ a spectator in the sense that 
we form in our mind a spectator with distinct faculties and principles by 
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which it judges; rather, we ‘imagine’ in the sense that we project ourselves 
into a different situation, thus becoming a spectator unto ourselves. 
 
[B] Conscience can be partial or impartial to varying degrees; it need not be fully 
(ideally) impartial. When Smith speaks of conscience as ‘ideal’, he is not 
referring to the degree of impartiality, but rather its unique position of having 
access to more information about the situation and about the agent.  
 
By clearing up the sense in which conscience involves adopting an imagined and impartial 
perspective on ourselves, we can also get a better understanding of how Smith’s discussion 
of conscience fits into the theme of progression in TMS.  Conscience is ideal in the sense that 
it has access to information that outside spectators often do not, particularly the agent’s 
sentiments, which outside spectators have to infer. But conscience can still be mistaken, and 
can most definitely be infected by partiality. Hence, even after conscience is formed, it must 
be cultivated and refined to serve as a source of accurate moral judgment.  
 
2.5 Interpretive Issue #1: ‘Supposed’ or ‘Imagined’ Spectators 
Conscience is ‘supposed’ or ‘imagined’, as opposed to ‘real’ or ‘actual’. But there are 
two different senses in which conscience can be imagined: 
 
[S-Self]  Conscience is ‘supposed’ in that the agent projects herself into the 
situation of a spectator, and judges herself, using only her own 
faculties and principles.  
 
[S-Other]  Conscience is ‘supposed’ in that the agent considers what another 
spectator would judge, given that spectator’s faculties and principles.73 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 The ‘S’!in S-Self and S-Other refers to ‘supposed’. This distinction is, admittedly, oversimplified. There is a 
range of possibilities between S-Self and S-Other. We can adopt some of the faculties and principles of others 
without adopting them all. For instance, in imaginatively entering into the situation of the fictional character 
Professor Charles Xavier, I might not adopt any of his faculties and principles except for his telepathic abilities, 
or except for his desire to bring harmony between humans and mutants.!
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This distinction needs some clarifying. In the [S-Self] sense of imagining, the agent is not 
imagining a spectator as an independently operating entity, with its own set of faculties and 
principles. Rather, the agent merely determines the situation of another person (a spectator) 
and then projects herself into that situation before evaluating her own motives and conduct. 
Once she has imagined or determined the situation of a spectator, the agent does not merely 
consider what she would judge given some set of facts about her dispositions; rather, she 
pretends to be in that situation, imaginatively responding to various facets of that situation as 
if she were actually in that situation.  
In the [S-Other] sense, however, the agent does not project herself, but rather her 
understanding of a particular spectator (whether a specific figure, like her father; a prototype 
that embodies all, or most, spectators; or even a version of herself), which operates from 
faculties and principles that are distinct from the agent’s own. To be clear, the [S-Other] 
sense of imagining includes cases in which the agent forms an image of herself, which 
embodies what the agent believes of herself (e.g. her dispositions), and determines what such 
a person would judge from the situation of a spectator. In such cases, the agent is not 
engaging with the spectator’s situation as if she were actually in the situation, but rather 
deducing what she would judge from facts about her dispositions, the same way that she 
would deduce what some other spectator, like a friend or a parent, would judge given that 
spectator’s dispositions.   
In the previous section, I presented the evidence for [S-Other], endorsed by, among 
others, Campbell, Darwall, and Griswold. One piece of evidence I gave was that Smith often 
speaks of viewing ourselves as others are likely to view us. The reference to other spectators 
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suggests that when we view ourselves, as conscience, we are judging ourselves using what 
we take to be other spectators’ principles, not those which we take to be our own. 
But such a reading conflicts with a key feature of Smith’s account of moral sentiments: we 
only have unmediated access to our own faculties and principles, never to those of others. 
Smith is quite explicit on this point in TMS 1.1.1.1 (restated here): 
 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of 
the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should 
feel in the like situation. 
 
And he makes the same point again in TMS 1.1.3.10: 
 
Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in 
another. I judge your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my 
reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, 
nor can have, any other way of judging about them. 
 
We cannot ever view situations as others do in the sense of exercising their faculties and 
principles. We can only infer what others feel and think, either by considering how we would 
feel and think using our own faculties and assuming their faculties operate similarly, or by 
examining their verbal and bodily expressions and connecting those expressions to certain 
feelings and thoughts, as taught to us by experience.  
 Smith makes a similar point in Part I when he first discusses what happens when an 
agent’s sentiments do not initially agree with the sentiments of spectators. It will be helpful 
here to quote at length: 
 
As they continually place themselves in his situation, and thence conceive of 
emotions similar to what he feels, so he is as constantly placing himself in theirs, and 
thence conceiving some degree of that coolness about his own fortune, with which he 
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is sensible that they will view it. As they are constantly considering what they 
themselves would feel, if they actually were the sufferers, so he is as constantly led to 
imagine in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the spectators of 
his own situation. As their sympathy makes them look at it, in some measure with his 
eyes, so his sympathy makes him look at it, in some measure, with theirs, especially 
when in their presence and acting under their observation: and as the reflected 
passion, which he thus conceives, is much weaker than the original one, it necessarily 
abates the violence of what he felt before he came into their presence, before he 
began to recollect in what manner they would be affected by it, and to view his 
situation in this candid and impartial light (TMS 1.1.4.8, emphases added).  
 
The first point is that we as agents place ourselves into the situation of a spectator. We are 
imagining that we are in the situation of the spectator, and from that situation, we imagine 
what feeling we would come to. It is this imaginary change in situation that leads to our 
coming to a new “reflected passion”, which is “similar to” that of the spectator, though 
“much weaker than the original one”. At no point do we exercise our faculties in the manner 
that the spectator actually does. Instead, our faculties generally operate differently under 
different situations. In this case, the change in situation (from ours as agent to that of the 
spectator) results in a change in how our faculties operate, thus producing a different 
sentiment from our original one.  
Furthermore, it is the change in situation, not in the adoption of different faculties or 
principles, to which Smith refers when speaking of viewing ourselves “with [the spectators’] 
eyes”. It is through sympathy that we come to view ourselves as others do. But “sympathy” 
involves a spectator entering into the situation of an agent, or vice versa, to determine how 
the spectator would feel in the situation of the agent: “[the spectators] constantly consider 
what they themselves would feel” (emphases added). Thus, we only view the situation as 
others do “in some measure”, for we are still viewing the situation using our own faculties 
and principles, not theirs. What I am suggesting, then, is that we should read Smith’s claims 
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that we judge “with the eyes” (e.g. TMS 3.1.1.2) or “in the light” in which others view us 
(e.g. TMS 2.2.2.1) as our judging ourselves from the situation of others, but not with their 
faculties and principles. Similarly, when Smith speaks of how our judgments “must always 
bear some secret reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, 
or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others” (TMS 3.1.1.2), Smith is not 
claiming that we judge ourselves using what we take to be the principles of others. Rather, he 
is pointing out that our judgments of ourselves using the faculties and principle we typically 
use when evaluating the motives and actions of others often give us insight into how others 
do or might view us from their situation. Smith repeats this point later in the same paragraph 
when he writes how we approve ourselves by “placing ourselves in his [any other fair and 
impartial spectator’s] situation” (emphasis added).  
These points extend to Smith’s discussion of conscience. Consider how he begins his 
account of conscience:  
 
The principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our conduct, 
seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise the like judgments 
concerning the conduct of other people (TMS 3.1.1.2, emphasis added). 
 
We judge ourselves the same way we judge others. But the manner in which we judge others 
is not to enter into the situation of the agent and consider how others would feel from the 
same situation. Rather, we judge an agent by imaginatively entering into the agent’s situation 
and determine what we as spectators would feel from that situation. Similarly, when we 
divide ourselves to both agent and spectator, we as spectators judge us as agent by 
imaginatively entering into the situation of the agent and considering what we as spectators 
would feel in that same situation, not what others would feel. And it is this change in 
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situation, in our entering into the situation of an impartial spectator to judge ourselves, that 
we view ourselves “with the eyes” of others: 
 
We begin, upon this account, to examine our own passions and conduct, and to 
consider how these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear to us 
if in their situation. We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and 
endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us (TMS 
3.1.1.5, emphases added).  
 
Again, Smith stresses that we consider how we appear to others by entering into their 
situation and consider how we, not they, would feel. We see as others do, in their light, not 
by taking on their faculties and principles, but by taking on their situation. And it is because 
we enter into this different situation that we as spectator is not the same as we the agent: “But 
that the judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as 
impossible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the effect” (TMS 
3.1.1.6). This difference between us as spectator and us as agent is not that we use different 
faculties and principles to make judgments when occupying these two different perspectives. 
Rather, our faculties and principles operate differently as a result of the change in situation. 
 
2.6 Interpretive Issue #2: ‘Impartial’ Spectators 
There is another feature that has been thought central to Smith’s account of 
conscience: impartiality. Smith often refers to conscience as the ‘supposed impartial 
spectator’. And in judging ourselves, we often do attempt to judge ourselves from the 
situation of an impartial spectator. But it is unclear exactly what role impartiality plays in 
conscience. Some have suggested that impartiality is essential for conscience: 
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[I-C] Conscience must be impartial, i.e. our judging ourselves from the 
situation of an impartial spectator. 
 
If an agent is not judging herself from the situation of an impartial spectator, then an agent is 
not judging herself as conscience. Thus, conscience is not just any self-judgment; it is an 
agent’s self-judgment as an impartial spectator. The support for this interpretation stems 
from an interpretation of Smith’s more general view of moral judgments:  
 
[I-M] Only impartial spectators can have moral sentiments (e.g., Macfie 
1967, Griswold 1999, Carrasco 2004 & 2008, Sayre-McCord 2010, 
Schliesser 2011, and Fleischacker 1999).  
 
Thus, if conscience does indeed issue moral judgments on the agent, then it must be an 
impartial spectator. I argue that neither of these views is correct, and that Smith does not 
adopt [I-C]. Smith’s recognition that we are liable to self-deception, even in our judgments of 
ourselves, suggests that Smith makes room for conscience to judge partially. The confusion, I 
take it, is between moral judgments and correct moral judgments. Impartiality is required for 
forming correct moral judgments but not for forming any moral judgments. 
Commentators have taken different routes in interpreting Smith as endorsing [I-M]. 
For instance, A. L. Macfie begins by noting a shift in Smith’s language: from ‘spectator’ to 
‘impartial spectator’. In his presentation of the sympathetic mechanism, Smith refers to the 
‘spectator’ as the one who judges (e.g. TMS 1.1.1.4-11, 1.1.3.1, 1.1.4.6-8). But after that, in 
discussing the amiable and respectable virtues, judgments of merit and demerit, and then 
later, conscience, Smith refers to the one judging as the ‘impartial spectator’ (e.g. TMS 
1.1.5.4, 1.1.5.8, 1.2.3.8, 2.1.2.2-3, 2.2.2.1, 2.3.2.2-4) and the ‘supposed impartial spectator’ 
(e.g. TMS 3.1.2.32, 3.1.3.1, 6.2.1.22). According to Macfie, this shift indicates that in 
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presenting the sympathetic mechanism, Smith is merely presenting the psychological 
mechanism, present in all spectators, that gives rise to fellow-feeling. However, Smith does 
not gives his account of moral sentiments until later, particularly in Part II and III in which 
Smith refers explicitly to impartial spectators (Macfie 1967, 94).  
Let me begin by pointing out that the shift is not as drastic as Macfie presents it. 
Smith refers to ‘impartial spectators’ with greater frequency in Part II and III of TMS. But 
Smith also continues to refer to ‘spectator’ without the qualification ‘impartial’ after Part I, 
and specifically in discussions of moral sentiments (e.g. TMS 2.1.5.6, 2.2.1.1-2, 2.2.1.4, 
2.2.1.7, 2.2.2.2, 3.1.1.5-6, 3.1.3.21). So even if there is a shift in Smith’s language, it is 
difficult to identify a specific point at which this shift occurs, and to draw any conclusions 
from when this shift occurs.  
Still, Macfie is correct in pointing out that the sympathetic mechanism alone does not 
give rise to moral sentiments. The sympathetic mechanism only results in the spectator’s 
actually feeling some semblance of what the spectator would feel in the situation of the 
agent. But what Macfie overlooks is that the description of the mere psychological 
mechanism ends at TMS 1.1.2. And in TMS 1.1.3, Smith begins his account of the judgments 
of propriety and impropriety: 
 
To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the 
same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of 
them as such, is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with 
them (TMS 1.1.3.1).  
 
Smith would agree with Macfie that the feelings in the spectator arising from the sympathetic 
mechanism are not moral sentiments. However, in observing the agreement or disagreement 
between that sympathetic sentiment of the spectator and the original sentiment of the agent, 
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we form a moral sentiment. Thus, the judgments of propriety and impropriety, described in 
Part I, are genuine moral sentiments. Yet Smith never refers to impartial spectators in this 
section at all, but instead refers to “the sympathetic emotion of the spectator” (TMS 1.1.3.1), 
suggesting that impartial spectators are not necessary for moral sentiments.  
D. D. Raphael gives a different explanation for the use of ‘impartial spectator’. There 
are various passages in TMS in which Smith appears to be making generalizations about 
spectators. Consider, for instance, the following: 
 
But these, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and are 
approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with 
them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with 
them (TMS 2.1.2.2, emphases added). 
 
This passage is in Part II, but seems to refer back to Part I in which Smith discusses 
propriety. And so even though Smith does not always use ‘spectator’ with the qualification 
‘impartial’, he seems to have had impartial spectators in mind all along. As Raphael puts it: 
 
[Smith] knows that unanimity cannot always be guaranteed and so he sometimes introduces a 
slight qualification, as in “every impartial spectator” or “every indifferent by-stander” (TMS 
II.i.2.2); but, since the passage containing those phrases is almost immediately followed by 
“every human heart”, the qualification counts for little. Smith in fact takes for granted that a 
spectator or bystander will be impartial just because he is not a party to the conduct judged 
(Raphael 2007, 17). 
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So even though Smith sometimes does qualify ‘spectators’ with ‘impartial’ or 
‘indifferent’, this qualification holds little weight – contra Macfie’s reading – because Smith 
seems to assume that the spectators for which his generalizations hold are impartial.74  
To some degree, Raphael is correct. All spectators tend to be at least more impartial than the 
agents that they judge because we generally do not feel for others the degree to which we feel 
for ourselves. The spectator, in entering into the situation of another and imagining how the 
spectator would feel, generally has a dulled response to the situation because the spectator is 
not the agent, not the one that is actually going through that situation: 
 
My companion does not naturally look upon the misfortune that has befallen me, or 
the injury that has been done me, from the same point of view in which I consider 
them. They affect me much more nearly (TMS 1.1.4.5).  
 
In other words, because spectators are entering into the situation of someone else, and 
because generally people are more concerned about themselves than others, spectators will 
not be as concerned for the agent in the agent’s situation as the agent is for herself. And so 
spectators are generally more impartial than the agents that the spectators judge. 
There are, however, several problems with Raphael’s conclusions. For one, even if it 
turns out that spectators are generally impartial, that fact alone does not show that partial 
spectators cannot make moral judgments. At most, that most spectators are more impartial 
about the actions of agents than are those agents themselves shows that most of those who 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Similarly, Campbell argues that because impartial spectators are judging from this shared position (similar to 
Hume’s common point of view; see Cohen 1997 and Korsgaard 1999), Smith can speak of impartial spectators 
as the impartial spectator: “The spectator standpoint is the common ground which unites men because it is when 
they are in the position of non-involved spectators that they tend to agree most readily…. This process…!
explains why he thinks he is justified in talking of the impartial spectator”!(Campbell 1971, 138). “The impartial 
spectator”!is simply a way of speaking of the generalizations that appear to hold for all impartial spectators. So 
when Smith refers to conscience as the supposed impartial spectator, Smith is presenting conscience as the 
embodiment of all the generalizations we hold of impartial spectators.  
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make moral judgments are more impartial than the agents they judge. Or alternatively, it may 
be that Smith is giving a more limited account of moral judgments, restricting his discussion 
to how impartial spectators make moral judgments. But even if Smith were to assume that 
spectators are at least more impartial on these matters than those they judge, he is in no way 
committed to the stronger claim that they must be more impartial. Moreover, he surely need 
not assert that spectators are fully impartial. This would be an exceedingly uncharitable 
interpretation as Smith agrees with Hume that when a spectator judges the reactions, motives 
or behavior of someone he loves, he is much less impartial than when evaluating a stranger. 
But setting this issue aside, there are problems with interpreting Smith in this manner, 
i.e. as using ‘spectator’ to refer to impartial spectators. For one, Smith is well aware that 
spectators can be partial, even if they are not a party to the conduct judged, and can be partial 
to varying degrees. If by ‘impartial’ Raphael means the spectator is devoid of any or almost 
all bias, to a larger extent, he is simply mistaken. Though a spectator may not be affected by 
self-love, she may very well be partial for other reasons, like particular habits and customs 
that make the spectator more or less likely to agree in sentiment with the agent (e.g. 1.2.2.1-
6, 6.1.1.2). Spectators can be biased in various ways, depending on their relationship with the 
agent, e.g. family, friends, acquaintances, that affect their judgments without the presence of 
any self-interest. On the other hand, if by ‘impartial’, Raphael means the spectator is less 
partial than the agent because of the absence of self-love, then it is unclear how this greater 
impartiality provides the kind of generalization that Raphael claims Smith is making. Given 
the variance in degree of bias that could still exist with this minimal degree of impartiality, 
Smith’s generalizations about how we judge would not hold true. Take a simple example like 
determining the proper punishment to an agent for a wrong done. Even if all spectators are 
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less partial than the agent, each spectator would come to different judgments depending, in 
part, on their relationship to the agent. Friends and family, because of past experiences, will 
be more sympathetic to the agent than a stranger, and even more so than friends and family 
of the victim, who would be more sympathetic to the victim.75 So Raphael might be correct 
that spectators are generally more impartial since self-love does not bias their judgment the 
way that it does the parties involved. But this would not reflect Smith’s use of ‘impartial’, 
which implies a much greater degree of impartiality.  
Furthermore, there are many instances throughout TMS in which it would be a 
mistake to assume that ‘spectator’ without qualification is referring to an impartial spectator. 
Let me just point out one such instance, though I think there are many more. In TMS 
2.2.3.11, Smith discusses a case in which a spectator “both punish[es] and approve[s] of 
punishment, merely from a view to the general interest of society, which, we imagine, cannot 
otherwise be secured.” In such cases, the spectator is faced with multiple sentiments, founded 
on very different principles.76 One sentiment is that which makes the severity of the 
punishment “appear necessary, and, for that reason, just and proper.” This sentiment is 
grounded in a principle that causes us to look at the more “remote consequences”, “either a 
considerable inconveniency, or a great disorder in the society.” The consideration of the 
consequences on the society-at-large seems to suggest that the spectator is impartial. The 
problem is that Smith here is distinguishing the judgment resulting from consideration of 
society-at-large with judgments stemming from the spectator’s sympathetic resentment 
(resentment that resonates with an impartial spectator), which makes the punishment seem !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Because of these sources of bias other than self-love, Campbell, for instance, interprets Smith as assuming the 
stronger sense of impartiality in making generalizations in, e.g., TMS 1.2.3.1 (Campbell 1971, 110).!
76!“The very different sentiments with which the spectator views those different punishments, is a proof that his 
approbation of the one is far from being founded upon the same principles with that of the other”!(TMS 
2.2.3.11).!
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“excessively severe.” This contrast suggests that judgments stemming from considerations of 
the “remote consequences” of an action are not judgments of merit made from an impartial 
situation because they do not make use of the sympathetic mechanism. Rather, they are more 
akin to those resulting from following general rules which are used to correct judgments of 
partial spectators. This is not to say that the spectator is not impartial to any degree. Instead, 
since this particular spectator appears to be judging from multiple principles, and not all 
require impartiality, it makes sense to leave open the question of the spectator’s impartiality. 
In general, we should pay close attention to the context, because though Smith often assumes 
impartiality for certain generalizations, he does also speak of people in general, both partial 
and impartial.  
Finally, assuming impartiality from the beginning fails to appreciate a central theme 
in Smith’s work: we become more impartial by correcting for our biases.77 In Part I, Smith 
gives a detailed explanation of how we may be partial in our judgment, and then come to be 
more impartial through interaction with others. Whether or not we are partial, we only have 
one way to judge the faculties of others: by comparing theirs with ours. When we run into a 
disagreement with others, we attempt to come to an agreement by disengaging from our 
situation and entering into their situation because we usually desire to have corresponding 
sentiments (TMS 1.1.2.1). The key is that both the spectator and the agent try to see through 
the eyes of one another. Through this process, both become more impartial because by seeing 
through each others’ eyes, they come to a shared situation, one that is not particular to one or 
the other. In that situation, they gain a degree of indifference which allows them to overlook 
any difference in opinion and have fellow-feeling: “so that, though our opinions may be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77 Many have already recognized Smith’s focus on moral development and education. For a more in-depth 
discussion, see Evensky (2005), Hanley (2009), Heilbroner (1982), and Macfie (1967). !
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opposite, our affections may still be very nearly the same” (TMS 1.1.4.5). A spectator can do 
so by adopting “the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to 
render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation” (TMS 1.1.4.6). The agent, 
likewise, must enter fully into the situation of the spectator, “conceiving some degree of that 
coolness about his own fortune, with which he is sensible that they will view it” (TMS 
1.1.4.8). By doing so, the agent comes to “view his situation in this candid and impartial 
light,” since one is able to place oneself in a more disinterested position, i.e. one that is not 
clouded by self-love and custom.78 It is particularly telling that this discussion of becoming 
more impartial comes after the discussion on how people make judgments of propriety and 
impropriety. If impartiality of the spectator is assumed in explaining how people come to 
approve and disapprove, it is unclear why Smith would wait to discuss impartiality, and even 
less clear why he would feel a need to give an account of how people become more 
impartial.79  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 It is easy to read TMS 1.1.4.8, which states that the agent comes to “view his situation in this candid and 
impartial light”, as only making a claim about the agent’s impartiality (e.g. Raphael 2007). But remember that 
this candid and impartial view is referring to the view of the spectator who not only engaged in this imaginative 
exercise of entering into the agent’s situation, but also does so fully. Just as the agent may be partial, so might 
the spectator. And in cases that the spectator is partial, it is the spectator that needs to imaginatively enter into a 
different situation to come to a sentiment that agrees with the agent.!
79 Raphael points out that this first appearance of ‘impartial spectator’!occurs in the context of the virtue of self-
command (TMS 1.1.5.4). According to Raphael, Smith only stresses impartiality of the spectator when 
discussing “the effect on the agent of the reactions of spectators”!(also see Shaver 2007, 193); hence, Raphael 
stresses the connection between impartiality and the virtue of self-command, since it is only the impartiality of 
the one judged that is of interest (Raphael 2007, 34). Self-command, then, is “essentially to feel for ourselves 
only what we see others can feel for us”, for the one judged to come closer to impartiality by viewing herself 
through the eyes of the spectator. I think Raphael is mistaken here. He is correct that impartiality is first 
introduced in the context of self-command, but he overlooks the fact that Smith is specifically speaking of the 
self-command of one’s feelings of resentment. The excessively strong feeling of resentment, the one that the 
impartial spectator cannot go along with, is what Smith calls ‘rage’. The more moderate feeling of resentment, 
the one felt by the impartial spectator, is what Smith calls ‘that noble and generous resentment’. Smith simply 
stresses the person judged coming to a more impartial stance. However, as I have tried to show, the spectator 
can also come to a more impartial stance by bringing herself closer to the situation of the one judged. Hence, 
impartiality is connected to both the virtue of self-command and the virtue of humanity.  
The only other time we find ‘impartial spectator’!in Part I is in TMS 1.1.5.8, which is not in the context 
of resentment. However, this passage harkens back to the discussion in TMS 1.1.4.5-8. Both passages discuss 
cases in which the spectator and the agent disagree in sentiment. In these cases of disagreement, both the 
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More recently, Maria Alejandra Carrasco has taken a quite different approach. 
Carrasco endorses both [I-C] and [I-M]: that conscience must be impartial and that only 
impartial spectators can make moral judgments, respectively. But she does so because she 
endorses an even stronger claim: moral sentiments require an appeal to conscience. Her 
argument relies on a distinction between the brute and uncultivated “natural sentiments” of 
partial spectators and the “moral” or “appropriate” sentiments of impartial spectators 
(Carrasco 2004, 87 and 2008, 136). Natural sentiments are our initial responses to an agent’s 
motives or action. Such feelings are not adjusted in any manner, and are generally excessive 
or deficient in the eyes of other (impartial) spectators. Moral sentiments, on the other hand, 
are sentiments of an ideal impartial spectator, i.e. conscience. By considering what an 
impartial spectator would feel, we adjust our initial (natural) sentiments to align more closely 
with that of conscience. We come to feel the appropriate sentiment, the sentiment that all 
impartial spectators would feel. And without this refinement through the appeal to 
conscience, we simply do not have moral sentiments.  
In defense of her interpretation, Carrasco points to a passage from TMS 3.1.3.28, in 
which we are torn between two sentiments: 
 
In such paroxysms of distress, if I may be allowed to call them so, the wisest and 
firmest man, in order to preserve his equanimity, is obliged, I imagine, to make a 
considerable, and even a painful exertion. His own natural feeling of his own distress, 
his own natural view of his own situation, presses hard upon him, and he cannot, 
without a very great effort, fix his attention upon that of the impartial spectator. Both 
views present themselves to him at the same time. His sense of honour, his regard to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
spectator and the agent try to become closer in sentiment to one another. In TMS 1.1.5.8, Smith is pointing out 
that even after the spectator enters as much as possible into the situation of the agent, and the agent tries to 
lower the degree of sentiment, there may be no fellow-feeling because the sentiments of the agent are too 
overwhelming.!
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his own dignity, directs him to fix his whole attention upon the one view. His natural, 
his untaught and undisciplined feelings, are continually calling it off to the other. He 
does not, in this case, perfectly identify himself with the ideal man within the breast. 
 
Smith is presenting a conflict between our “natural feelings” and the feelings we have in 
virtue of adopting the perspective of an impartial spectator. Carrasco takes this distinction to 
be between natural sentiments, which are our “untaught and undisciplined feelings”, and 
moral sentiments, which are disciplined. And in this context, these disciplined feelings are 
referring to those of conscience, which is “impartial, universal, and reflexive” (Carrasco 
2004, 86). Thus, Carrasco concludes: 
 
I think it is clear that Smith does not believe that our notions of moral good and evil 
arise from our brute or natural sentiments but rather from our sentiments informed by 
the impartial spectator. Before the development of this “inmate within the breast” we 
simply do not make moral judgments…. The contrivance of our nature that enables us 
to identify good and evil certainly includes sentiments, but sentiments informed by 
the impartial spectator (Carrasco 2004, 87).80 
 
Moral sentiments, then, are the sentiments we feel after considering what conscience, an 
impartial spectator, would feel, and aligning our sentiment with it. They are not simply any 
sentiment arising from the sympathetic mechanism, but rather one arising from the 
sympathetic mechanism applied to conscience’s perspective to adjust our original sentiment. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 By “inmate within the breast”!and “impartial spectator”, Carrasco is referring to the supposed impartial 
spectator, i.e. conscience. Sayre-McCord provides a similar analysis in which judgments of deservedness are 
tied to the view of the supposed impartial spectator, which he calls ‘Impartial Spectator’!(Sayre-McCord 2010, 
130). For our purposes, we only need to note that Carrasco is claiming that any moral judgment is one made 
from a moral sentiment, i.e. a sentiment informed by an impartial stance, and not a natural sentiment.  
Eric Schliesser makes a similar distinction, but he views moral sentiments as “the cultivated feelings 
humans acquire from the local social institutions that acculturate them”!(Schliesser 2011, 20). And so unlike 
Carrasco, Schliesser does not require the appeal to the supposed impartial spectator to form moral sentiments; 
instead, he requires the cultivation of sentiments from social settings to form moral sentiments. Though my 
responses are directed at Carrasco, they are equally applicable to Schliesser.!
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So then it is not until Part III, when Smith introduces conscience, that Smith gives an account 
of moral sentiments.  
 There are several issues with Carrasco’s interpretation. The strongest, most direct 
evidence against Carrasco’s reading is the following passage: 
 
[O]ur first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other 
people; and we are all very forward to observe how each of these affects us (TMS 
3.1.1.5, emphases added).  
 
If Carrasco is correct, then our first moral sentiments occur after the development of 
conscience. But this passage is a summary of what he has presented thus far, and it occurs 
before his presentation of conscience. More importantly, Smith claims that our first moral 
judgments are of others. And given the context, he is referring to his account of how we 
judge others presented in Part I and II: “In the forgoing parts of this discourse, I have chiefly 
considered the origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the sentiments and 
conduct of others” (TMS 3.1.1.1). Conscience, on the other hand, is described as the means 
by which we judge ourselves: “I come now to consider more particularly the origin of those 
concerning our own” (TMS 3.1.1.1).  
Her reading of TMS 3.1.3.28 is also problematic. In that passage, Smith is without a 
doubt distinguishing between our natural (“untaught and undisciplined”) sentiments and our 
sentiments informed by conscience. Carrasco assumes that this distinction is between non-
moral and moral sentiments. But Smith never makes such a claim, nor does he suggest such a 
distinction, for instance, through his use of ‘moral’ or ‘morality.’ Instead, the context 
suggests that Smith has a wholly different distinction in mind. In this chapter, Smith is 
discussing how conscience disciplines, refines, and corrects our sentiments:  
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In the same manner, to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or 
gain of a very small interest of our own, appears to be of vastly more importance, 
excites a much more passionate joy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, 
than the greatest concern of another with whom we have no particular connexion…. 
Before we can make any proper comparison of those opposite interests, we must 
change our position. We must view them, neither from our own place nor yet from 
his, neither from our own eyes nor yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes 
of a third person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with 
impartiality between us (TMS 3.1.3.3). 
 
The “natural feelings” that Smith describes in TMS 3.1.3.28 are these “selfish and original 
passions of human nature.” The key is that the original sentiment is what we feel as an agent, 
not as a spectator. Upon encountering some situation that affects us, we initially tend to feel a 
stronger degree of self-love than what would be agreeable to others. These “selfish passions” 
are described in detail in TMS 1.2.5. This excess of self-love, however, is felt by the one who 
is now under judgment by conscience, not by a spectator of another. In contrast, the feelings 
we have as conscience are what we feel as spectator, specifically as an impartial spectator of 
ourselves. We view ourselves from the situation of an impartial spectator, and feel very 
differently than we do as agent. And through this change in person, we correct for this 
“natural inequality of our sentiments”, i.e. we feel something much closer to what all other 
spectators would feel.  
This contrast parallels Smith’s discussion of how we divide ourselves when judging 
ourselves: “I, the examiner and judge” and “I, the person whose conduct is examined into 
and judged of” (TMS 3.1.1.6). And this parallel is maintained in TMS 3.1.3, “Of the influence 
and authority of conscience”, in which Smith describes people of differing degrees of self-
command. The struggle is between viewing the situation as an agent, with all the original, 
natural sentiments that come with such a viewpoint, and viewing the situation as a spectator, 
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with the more refined sentiments that align much closer to those of others. The child with no 
self-command has all these natural sentiments without any restraint: “it endeavours always, 
by the violence of its outcries, to alarm, as much as it can, the attention of its nurse, or of its 
parents” (TMS 3.1.3.22). The person of weak self-command is only able to view herself as a 
spectator for a short duration, and is only “becalmed the moment [spectators] come into his 
presence” (TMS 3.1.3.23). She is unable to continuously view herself as a spectator. She is 
soon brought back to feel what she originally did as agent, to her original (natural) passions 
of “sighs and tears and lamentations” felt from “[h]is own view of his situation” (TMS 
3.1.3.23). The person of strong self-command, the “man of real constancy and firmness”, on 
the other hand, is able to constantly view herself as conscience, and feeling as she does from 
this viewpoint as a spectator:  
 
He has never dared to forget for one moment the judgment which the impartial 
spectator would pass upon his sentiments and conduct…. He does not merely affect 
the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them. He almost identifies 
himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial spectator, and scarce even 
feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him to feel (TMS 3.1.3.25).  
 
Unlike those of weaker self-command, this person constantly views himself as a spectator, 
feeling as a spectator does, never returning to the original feelings from the viewpoint as 
agent.   
The contrast between what we feel as agent and what we feel as spectator is 
revealing. Carrasco is correct that the natural sentiments are not moral sentiments. But that 
they are not moral sentiments has nothing to do with the lack of appeal to conscience. 
Instead, it is because natural sentiments are sentiments felt as agents, and moral sentiments 
are sentiments felt by spectators. In Smith’s account, moral sentiments are sentiments of 
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spectators in response to something felt or done by agents. They are the sentiments we feel 
when we as spectators judge others by entering into their situation and considering what we 
would feel from that same situation. And because unlike the agent’s sentiments, the 
spectator’s sentiments are a product of this imaginative exercise, the spectator’s sentiments 
will always be different from the agent’s: 
 
What [the spectators] feel, will, indeed, always be, in some respects, different from 
what [the agent] feels, and compassion can never be exactly the same with original 
sorrow; because the secret consciousness that the change of situations, from which 
the sympathetic sentiments arises, is but imaginary, not only lowers it in degree, but, 
in some measure, varies it in kind, and gives it a quite different modification (TMS 
1.1.4.7). 
 
Similarly, when we judge ourselves, we take on the roles of both agent and spectator. But 
only we as spectators are the ones who are engaging in this imaginative exercise, and who 
have moral sentiments. The distinction between natural and refined sentiments is not 
essentially one between non-moral and moral sentiments. Rather, natural sentiments are the 
initial, often partial, sentiments we feel as agents, and the refined sentiments are the 
sentiments we feel when we as spectators attempt to judge ourselves. These refined 
sentiments are moral sentiments in virtue of their being the sentiments of spectators judging 
agents, not because they result from conscience. 
Finally, Carrasco is correct that Smith thinks we adjust our sentiments by viewing the 
situation in a more impartial light, and that this process of adjusting our sentiments by 
appealing to the impartial perspective is part of moral education. However, Carrasco thinks 
this process is necessary for moral sentiments. But Smith often speaks of moral sentiments of 
partial spectators, of spectators who fail to appeal to this impartial perspective. And when 
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such partial spectators do appeal to the impartial spectator, they correct, not form, moral 
sentiments. In other words, the appeal to conscience is not necessary for the formation of 
moral sentiments, but rather for the correcting of both our moral and non-moral sentiments.  
For instance, in TMS 1.3.3, Smith provides a detailed account of the various ways in which 
our “disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor 
and mean condition” corrupt our moral sentiments. He states:  
 
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to 
despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary 
both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, 
at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral 
sentiments (TMS 1.3.3.1). 
 
This, of course, does not indicate that a spectator need not be impartial to make moral 
judgments. But his discussion here is important for understanding how he uses ‘corruption’. 
In the “middling and inferior stations of life,” acquisition of wealth and greatness often 
results from praiseworthy virtuous character: “real and solid professional abilities, joined to 
prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success” (TMS 1.3.3.5). 
However, this is not so for the “superior stations of life,” in which “success and preferment 
depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed equals, but upon the fanciful 
and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud superiors” (TMS 1.3.3.5). Because 
we associate wealth with certain praiseworthy characters, we often approve of the wealthy, 
even when they lack virtue. The result is that people begin to seek out wealth while 
abandoning the cultivation of virtuous characters. It is this confusion that Smith calls a 
“mistake” (TMS 1.3.3.3). And it is the “most studious and careful observer” that does not 
make this mistake in moral sentiments and aims for what is “more correct” (TMS 1.3.3.2).  
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Later, Smith speaks explicitly of different kinds of partiality that are, like the 
disposition to admire the rich and powerful, ‘corrupters’ of moral sentiments. In TMS 
3.1.3.41, he states: “The propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be corrupted, as 
when the indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the indifferent and impartial one is 
at a great distance.” Soon after, he specifies one kind of partiality: “Of all the corrupters of 
moral sentiments, therefore, faction and fanaticism have always been by far the greatest” 
(TMS 3.1.3.43).  And in Part V, Smith points out another ‘corrupter of moral sentiments':  
 
There are other principles besides those already enumerated, which have a 
considerable influence upon the moral sentiments of mankind, and are the chief 
causes of the many irregular and discordant opinions which prevail in different ages 
and nations concerning what is blameable or praise-worthy. These principles are 
custom and fashion, principles which extend their dominion over our judgments 
concerning beauty of every kind. (TMS 5.1.1.1).  
 
And these distorted moral sentiments, born out of the bias of custom and fashion, produce 
perverse moral judgments (see TMS 5.1.2.12).81 In each of these cases, Smith is pointing out 
that our moral sentiments can be corrupted by various partialities of the spectator. And by 
‘corrupted’ moral sentiments, all Smith means is that they are incorrect, not that they are not 
moral sentiments at all. So there is a connection between moral sentiments and impartiality: 
moral sentiments are often corrupted when the spectator is partial, e.g. when influenced 
heavily by custom and fashion or by faction.  
 This treatment of corrupted moral sentiments fits in nicely with Smith’s analogy 
between moral judgments and perceptual judgments. According to Smith, we make errors in 
our judgments of the dimensions of objects at a distance because by the “eye of the body”, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 More specifically, custom and fashion do not significantly affect our judgments of the “general style of 
character and behaviour”, but they do affect our judgments of the “propriety or impropriety of particular 
usages”!(TMS 5.1.2.12).!
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“objects appear great or small, not so much according to their real dimensions, as according 
to the nearness or distance of their situation” (TMS 3.1.3.2). We correct this inaccurate 
judgment by imaginatively entering into a more impartial situation. Similarly, we make 
errors in our moral judgments because our sentiments are often distorted as a result of our 
particular situation. And so “we remedy the defects of both these organs pretty much in the 
same manner” (TMS 3.1.3.2). In both cases, we form judgments using what the “eye of the 
body” and the “natural eye of the mind” (i.e. moral sentiments) give us, and when these 
judgments are erroneous, we correct for them by entering into a more impartial situation.82 
 In sum, spectators, including those employing their conscience, need not be impartial 
to have moral sentiments. Generally, spectators will be more impartial than the agent they are 
judging, for the agent’s reactions to her situation are affected by self-love in a way that does 
not affect the reactions of spectators evaluating the propriety of the agent’s reactions and the 
merit of the motives and actions to which they give rise. But spectators can be just as partial, 
if not more so, than agents, and still form moral sentiments; it is just unlikely that their 
sentiments will consistently agree with those that would be felt by impartial spectators. 
 
2.7 Interpretive Issue #3: ‘Ideal’ 
Several times, Smith refers to conscience as an ‘ideal’: the “ideal man within the 
breast” (TMS 3.1.3.26, 3.1.3.28-9, 3.1.4.4) and the “ideal spectator” (TMS 3.1.3.38). The 
general assumption is that this ideal judge embodies all the characteristics needed to form !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Smith also treats general rules like the appeal to impartial spectators in that general rules are used to correct 
our initial sentiments, e.g. TMS 2.2.3.10: “Our disapprobation of his ordinary character and conduct does not in 
this case altogether prevent our fellow-feeling with his natural indignation; though with those who are not either 
extremely candid, or who have not been accustomed to correct and regulate their natural sentiments by general 
rules, it is very apt to damp it”!(emphasis added). This passage also serves as an example of how Smith uses 
‘natural’!to describe our moral sentiments in both partial and impartial situation. The ‘natural indignation’!is the 
indignation that rises to the level that an impartial spectator would feel, whereas the ‘natural sentiment’!that is 
corrected and regulated by general rules is the sentiment that would arises in a partial spectator. !
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ideal (correct) moral judgments. In particular, this ideal judge is understood to be completely 
impartial and fully informed. For example, in the introduction to TMS, Haakonssen describes 
conscience as follows:  
 
We tend to imagine how a spectator would judge us and our behaviour if he or she 
was not limited by prejudice, partiality, ignorance, poor imagination and lack of 
ordinary good will in the way in which the actual spectators of us, including we 
ourselves, are limited. We imagine an ideal judgment and an ideal judge” 
(Haakonssen 2002, xv). 
 
Similarly, Carrasco claims that conscience, though initially nothing more than “social 
consensus”, eventually develops an independence from this consensus and becomes the kind 
of ideal judge that Haakonssen describes (Carrasco 2004, 106-7). The evidence for 
attributing these features to Smith’s conception of an ideal judge consists in various 
characterizations that Smith gives of conscience: “equitable judge” (TMS 3.1.1.2), “well-
informed” (TMS 3.1.2.32), “awful and respectable judge” (TMS 3.1.3.25), “complete 
impartiality of an equitable judge” (TMS 3.1.4.3), and  “the severe eyes of the most impartial 
spectator” (TMS 3.1.4.4). These descriptions leave us with the impression that conscience is 
ideal at least in that it is completely impartial and fully informed, endowed with all the 
capacities to judge, including superior imaginative and emotional abilities. As a result, 
conscience issues only ideal, i.e. correct, moral judgments. 
Under this interpretation of ‘ideal’, conscience is a spectator that feels and judges 
differently than any particular spectator does. When we judge others as spectators or adopt 
the perspective of spectator in judging ourselves, we are rarely fully informed and fully 
impartial. If conscience has these properties, judgments of conscience are ideal in ways that 
our typical judgments often are not. Thus, when we appeal to conscience and imagine how 
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conscience judges us, we must not be exercising our faculties as we generally do to judge 
others, but rather exercising our faculties as someone else, an abstract entity or a prototype 
that has all the features of an ideal judge, would judge.  
 Though Smith does speak of conscience as an ‘ideal’, Smith also speaks of 
conscience as faulty in certain respects, which suggests Smith does not think that conscience 
is ideal in the ways Haakonssen suggests. The primary textual evidence for my position 
comes from Smith’s discussion of self-deception in TMS 3.1.4. According to Smith, though 
we often attempt to judge ourselves as impartial spectators, we often fail to do so: 
 
So partial are the views of mankind with regard to the propriety of their own conduct, 
both at the time of action and after it; and so difficult is it for them to view it in the 
light in which any indifferent spectator would consider it (TMS 3.1.4.5). 
 
It is clear from the first half of this passage that we can form partial moral judgments of 
ourselves. But it is less clear what the self-deception is. The claim might be that we fail to 
judge ourselves as an impartial spectator and so fail to judge ourselves as conscience, for 
conscience is necessarily our judging ourselves as ideal (and thus impartial) spectator. The 
self-deception, then, is that we believe we are judging as conscience even though we are not, 
that we are hearing the voice of conscience when it is not conscience that is speaking to us. 
On the other hand, the claim might be that we judge ourselves as conscience, believing 
conscience to be impartial when it is not. Under this interpretation, the self-deception is that 
we believe conscience to be impartial when it is not, that conscience is judging us impartially 
and with full knowledge of the situation when it is not doing so. Conscience, in other words, 
need not be ideal.  
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To settle this matter, then, we need to determine whether we are appealing to 
conscience when, unbeknownst to us, we judge ourselves as partial spectators. If conscience 
must be an ideal (thus fully impartial) spectator, then we must not be appealing to conscience 
when we judge ourselves as partial spectators. But if conscience need not be ideal, then we 
can still be appealing to conscience when we judge ourselves as partial spectators. At times, 
Smith seems to adopt the former:  
 
The violent emotions which at that time agitate us, discolour our views of things; 
even when we are endeavouring to place ourselves in the situation of another, and to 
regard the objects that interest us in the light in which they will naturally appear to 
him, the fury of our own passions constantly calls us back to our own place, where 
every thing appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love (TMS 3.1.4.3). 
 
The passage here is similar to Smith’s discussion of the different degrees of self-command in 
TMS 3.1.3. Those of weak self-command are unable to continually appeal to conscience. 
Their difficulty is not in judging correctly as conscience, but rather in maintaining that 
perspective of conscience, in remaining in the situation of an impartial spectator: “with a 
weak man, it is not of long continuance” (TMS 3.1.3.23). They soon abandon their view as 
conscience, and return back to their own situation. Those of great self-command, however, 
are able to maintain that perspective of an impartial spectator, to continually appeal to 
conscience, so much so that they identify with it (TMS 3.1.3.25). Smith might be presenting 
the same difficulty here: we are attempting to view ourselves as conscience, but fail to 
because “the fury of our own passions constantly calls us back to our own place”, i.e. our 
own partial perspective on and reactions to our situation (colored as they are by self-love) 
and not that of conscience.  
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There is, however, a relevant difference between TMS 3.1.3 and 3.1.4. In TMS 3.1.3, 
Smith is discussing how we are often partial when an impartial spectator, either real or 
imagined, is not present: “The propriety of our own moral sentiments is never apt to be 
corrupted, as when the indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the indifferent and 
impartial one is at a great distance” (TMS 3.1.3.41). But in TMS 3.1.4, Smith explains how 
we can be partial even when an impartial spectator is present: 
 
In order to pervert the rectitude of our own judgments concerning the propriety of our 
own conduct, it is not always necessary that the real and impartial spectator should be 
at a great distance. When he is at hand, when he is present, the violence and injustice 
of our own selfish passions are sometimes sufficient to induce the man within the 
breast to make a report very different from what the real circumstances of the case 
are capable of authorizing (TMS 3.1.4.1, emphases added).  
 
The problem is not that we fail to view ourselves as conscience; Smith is clear here that the 
“man within the breast”, i.e. conscience, is present and forming a judgment. The problem is 
that when our self-love is far too strong, then even conscience can form sentiments that are 
not called for by the “real circumstances”, i.e. the actual situation. Conscience, in other 
words, can be infected by self-love such that it issues partial judgments. This point is 
repeated later in TMS 3.1.4: 
 
Of the manner in which those objects would appear to another, of the view which he 
would take of them, we can obtain, if I may say so, but instantaneous glimpses, which 
vanish in a moment, and which, even while they last, are not altogether just (TMS 
3.1.4..3, emphasis added). 
 
Smith is making two points here. For one, as he spoke of in TMS 3.1.3, we sometimes have 
difficulty sustaining this viewpoint of an impartial spectator. Hence, we might only get 
“instantaneous glimpses, which vanish in a moment”. But Smith is also pointing out that, 
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even when we do judge ourselves from that situation, i.e. even as conscience, our judgments 
“are not altogether just”. Smith, in other words, recognizes that even conscience can err in its 
judgment, and hence is not always ideal.  
 Later on, Smith states that we fail to judge ourselves correctly as conscience, even 
when we judge ourselves for something we have already done and our emotions regarding 
that situation have subsided:  
 
[W]hen the paroxysm of emotion, in the same manner as when the paroxysm of 
distress, is fairly over, we can identify ourselves, as it were, with the ideal man within 
the breast, and, in our own character, view, as in the one case, our own situation, so in 
the other, our own conduct, with the severe eyes of the most impartial spectator…. It 
is seldom, however, that they are quite candid even in this case…. It is so 
disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often purposely turn away our view 
from those circumstances which might render that judgment unfavourable (TMS 
3.1.4.4, emphasis added). 
 
Again, it is not that we fail to judge as conscience. Smith is clear that we are identifying 
ourselves with “the ideal man within the breast”, “with the severe eyes of the most impartial 
spectator”. So we do not fail to enter into the situation of an impartial spectator to judge 
ourselves. Rather, while in that situation of an impartial spectator, we begin to distort our 
own beliefs and sentiments to justify our prior actions. In other words, we do not use our 
faculties and principles the way we generally would when judging others, i.e. we are not 
candid in our judgments of ourselves.83 While in this imaginative exercise, we purposely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 To judge candidly is to judge in a manner consistent with how one’s own faculties and principles generally 
operate (and in that sense, to judge honestly). Thus, when we judge ourselves candidly, we judge ourselves as 
we would generally judge others. Judging consistently in this manner is not necessarily the same as judging 
impartially, for a spectator can be impartial (i.e. hold no connections with any of the parties involved) and still 
fail to judge consistent with human faculties and principles. Thus, Smith supplements ‘impartial’!with ‘candid’!
to stress that it is sometimes not enough simply to be an impartial spectator to make the correct or proper moral 
judgment: “[He] strives to regard himself, not in the light in which he at present appears, but in that in which he 
ought to appear…!if the sentiments of mankind were either altogether candid and equitable, or even perfectly 
consistent with themselves. The more candid and humane part of mankind entirely go along with the effort 
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ignore certain features of the situation, or we “endeavour to exasperate anew those unjust 
passions which had formerly misled us; we endeavour by artifice to awaken our old hatreds, 
and irritate afresh our almost forgotten resentments” (TMS 3.1.4.4). In such cases, conscience 
is present, but it fails to judge as an ideal spectator by failing to judge with full impartiality or 
to judge without considering all features of the situation.  
But if conscience need not be ideal, why does Smith refer to conscience as the ‘ideal 
judge’? I want to suggest that all that Smith means by ‘ideal’ is that conscience is in the best 
possible situation to judge correctly. Unlike the agent, conscience is one step removed from 
the agent’s situation and so less likely to feel too much self-love. And unlike outside 
spectators, conscience has better access to the agent’s motives, at least the motives of which 
the agent is aware.84 However, though conscience judges from an optimal position, it does 
not necessarily judge correctly, for even from this advantageous situation, it remains, as 
Smith notes, susceptible to the distorting influence of self-love. 
 The primary textual evidence for this reading concerns Smith’s two distinctions: 1) 
between sentiments of agents and those of spectators, and 2) between our judgments of 
ourselves and other spectators’ judgments of ourselves. I presented the first distinction in 
§2.6 in response to Carrasco’s interpretation.85 In that discussion, I argued that the spectator 
in question need not be conceived of as ideally impartial and so need not present his 
evaluations as those of his conscience. However, Carrasco is right that conscience tends to be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
which he thus makes to support himself in his own opinion (TMS 2.3.3.6, emphases added; also see TMS 
1.1.4.8, 3.1.3.28, 7.2.4.10).!
84 My interpretation aligns with that of Vivienne Brown :“The impartial spectator is ideally placed to do just 
this, as his location with respect to the moral agent provides impartiality, while his knowledge of the 
circumstances of the case enables him to make an informed judgment”!(Brown 1994, 29). Raphael (1975, 95) 
and Evensky (2005, 36-37) also provide similar interpretations. However, there is little defense of this 
interpretation. So my aim is to provide richer textual evidence in support of this interpretation.!
85 My point there was to show that moral sentiments are those of spectators (whether other spectators or an 
agent’s viewing herself from a spectator’s perspective) and involve the comparing of sentiments, whereas 
natural sentiments are those of unreflective agents and involve no comparison of sentiments.!
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more impartial than the agent in virtue of being a spectator. The agent is directly affected by 
her situation; spectators are always one step removed from that situation. As a result, 
spectators are generally more impartial than the agent. Smith initially made this point in TMS 
1.1.4.8, when he speaks of how the mere viewing ourselves from the situation of a spectator, 
not necessarily an impartial one, results in our viewing ourselves in a “candid and impartial 
light”. By becoming a spectator, the agent leaves her “natural station”, i.e. the situation of the 
agent, and views herself “at a certain distance” (TMS 3.1.1.2). She becomes a spectator that 
can now only consider the agent’s situation by imaginatively entering into it as all spectators 
must. But through this imaginative exercise, though the spectator may “form some idea of 
[the agent’s] sensations, and even feel something… which is not altogether unlike them”, the 
spectator generally feels something that is “weaker in degree” (TMS 1.1.1.2). This weaker 
sentiment is not a product of the spectator’s impartiality (Smith has yet to even mention 
impartiality at this point), but rather of the nature of the sympathetic process, of the 
difference between actually being in the situation as an agent and imaginatively being in the 
situation as a spectator. Hence, when we divide ourselves to spectator and agent to judge 
ourselves, our sentiments are modified: their character is less violent than they were when we 
reacted as an agent (TMS 3.1.1.6). In particular, conscience, like other spectators, lacks “the 
strongest impulses of self-love” and the “natural misrepresentations of self-love” (TMS 
3.1.3.4) felt by the agent initially, for like any spectator, conscience is not fully absorbed in 
the situation of the agent. 
While both an agent’s conscience and actual spectators are more impartial than that 
agent, conscience and actual spectators differ in how informed they are of the agent’s 
motives and actions. The distinction plays a central role in Smith’s division in TMS 3.1.2 
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between praise and praiseworthiness (i.e. the deservedness of praise). The two are different in 
kind.86 The former are others’ judgments of us (i.e. the approval of actual spectators); the 
latter, our judgments of how others ought to judge us,87 by which Smith means how others 
would judge if they were better informed: 
 
When he [the agent] views it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view 
it, he thoroughly enters into all the motives which influenced it, looks back upon 
every part of it with pleasure and approbation, and though mankind should never be 
acquainted with what he has done, he regards himself, not so much according to the 
light in which they actually regard him, as according to that in which they would 
regard him if they were better informed (TMS 3.1.2.5). 
 
Conscience judges as, we presume, others would had they been better informed. In other 
words, the gap between the praise actually received and the praiseworthiness judged by 
conscience is a product of conscience’s being better informed about the agent’s actions or the 
agent’s motives. Since conscience is the agent adopting a certain perspective on her actions 
and reactions, conscience has access to the agent’s motives and actions of which the agent 
herself is aware. Actual spectators, on the other hand, do not always have this information 
because spectators are not observing the agent at every moment, and furthermore must infer 
the motives of the agent, e.g. based on facial and verbal expressions. Thus, actual spectators 
are liable to be “deceived” (TMS 3.1.2.4) or “ignorant” (TMS 3.1.2.5) in ways that conscience 
is less susceptible.  This is not to say that conscience is not liable to deception or ignorance. 
We are often unaware of our own motives. We might mistakenly identify the sentiments that 
are driving our actions. For instance, I might be unaware of the jealousy that I feel towards a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86!“Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with 
one another, are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent of one another”!(TMS 3.1.2.2).!
87!“Praise and blame express what actually are; praise-worthiness and blame-worthiness, what naturally ought to 
be the sentiments of other people with regard to our character and conduct”!(TMS 3.1.2.25). !
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colleague and how that jealousy is motivating me to work harder so that I can gain more 
accolades. I genuinely believe that I am driven by a desire for security so that I can better 
provide for my family, when in fact that desire is quite weak. However, because conscience 
does not have this additional barrier of having to infer the thoughts and sentiments of the 
agent, conscience has some epistemic advantage over outside spectators. As a result, 
conscience becomes the standard by which we measure ourselves, not the praise of actual 
spectators, for conscience does not issue judgments that are not rooted in ignorance or 
mistake, but correctly assesses the propriety of the agent: 
 
It is by no means sufficient that, from ignorance or mistake, esteem and admiration 
should, in some way or other, be bestowed upon us. If we are conscious that we do 
not deserve to be so favourably thought of, and that if the truth were known, we 
should be regarded with every different sentiments, our satisfaction is far from being 
complete. The man who applauds us either for actions we did not perform, or for 
motives which had no sort of influence upon our conduct, applauds not us, but 
another person (TMS 3.1.2.4).  
 
If the man without should applaud us, either for actions which we have not 
performed, or for motives which had no influence upon us; the man within can 
immediately humble that pride and elevation of mind which such groundless 
acclamations might otherwise occasion, by telling us, that as we know that we do not 
deserve them, we render ourselves despicable by accepting them (TMS 3.1.2.32).  
 
In these cases, in which praise is not forthcoming from others because they are ignorant of 
our motives, we justly retain our belief in our praiseworthiness because of the inner praise 
issued by conscience, for it is the more accurate judgment, grounded on the truth about our 
motives and actions. 
 Conscience, then, is not ideal in that it is the perfect judge, one with no partiality and 
perfect knowledge of the situation such that it only forms correct moral judgments. Rather, it 
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is ideal in that it is in a privileged position to judge the agent: it is more impartial than the 
agent before her reflects in virtue of the agent’s having adopted the perspective of a spectator 
at some distance from the agent’s situation, and conscience is more well-informed than any 
actual spectators in virtue of being the agent herself, having direct access to all of the agent’s 
motives and actions without the need to infer them from observations. But such a notion of 
an ideal spectator leaves open the door for self-deception and uncorrected sentiments still 
biased by the agent’s self-love (discussed in TMS 3.1.4), for though conscience may be more 
impartial than the agent and more informed than actual spectators, it does not necessarily 
have complete impartiality and full information, and so may still form incorrect moral 
judgments. 
 
2.8 Assessing Smith on Conscience 
In the previous chapter, I presented an overview of the history of ‘conscience’ and 
highlighted some key features that any plausible account of conscience must explain:  
 
[1] Conscience at least seems to provide moral knowledge, i.e. knowledge of what 
is good, right, or proper.  
[2] Conscience involves judgments of particulars, that some particular feeling, 
intention, or action is good, right, or proper in some particular instance.  
[3] Conscience is not infallible; we are capable of doubting our own conscience, 
and admit that our conscience can be mistaken, at least with regard to 
particular moral judgments. 
[4] Conscience is private in that one has direct access only to one’s own 
conscience. 
[5] Conscience is like a judge or witness in that it makes us aware of what we 
have done with respect to some moral standard. 
[6] Conscience motivates certain behaviors, specifically through emotions like 
guilt and shame, as well as tranquility and self-content. 
 
! 109 
Smith’s theory is able to account for all these features. Conscience judges us from a situation 
that the agent herself believes to be the optimal situation from which to judge. And so 
conscience always at least appears to issue correct moral judgments, providing us with what 
seems to be knowledge of what is proper and improper. Those moral judgments are specific 
to the particular situation of the agent: conscience enters into the particular situation of the 
agent and judges the agent with regard to that situation only. Conscience does not issue more 
general judgments of what is or is not proper across a range of situations. Though conscience 
appears to provide moral knowledge, it is not infallible; conscience can be infected by self-
love, the same way our judgments of others can be. Each conscience is specific to the agent, 
since conscience just is the agent judging herself, using all of her own faculties and 
principles. Yet, because conscience is the agent judging herself from a different situation, she 
appears to be like a spectator distinct from us who judges us and makes us aware of what we 
have or are about to do. Finally, we (generally) derive pleasure from the agreement of 
spectators, and displeasure from their disagreement. This sentiment extends to conscience – 
the most intimate of all spectators for it has access to our innermost motives. We feel 
pleasure when conscience approves of our actions, and displeasure when it disapproves. 
Through such feelings, we are then motivated to change our behavior accordingly so that we 
maintain conscience’s approval or avoid its disapproval.  
Aside from accounting for these features, Smith’s view has some advantages over the 
alternatives I present in Chapter 1. Medieval philosophers and Hobbes grounded conscience 
in practical reason: conscience was a function of practical reason by which we derived 
knowledge of what to do in a particular situation by deriving the right action syllogistically 
from the first principles of morality (or in the case of Hobbes, definitions). The problem with 
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this picture of conscience is that it is inconsistent with our phenomenological experience of 
conscience. The phenomena that Medieval philosophers and Hobbes describes are really 
more explicit and deliberate forms of moral reasoning. However, conscience is often 
experienced without such deliberation. Conscience seems to come upon us, rather than 
operate under our deliberate control. Thus, we experience conscience as a watchful eye that 
we cannot escape, as the feelings of guilt that we cannot shake.88 
 Smith is able to avoid this issue because conscience does not issue moral judgments 
in such a rigid manner. Conscience is grounded in imagination, not reason.89 Through 
imagination, we divide ourselves such that there are now two distinct judgments, one by we 
the agent and one by we the spectator. This divided self is consistent with our common 
imagery of conscience as an internal witness or judge, or as the representative of God within 
us.90 We as the agent are imagining another being, a spectator, who actually judges us. Yet, 
unlike actual spectators, and like God, this imagined spectator has access to all of our past 
and present motives, and our past, present, and intended actions. Of course, Kant also 
describes conscience as an internal judge: conscience is that internal tribunal in which a 
judge convicts or acquits us of having acting in accordance or against our duties. However, in 
Kant’s system, conscience only judges of whether or not we have lived up to our duties, and 
so provides us with information about the consistency between our moral beliefs and our 
actions. It does not seem to provide us with any knowledge of what to do beyond what we 
already believe we ought to do. For such knowledge, we need to turn instead to, e.g., the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Fuss leveled the same criticism against Broad’s account of the cognitive aspect of conscience (Fuss 1964, 
114).!
89 Carrasco (2004) attempts to argue that Smith denies conscience as a function of theoretical reason, but not 
practical reason. Most commentators, however, take Smith at his word when he explicitly denies conscience as 
a function of reason in any sense (D. D. Raphael 2007, Darwall 1999, Kleer 1995, Otteson 2002). !
90 Smith refers to conscience as “the demigod within the breast”, “those vicegerents of God within us”, and “the 
substitute of the Deity”. For more on Smith’s religious commitments in TMS, see Hill (2001), Evensky (2005), 
Brown (1992-1993), and Schliesser (2008).  !
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Categorical Imperative. In Smith’s system, conscience does check for consistency in our 
duties (as we believe them to be) and our actions, but does so by forming its own judgment 
of what is right to do. In other words, conscience provides moral knowledge by issuing a new 
judgment that corrects our prior judgment.  
 Finally, because Smith builds up conscience from more basic faculties of the human 
mind, he does not have to rely on any theory of a distinct faculty of the mind. Both Butler 
and Freud relied on a distinct faculty (for Butler, conscience as a distinct judging faculty; for 
Freud, the superego) to account for conscience. As Langston points out, one of the reasons 
that conscience seems to have fallen out of favor in contemporary ethics is that doubt arose 
as to whether such a distinct faculty exists (Langston 2001). Smith, however, grounds his 
theory in a more basic, better understood set of human capacities: our capacity to feel and act 
from those feelings, and our capacity to imagine being (feeling and acting) in another 
person’s situation.91  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Jan Horst Keppler provides an extensive treatment of how Smith builds up our moral faculties from more 
basic capacities in Adam Smith and the Economy of Passions (2010).!
! 112 
3 
 
 
Cultivating Conscience: The Amiable Virtues 
 
There is nothing more dangerous than the conscience of a bigot.  
 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
 
 Conscience is commonly described as a moral guide: it directs us toward the right 
motive and action by either commanding or convicting us to perform it. Hence, we often 
appeal to its dictates in deciding how we ought to feel and act toward others, or in justifying 
ourselves to others. Yet, few would argue that conscience is infallible in its moral judgments. 
Bonaventure and Aquinas were well aware that conscience errs, leading us to do what is 
sinful all the while believing we are obeying God.92 Mill seemed to think that conscience can 
serve as a moral guide, but only after it has received proper education and training.93 
Similarly, Kant claimed that though we cannot determine when we experience conscience 
and so have no duty to obey conscience, we have a duty to develop our conscience so that it 
correctly presents our moral duties and convicts (or acquits) us accordingly.94 So there has 
long been a general recognition that conscience does err, and that there was a need to 
properly educate it if it is to be a reliable moral guide. The difficulty, however, is in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Bonaventure (1980, 120); Aquinas (1980, 132). !
93 Mill (U 3.8-11). !
94 Kant (MM 6:401). !
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providing a plausible account of how to improve our conscience given that we are liable to 
self-deception: we believe conscience judges correctly when it does not.  
 Smith recognized that conscience can and does err, and that we need safeguards for 
protecting ourselves against an erroneous conscience. He was especially worried about how 
we can correct conscience in the face of self-deceit, which prevents us from realizing that 
conscience has erred in the first place. Smith’s explicit account for how we correct our 
erroneous conscience is that through experience, we form general rules of what is proper or 
improper in a given situation, and that such rules can correct for our erroneous conscience.  
 In this chapter, I argue that though general rules are crucial for the moral 
development of an agent, the articulation and acceptance of such rules is limited in its ability 
to combat self-deceit and to correct for an erroneous conscience. General rules help an agent 
act properly but only in matters of justice; they do not do much to mitigate the errors that 
conscience makes in other areas of judgment. I suggest an alternative account of how we 
cultivate conscience: since conscience uses all the same faculties and principles we use to 
judge others, we can only improve conscience by improving how we judge others generally. 
We need to develop our capacity to evaluate ourselves as spectators, thereby acquiring what 
Smith calls the ‘amiable virtues’. Smith does not focus on this aspect of moral development, 
and instead focuses on self-command. As a result, Smithean scholarship has focused on how 
to better feel and do what is proper through the use of conscience, and has largely ignored the 
question of how to improve conscience. This oversight, I believe, is a serious mistake. Smith 
places conscience at the core of a virtuous person, but it can only serve the role that Smith 
gives it if conscience is highly developed. My aim then is to sketch a clearer picture of how 
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we can cultivate conscience within Smith’s theory of moral development, with a focus on the 
importance of encountering diversity. 
  
3.1 How Does Conscience Err? 
 An errant conscience is a conscience that fails to form the correct moral judgment of 
the agent who is judging herself. Conscience might judge the agent to have felt the proper 
degree of resentment when she did not, or to be blameworthy for an action that was proper. 
Though Smith does not use the term ‘errant conscience’, it is clear that he thinks that our 
moral judgments of ourselves can err: 
 
In order to pervert the rectitude of our own judgments concerning the propriety of our 
own conduct, it is not always necessary that the real and impartial spectator should be 
at a great distance. When he is at hand, when he is present, the violence and injustice 
of our own selfish passions are sometimes sufficient to induce the man within the 
breast to make a report very different from what the real circumstances of the case are 
capable of authorising (TMS 3.1.4.1).95 
 
However, Smith is less clear about the different ways in which conscience can err. I want to 
begin by highlighting some primary ways in which conscience errs, ways that are consistent 
with Smith’s moral theory. I am drawing here on the different ways that we err in our 
judgments of others. Smith recognizes these kinds of errors. Furthermore, it is wholly 
consistent with his account of conscience that conscience fall prey to the same kinds of 
errors.  
 First, we can be uninformed about the agent’s situation, either completely unaware or 
simply mistaken of certain facts of the case. Thus, we come to an incorrect judgment of what 
we would feel in that situation and, as a result, incorrectly approve or disapprove of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 See Chapter 2 for a detailed account of Smith on conscience’s fallibility.!
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agent. Smith first suggests this possibility in explaining how we sympathize with others. He 
notes that certain passions and actions, like the “furious behaviour of an angry man,” serves 
to “disgust and provoke us against them” even though we are uninformed of what provoked 
the agent’s anger (TMS 1.1.1.7). It is possible that we simply withhold judgment when we are 
not fully informed of the situation. When we are unsure of the situation, and aware that we 
are, “[g]eneral lamentations… create rather a curiosity to inquire into his situation” (TMS 
1.1.1.9). Yet even then, we do not sympathize with the agent, and until we are informed 
otherwise, “our sympathy with the grief or joy of another…. is always extremely imperfect” 
(TMS 1.1.1.9). Furthermore, though Smith speaks here of our being uninformed, he thinks we 
can also be mistaken about the situation, e.g. when a person is falsely accused (TMS 2.1.5.6). 
In all these cases, if I know of the details of your situation, I may be more inclined to agree 
with you since I may be affected by those details in the same way. However, because I am 
unaware of those details or misinformed about them, I do not affected by those details and so 
feel quite differently from you. My imperfect sentiment then becomes the basis for my errant 
moral judgments. 
 To some degree, conscience is less susceptible to this kind of error because 
conscience and the agent are one and the same person, so that an agent’s conscience has 
access to all the same information that the agent does. In particular, conscience has access to 
the agent’s motives and action, about which other spectators are often uninformed. Other 
spectators often praise “from ignorance or mistake” (TMS 3.1.2.4), failing to praise even 
when praise is deserved if they should never be acquainted with what [the agent] has done” 
(TMS 3.1.2.5). Conscience, however, not only praises but also judges the praiseworthiness of 
the agent, of the praise deserved “if the truth were known” (TMS 3.1.2.4), “if [the spectators] 
! 116 
were better informed” (TMS 3.1.2.5). Thus, conscience does not seem to suffer from the 
same problem of false beliefs or ignorance that spectators often face when judging others.96 
 However, even though conscience is better informed of the agent’s motives and 
actions, it may not be better informed about all the other aspects of the situation. Because 
conscience and the agent are one and the same, conscience only has access to information 
about the situation that the agent has. Thus, if the agent is uninformed, so is conscience. And 
the agent can be uninformed about many aspects of the situation, beyond her own motives 
and actions. For instance, suppose I am furious at your stepping on my foot because I am 
uninformed of the fact that you had a muscle spasm that resulted in your stepping on my foot. 
If I remain unaware of this fact as I appeal to conscience, then conscience will judge me to be 
perfectly proper in feeling resentment towards you, even though it is improper for me to feel 
resentment given you had no ill-motive. It is not uncommon for agents to be uninformed of 
some aspect of the situation, and as a result feel and act improperly. And if the agent is 
uninformed, conscience, which is really just an aspect the agent’s mind, will also be 
uninformed in the same way. 
 Second, we can form incorrect moral judgments when we fail to account for the 
inconsistency in our current state and the way our faculties and principles generally operate. 
Smith, for instance, recognizes that the spectator’s current state can influence how the 
spectator feels upon entering into the agent’s situation: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 As I stated in the previous chapter, the claim is not that people (and their conscience) are always fully aware 
and correct about their own motives. We might have hidden, unconscious motives, or might be simply mistaken 
about which sentiment is motivating our actions. Still, conscience does have one epistemic advantage over 
outside spectators: it does not need to make inferences to the motives of which the agent is aware. Because 
conscience does not need to infer what the agent (knowingly) feels, conscience has one less possible source of 
error.!
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We may often approve of a jest, and think the laughter of the company quite just and 
proper, though we ourselves do not laugh, because, perhaps, we are in a grave 
humour, or happen to have our attention engaged with other objects. We have 
learned, however, from experience, what sort of pleasantry is upon most occasions 
capable of making us laugh, and we observe that this is one of that kind (TMS 
1.1.3.3). 
 
Smith thinks that when we are attuned to our current state, e.g. “grave humour”, then we can 
adjust our moral judgments accordingly based on our experience of how we have felt in 
situations like the agent’s. However, if we are unaware of our current state, then we cannot 
account for this abnormality in forming a judgment of others. If I am downtrodden and 
unaware of it, then when I enter the situation of a person in great spirit, I will not be able to 
feel nearly the same because my current state prevents me from imaginatively feeling 
anything so cheerful. 
 Similarly, conscience can be unaware of its own state and so fail to account for 
peculiarities that may affect its sentiments when judging others. This occurs because, again, 
the agent and conscience are one and the same person using the same faculties. Thus, the 
agent’s sentiments often “carry over” over to (or unduly bias) his or her conscience. If the 
agent is in a grave mood, then conscience is exercising its faculties from this grave mood. If 
the agent does not adjust for her current mood, then neither will her conscience. The mere 
change in situation, of an agent to that of a spectator, will not necessarily change a person’s 
mood from grave to balanced. The change in situation might mean that the conscience’s 
sentiments are less pronounced in some respects since sentiments arising from the 
sympathetic mechanism generally does not rise to the phenomenological level or intensity 
with which they are felt by the agent with whom one is sympathizing (TMS 1.1.1.2). So the 
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change in situation might mitigate the effects of these peculiarities by dulling the sentiments, 
but it will not eliminate them altogether. 
 Third, we form incorrect moral judgments because of the various corrupting 
influences on our moral sentiments. Smith claims that various natural principles of human 
nature, if not properly regulated, lead us to approve of what is not proper, and disapprove of 
what is proper. In other words, these influences corrupt us as spectators, as the judge of 
others and ourselves. For instance, we have a natural disposition to admire those who display 
great wealth and power, regardless of whether or not they are virtuous. As a result, we come 
to approve of and follow in the steps of those with wealth and power, even if they lack all the 
virtues. For the same reasons, we disapprove of those in “poor and mean condition” even if 
they are virtuous and simply fell into bad fortune (see TMS 1.3.3 titled “Of the corruption of 
moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, 
and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition”). Custom and fashion also can 
corrupt our moral sentiments, though not to the degree that the disposition to admire the 
wealthy and powerful can.97 Custom and fashion often compound the degree to which we 
approve or disapprove of another: “When custom and fashion coincide with the natural 
principles of right and wrong, they heighten the delicacy of our sentiments, and increase our 
abhorrence for every thing which approaches to evil” (TMS 5.1.2.2). Also, the differences in 
custom and fashion among the “different professions and states of life” and the “different 
situations of different ages and countries” lead to wide variance in what is considered proper 
and what virtues we deem most praiseworthy (TMS 5.1.2.4-11). Though Smith claims that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 “Since our sentiments concerning beauty of every kind, are so much influenced by custom and fashion, it 
cannot be expected, that those, concerning the beauty of conduct, should be entirely exempted from the 
dominion of those principles. Their influence here, however, seems to be much less than it is every where else”!
(TMS 5.1.2.1; also see TMS 5.1.2.12).!
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our moral sentiments are not “very grossly perverted” by custom and fashion, he does admit 
that they can and are corrupted to some degree by custom and fashion (TMS 5.1.2.13).98 
 The question is whether conscience is immune to these corrupting influences, or at 
least better at tempering these dispositions so that the conscience of the wealthy and powerful 
do not approve of their actions beyond what they deserve (nor the consciences of the poor 
and dispossessed unduly disapprove of their own actions) and our consciences do not (in 
general) approve or disapprove of sentiments and actions as a product of custom or fashion. 
Smith does not take up this issue directly, but his account of these corrupting influences 
suggests that conscience does not necessarily mitigate their effects. For Smith, conscience 
corrects for our moral sentiments by allowing us to view ourselves as an impartial spectator. 
Smith also claims that these corrupting influences are present in impartial spectators. For 
instance, if two people with the same intent and action produce different results, we would 
judge the person who confers greater benefit on us more meritous, even though they are not 
deserving of greater merit. More importantly, our judging as impartial spectators does not 
diminish the corrupting influence of fortune: “[t]his consideration, they imagine, should [be 
so] even in the eyes of the impartial spectator” (TMS 2.3.2.2).99 Similarly, Smith claims that 
custom affects how we judge the degree to which a particular quality is “blamable or praise-
worthy” (TMS 5.1.2.7). For Smith, conscience, as opposed to actual spectators, is that which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Smith claims that we need to account for the differences in “rank and profession”!when we judge the 
propriety of others: “when we bring home to ourselves their situation in this particular respect, we must be 
sensible, that every occurrence should naturally affect them more or less, according as the emotion which it 
excites, coincides or disagrees with the fixt habit and temper of their minds”!(TMS 5.1.2.5). For instance, given 
the role of a clergy person, we “cannot expect the same sensibility to the gay pleasures and amusements…!
which we lay our account with in an officer”!(TMS 5.1.2.5). It might seem as if he is claiming that there is no 
impropriety arising from the differences in custom and fashion. However, Smith is not making such a claim. He 
is pointing out that though “custom has allotted”!certain manners for certain professions, the propriety of those 
manners for those engaged in those professions are “independent of custom”!(TMS 5.1.2.5).!
99 Though Smith claims that this irregularity of our sentiments has some benefits (TMS 2.3.3.3), he claims that 
such irregularity is nonetheless “unjust” (TMS 2.3.2.2), and that the proper sentiment is the sentiment that a 
spectator would feel if it were “either altogether candid and equitable, or even perfectly consistent with 
themselves” (TMS 2.3.3.6).  
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forms judgments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness (TMS 3.1.2). So though Smith 
does not focus on the effects of these corrupting influences on conscience (and instead on the 
effects of excessive self-love), he does seem to acknowledge that conscience is not immune 
to these corrupting influences.  
 Fourth, we form incorrect moral judgments by being partial: we fail to account for the 
particular relation that we have with the agent. The way we judge is influenced by the 
relationship we have with the agent. The closer we are to that agent, the more likely we are to 
agree with her sentiments. Parents generally do not judge their children improper because 
they care much more about their children than strangers, and so tend to side with their 
children and agree with their sentiments, even though they would not do the like for strangers 
(TMS 3.1.3.22). Similarly, friends judge fellow friends more favorably than they would a 
stranger because they care more deeply about friends than strangers, though not to the degree 
that a parent does (TMS 1.1.4.9). These biases are not born of any fact about the situation and 
the agent’s response to it. Rather, these biases are solely a product of the relationship 
between the spectator and agent: the closer the relationship to the agent, the more likely it is 
that the spectator agrees with the agent, regardless of the propriety of the agent’s sentiments. 
If the spectator does not account for the particular relation to the agent, then the spectator is 
susceptible to errant moral judgments. This is not to say that partial spectators will always 
make an errant moral judgment. For example, we can correctly judge the propriety of the 
actions of our enemies, against whom we are biased (TMS  2.3.1.5). However, these natural 
sources of bias do mean that spectators will need to adjust their moral judgments in 
recognition of the partial relation that they bear to certain agents. 
! 121 
 Though conscience is aimed at judging as an impartial spectator, who presumably has 
no relation to the agent, conscience is particularly vulnerable to errors from partiality because 
it is directed at the very agent whose conscience it is. Hence, conscience is vulnerable to 
“caring” more about the agent than other people because conscience shares the closest 
possible relationship to to the agent: a relationship with itself. The danger, then, is the same 
danger that agents face in assessing what is proper to the situation. Agents feel an overly 
strong self-love, or preference for themselves, when they are affected by the situation. 
Similarly, though judgments of conscience are the products of an agent’s attempt to adopt the 
perspective of a spectator on her own actions, judgments of conscience are still products of 
that agent’s mind, and are therefore affected by a greater degree of self-love than the 
judgments of a numerically distinct spectator. This partiality presents itself in two primary 
ways. For one, when we consult conscience prior to acting so that we can determine what is 
proper to do, “the eagerness of [the agent’s] passion will seldom allow us to consider what 
we are doing, with the candour of an indifferent person” (TMS 3.1.4.3). It is difficult for 
conscience to fully disassociate itself from the agent. So conscience is often in danger of 
adopting the agent’s sentiments, feeling the same sentiment by becoming affected by the 
situation in all the same ways as the agent. Thus, though conscience can disagree with the 
agent, it is also vulnerable to agreeing with the agent’s more immediate (less reflective) 
reactions to her situation and approving of her more often than do the evaluations of others, 
whether or not the agent is proper.100 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 This form of partiality may seem similar to the previous kind of error. In both cases, the agent’s sentiments 
are transferred over to conscience, which affects how conscience judges. However, there is a key difference. 
When conscience does not account for the agent’s unusual mood, it fails to address an influence that is 
independent of the agent’s relationship with the spectator, e.g. the depressive episode that the agent undergoes 
alone. However, when conscience does not account for partiality, it fails to address the influence of the 
relationship itself.!
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 Conscience is also vulnerable to error because when the agent appeals to conscience 
to judge some prior action of hers, conscience has difficulty disapproving of that action 
because doing so would mean disapproving of itself. Unlike the prior case, the agent’s 
sentiments does not infect conscience’s judgments. Once the action is completed, the agent’s 
sentiments subside. Yet even then, “[i]t is seldom… that they are quite candid” because “[i]t 
is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often purposely turn away our view from 
those circumstances which might render that judgment unfavourable” (TMS 3.1.4.4).101 A 
strong sense of self-love does not impose itself on conscience as a result of its sharing its 
faculties with the agent. Rather, conscience strongly favors the agent, just as a mother favors 
her child over other children, or just as a person favors a friend over a stranger. We wish to 
look at those closest to us in a more favorable light, and so conscience distorts or ignores 
various aspects of the situation, including the motives and actions of the parties involved, to 
come to a more favorable judgment of the agent. This is not to say that conscience cannot set 
aside this bias to judge as a more impartial spectator. However, the relation between 
conscience and agent leaves conscience vulnerable to such bias, which, left unchecked, 
results in an errant moral judgment.  
 This partiality that conscience has for the agent, both before and after the agent 
commits the act, constitutes the essence of self-deception. For Smith, self-deception is not 
merely conscience’s unknowingly erring in its moral judgment, which is the case when 
conscience is simply misinformed about the situation. Instead, self-deception requires that 
conscience distorts its sentiments, either distorting (or ignoring) various aspects of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Smith repeats these points in TMS 6.3.1.22: “The principle of self-estimation may be too high, and it may 
likewise be too low. It is so very agreeable to think highly, and so very disagreeable to think meanly of 
ourselves, that, to the person himself, it cannot be well doubted, but that some degree of excess must be much 
less disagreeable than any degree of defect.”!
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situation or igniting old passions to form a more favorable moral judgment of the agent. 
Conscience “turn[s] away our view from those circumstances which might render that 
judgment unfavourable (TMS 3.1.4.4). Or it views the situation the way the agent does, 
“where every thing appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love” (TMS 3.1.4.3). 
Conscience might also “foolishly and weakly, endeavour to exasperate anew those unjust 
passions which had formerly mislead us”, to “awaken our old hatreds, and irritate afresh our 
almost forgotten resentments” (TMS 3.1.4.4). Self-deception, in other words, is conscience’s 
failure in being honest with itself and the agent. By allowing self-love to infect its judgments 
through these distortions, conscience is not judging with the “candour” of an impartial 
spectator, by “pull[ing] off the mysterious veil of self-delusion, which covers from his view 
the deformities of his own conduct” (TMS 3.1.4.4). We lie to ourselves about the motives and 
actions of others and ourselves, facts of the case, and the consequences of our actions. 
Moreover, conscience genuinely believes itself to be judging as an impartial spectator, 
unaware that it is being dishonest in this way since “[t]he passions… all justify themselves, 
and seem reasonable and proportioned to their objects, as long as we continue to feel them” 
(TMS 3.1.4.3). So even though conscience may purposely distort its sentiments or the 
situation, it does not believe itself to be doing so, and instead believe that it judges as an 
impartial spectator.102  
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 There is much more to be discussed regarding self-deceit in Smith’s theory. I limited my discussion here to 
how self-deception serves as a barrier to correcting our own sentiments. For more detailed discussions of Smith 
on self-deception, see Hanley (2009), Mitchell (1987), and Schliesser (2003). For a helpful contrast between 
Smith and Butler on self-deception, see Martin (1986). !
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3.2 Correcting an Erroneous Conscience: The Explicit Account 
Immediately after introducing the problem of self-deceit, Smith gives an account of 
how we overcome it. Smith’s explicit account is that from our repeated observations of our 
own moral judgments of others, we find that “all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced 
in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of” and from those observations, we are 
thusly able to form general rules about what is proper in certain situations (TMS 3.1.4.8). 
These general rules are initially a product of “[o]ur continual observations upon the conducts 
of others” (TMS 3.1.4.7, emphases added). But those rules are further confirmed when we 
hear “every body about us express the like detestation” (TMS 3.1.4.7). Once these general 
rules are “universally acknowledged and established, by the concurring sentiments of 
mankind”, these rules become the standard for judging one another (TMS 3.1.4.11). But more 
important for our purposes, it is only when these rules become “fixed in our mind by habitual 
reflection” that they become effective in correcting our erroneous conscience, in correcting 
the “misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our 
particular situation” (TMS 3.1.4.12). To be “fixed in our mind” is for us to develop the “awe 
and respect with which he has been accustomed to regard it” (TMS 3.1.4.12), “what is 
properly called a sense of duty” (TMS 3.1.5.1). It is only once we develop this sense of duty 
that the general rules effectively correct for our erroneous conscience, because it is only then 
that we feel the “agonies of doubt and uncertainty”, “terror”, and the “fury of his desires to 
violate it” “at the thought of violating so sacred a rule” (TMS 3.1.4.12). Hence, “[w]ithout 
this sacred regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct can be much depended on” 
(TMS 3.1.5.2).103 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 For an excellent in-depth discussion of the role of general rules in combatting self-deceit, particularly on 
matters of justice, see Khalil (2009) and Haakonssen (1981). !
! 125 
 I want to emphasize that though our sense of duty is confirmed and sometimes 
heightened by agreement with others in our judgments of obligation, unless we adopt these 
general rules as reflections of our better judgment, then those general rules do not have any 
effect in correcting our erroneous conscience. It is because we formed these rules by 
reflecting on our moral judgments that we come to respect them. The mere fact that others 
consistently make moral judgments of a certain kind in certain circumstances does not result 
in the kind of awe and respect for general rules that Smith thinks is central to our sense of 
duty. If it is to be our sense of duty, and not the mere fear of the disapproval or punishment 
of others, that is to motivate us to correct our conscience, then we must find the general rules 
to be a reflection of our own moral judgments. Hence, Smith writes: 
 
At the very time of acting, at the moment in which passion mounts the highest, he 
hesitates and trembles at the thought of what he is about to do: he is secretly 
conscious to himself that he is breaking through those measure of conduct which, in 
all his cool hours, he had resolved never to infringe, which he had never seen 
infringed on by others without the highest disapprobation, and of which the 
infringement, his own mind forbodes, must soon render him the object of the same 
disagreeable sentiments (TMS 3.1.4.12, emphases added). 
 
General rules, at least the ones we apply to correct our conscience, are rules formed from our 
own judgments, not from the judgments of others.  
Our own moral judgments are, of course, heavily influenced by those of others.104 
Through the years, how we judge others might be shaped by the judgments others make of us 
and of third parties. When others agree with our moral judgments, then we are more 
confident of our moral judgments; when others disagree, we sometimes change our initial 
moral judgments to better align with those of others. But unless we endorse their judgments, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 Even this might be an understatement given the kind of influence that parents, friends, and educators have on 
our moral development.!
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unless we judge the same, then we do not feel reverence or awe for the rules that might be 
extracted from their judgments.  
Finally, the respect and awe that we have for general rules can be “further enhanced 
by an opinion… that those important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the 
Deity, who will finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty” (TMS 
3.1.5.3). In regarding these general rules as the laws of the Deity, “they necessarily acquire a 
new sacredness” (TMS 3.1.5.12):  
 
How vain, how absurd would it be for man, either to oppose or to neglect the 
commands that were laid upon him by Infinite Wisdom, and Infinite Power! How 
unnatural, how impiously ungrateful not to reverence the precepts that were 
prescribed to him by the infinite goodness of his Creator, even though no punishment 
was to follow their violation  (TMS 3.1.5.12). 
 
Aside from the heavy rhetoric, his point is that the observing of general rules is a product of 
the esteem with which we hold those rules. At first, we do so because of our own 
commitments to those moral judgments, for we are the ones who made or endorsed those 
moral judgments.105 This is what Smith calls our “natural sense of duty”. It then becomes 
reinforced by the agreement with others. And finally, we gain an even greater sense of 
reverence and awe for those rules when we accept them as the laws of God, as not simply 
general rules that I lay down for myself, or those that others lay down for themselves, but 
what the Almighty lays down for all. This enhanced reverence for the general rules provides 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 It is possible, or even likely, that we endorse general rules without building them up from our own moral 
judgments. For instance, parents often teach children these general rules without any (explicit) rationale, and 
children view those rules with respect. In such cases, children are deferring their judgments to their parents. 
Smith does not discuss such instances in TMS, but his overall point still holds true: our “natural sense of duty”!is 
grounded in our agreeing with and giving esteem to the general rules.!
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us with an even stronger motive for acting in accordance with those rules, even when our 
conscience initially judges it proper to do otherwise.  
 
3.3 Limits of General Rules 
 Though Smith explicitly appeals to general rules as the means for correcting 
erroneous conscience, I think it would be a grave mistake to think that the adoption of 
general rules is the only means, or even the primary or best means, by which we correct 
conscience. First of all, general rules are formed inductively from our particular moral 
judgments, and so are vulnerable to error as with any other inductive reasoning. All that is 
required for forming general rules is consistency in our moral judgments, and there may very 
well be consistency in erroneous judgments. Now, Smith does not think there will be errors 
of the sort with regard to the “general style of conduct or behaviour” (TMS 5.1.2.14) for if 
certain basic rules of justice are not in place and followed to a substantial degree, then a 
society would simply collapse (e.g. TMS 2.2.3.6, 5.1.2.16). But that does not mean that 
people are somehow immune to error when it comes to general rules. Smith seems to leave 
open the door for erroneous general rules when he admits that we can, through custom, have 
laws, a kind of general rule, that may have been reliable for determining proper action in the 
past, but are not so reliable today. For instance, infanticide was practiced in the “earliest 
period of society” because during those times, a person is frequently unable to provide 
support for both herself and her child. And in such cases, it is proper to abandon the child, 
and to do so customarily since such instances were so frequent. But in “all the states of 
Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians”, such a custom, such a rule of action, 
would be perfectly improper, for these states are not faced with such frequent hunger (TMS 
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5.1.2.15). Any general rules allowing for infanticide in these states would be “destructive of 
good morals”, capable of “establishing, as lawful and blameless, particular actions, which 
shock the plainest principles of right and wrong” (TMS 5.1.2.14). So though it seems unlikely 
that the most general of the principles of action will turn out to be erroneous, Smith 
recognizes that we can make errors in the continued adoption of at least some general rules of 
action that have persisted despite a change in context that renders them maladaptive.  
 Secondly, even if we were to form correct general rules, these rules are limited in two 
ways: we can only form accurate general rules regarding matters of justice, and the general 
rules that combat self-deceit only apply to conduct, not motives.106 Let me address each 
limitation in turn. We form a wide range of different moral judgments. However, only 
judgments of what is demeritous, i.e. rules of justice, have the constancy required for the 
formation of applicable general rules. All other moral judgments, i.e. judgments of propriety, 
impropriety, and merit, vary too much for us to make any inductive inference: 
 
The general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which determine what are 
the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity, of gratitude, of friendship, are in 
many respects loose and inaccurate, admit of many exceptions, and require so many 
modifications, that it is scarce possible to regulate our conduct by a regard to them…. 
There is, however, one virtue of which the general rules determine with the greatest 
exactness every external action which it requires. This virtue is justice. The rules of 
justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or 
modifications, but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves, 
and which generally, indeed flow from the very same principles with them (TMS 
3.1.6.9-10).107 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 I am expanding on Griswold’s claim that general rules do not serve as a substitute for moral judgment and so 
there is a need for moral education, which “will teach the observer how to judge”!(Griswold 1999, 214).!
107 Smith repeats the same points by drawing an analogy to the written language: “The rules of justice may be 
comparable to the rules of grammar; the rules of the other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the 
attainment of what is sublime and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, and indispensible. The 
other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought 
to aim at, than afford us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it” (TMS 3.1.6.11).!
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There is enough constancy in our judgments of, say, murder and theft that we can lay down 
general rules for such cases (that it is demeritous to murder under any, or most, 
circumstances; that it is demeritous to steal under most circumstances). But for most other 
matters, like what is proper to give to charity, or what actions are deserving of reward, we 
have difficulty forming general rules with much precision because our judgments in such 
cases vary more from situation to situation. There is far too much variance in what is proper 
to do from one situation to the next, such that any general rules that we can form will still 
“admit of ten thousand exceptions” (TMS 3.1.6.9). Thus, these rules, if we are able to form 
any such rules, will not provide much guidance on what is proper to do:  
 
If your benefactor attended you in your sickness, ought you to attend him in his? or 
can you fulfill the obligation of gratitude, by making a return of a different kind? If 
you ought to attend him, how long ought you to attend him? The same time which he 
attended you, or longer, and how much longer? If your friend lent you money in your 
distress, ought you to lend him money in his? How much ought you to lend him? 
When ought you to lend him? Now or to-morrow, or next month? (TMS 3.1.6.9). 
 
Loose and inaccurate rules are not of much help in answering these questions, so those rules, 
Smith claims, should not be given much regard: “To affect, however, a very strict and literal 
adherence to them would evidently be the most absurd and ridiculous pedantry” (TMS 
3.1.6.9; also see TMS 3.1.6.8). We are much better off assessing each case on its own merit, 
rather than on a general rule.  
 Additionally, the general rules that Smith claims corrects for our erroneous 
conscience only direct our conduct, not our motives or sentiments. In his discussion of the 
general rules that correct for self-deceit (TMS 3.1.4), Smith qualifies every instance of 
‘general rules’ with ‘conduct’, ‘what to do’, and ‘action’, for instance:  
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Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to 
ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or 
to be avoided (TMS 3.1.4.7, emphasis added). 
 
The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all 
actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or 
disapproved of (TMS 3.1.4.8, emphasis added).  
 
Those general rules of conduct, when they have been fixed in our mind by habitual 
reflection, are of great use in correcting the misrepresentations of self-love 
concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular situation (TMS 3.1.4.12, 
emphasis added). 
 
These general rules, in other words, only extend to what we ought to do. They override any 
sentiment we have by commanding us to act in some way without any regard for how we 
ought to feel or what our motive ought to be.  
 Smith makes the same qualifications when describing the sense of duty. This sense is 
not merely a feeling of obligation born of these general rules that correct conscience; it is a 
feeling of obligation to act even when we have strong motives to act otherwise: “The regard 
to those general rules of conduct, is what is properly called a sense of duty, a principle of the 
greatest consequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are 
capable of directing their actions (TMS 3.1.5.1, emphases added). And later, he stresses that 
the importance of this sense of duty is to direct one’s actions, not one’s sentiments: “That 
habitual reverence which your former experience has taught you for these, enables you to act, 
upon all such occasions, with nearly equal propriety, and hinders those inequalities of 
temper, to which all men are subject, from influencing your conduct in any very sensible 
degree” (TMS 3.1.5.2, emphasis added). The sense of duty, then, is a respect for certain 
general rules of conduct, rules that direct us to act in certain ways even when we have 
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motives to do otherwise. The sense of duty does not direct us to change our sentiments in 
accordance with some general rule. In other words, the sense of duty is not some application 
of a general rule regarding how we are to feel, such that we are obeying these rules when we 
change our sentiments to fit the sentiment determined appropriate by the general rule. Rather, 
the sense of duty serves as a competing motive to combat the influence of other motives in 
directing action; it is one of principle of action among many that influence an agent’s actions. 
Sometimes, acting solely from the sense of duty is proper; other times, doing so is not, and 
instead requires that the sense of duty is accompanied by other motives, like benevolence 
(TMS 3.1.6.2). The sense of duty is itself a sentiment that competes or harmonizes with other 
sentiments to bring about some action, not a sentiment of obligation to have some other 
sentiment. 
 That general rules are only of conduct is a particularly worrisome when we are 
focusing on correcting moral judgments because Smith thinks that moral judgments are 
judgments about the principles of action, the motives or sentiments that bring about action, 
and that this is so even when we are making judgments of merit and demerit. Hence, he 
writes that even when someone performs an action that benefits (or harms others), we do not 
think gratitude (or resentment) is proper unless we also find the agent’s sentiments proper: 
 
It is to be observed, however, that, how beneficial soever on the one hand, or how 
hurtful soever on the other, the actions or intentions of the person who acts may have 
been to the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon, yet if in the one case there 
appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the agent, if we cannot enter into 
the affections which influenced his conduct, we have little sympathy with the 
gratitude of the person who receives the benefit (TMS 2.1.3.1, emphases added). 
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Smith’s claims here are consistent with his aim in TMS, which is not to produce rule-
followers, but rather to cultivate virtues (TMS 7.3.Intro.3). The virtuous person does the 
proper action, but does so with the proper sentiments. The proper motive may at times 
strictly be the reverence for general rules. But in most cases, the reverence for general rules 
alone will be insufficient for proper motive. Smith is explicit about this in TMS 3.1.6, titled 
“In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what 
cases it ought to concur with other motives”.  In that chapter, Smith describes two 
considerations that determine when acting solely from a sense of duty would be proper:  
 
[F]irst, upon the natural agreeableness or deformity of the sentiment or affection 
which would prompt us to any action independent of all regard to general rules; and, 
secondly, upon the precision and exactness, or the looseness and inaccuracy, of the 
general rules themselves (TMS 3.1.6.2). 
 
As for the first consideration, the type of sentiment affects whether or not the sense of duty 
alone is the proper motive. The actions that generally arise out of benevolence, like giving 
money to those in dire need, must be accompanied by the benevolent affections as much as 
the sense of duty (TMS 3.1.6.4). In contrast, the actions that generally arise from the 
“malevolent and unsocial passions”, like revenge, need not, and in many cases should not, be 
accompanied by such passions, but instead strictly from a sense of duty (TMS 3.1.6.5). As for 
the second consideration, Smith claims that the more loose and inaccurate the general rule is, 
the less proper it is to act solely from a felt obligation to obey the rule. Such loose and 
inaccurate rules are those of “almost all of the virtues” (TMS 3.1.6.9, emphases added). The 
only exception is the rules of justice (TMS 3.1.6.10-11). So even if general rules are able to 
correct our actions, and may even provide an additional motive, i.e. the sense of duty, they 
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cannot correct our sentiments nor can they correct judgments in matters other than justice—
judgments that depend on identifying the proper motive or response to a given situation. 
 Of course, Smith does not deny that we can appeal to general rules to form judgments 
of propriety, judgments of what we ought to feel. For instance, he writes: “the general rules 
derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond 
with, correct upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present 
emotions” (TMS 1.1.3.4; also see TMS 2.2.3.10). He mentions these general rules for our 
sentiments again in Part III: “those general rules which our moral faculties observe in 
approving or condemning whatever sentiment or action is subjected to their examination” 
(TMS 3.1.5.6). But in this instance, he is making a point about some feature of all general 
rules of morality: these general rules are prescriptions in the way the rules of a sovereign are, 
so they can be properly called laws. His point is not about the correction of self-deceit.108  
 Given these restrictions on general rules, general rules seem to only be able to correct 
for conscience in a small range of cases. Conscience issues a wide range of different moral 
judgments. Conscience not only judges the propriety of our actions that may harm others, 
like physical assault; it also judges the propriety of our actions that benefit others, like how 
much we ought to give to charity. Conscience not only judges what we ought to do; it also 
judges how we ought to feel in doing those actions. General rules will not be able to correct 
conscience in any of these instances.109 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 Similarly, in TMS 3.1.4.8, Smith leaves open his discussion of general rules to include both.!
109 Another possible problem with general rules as the means for correcting conscience is that general rules may 
be susceptible to the same self-deceit that conscience is. Some argue that Smith’s account allows for general 
rules, once formed, to be used in the sympathetic process to judge others and ourselves (e.g. Griswold 1999, 
Carrasco 2004). We use the sympathetic mechanism to enter into the situation of the agent, and then consider 
how we would feel and act from that situation given that we have the general rules that we do. If conscience 
does use general rules, then the moral judgments we form through general rules are apt to self-deceit, since 
conscience, biased by strong self-love, can misapply such rules while the agent believes conscience to have 
judged correctly. 
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3.4 Correcting Conscience by Correcting Our Moral Judgments of Others 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that we judge ourselves using all the same faculties 
and principles we use to judge others. If this interpretation is correct, then we have another 
means for correcting conscience: we can correct how we judge others. Because we judge 
ourselves using the same principles we use to judge others, if we do not judge others 
correctly, then we will fail to judge ourselves correctly. Likewise, if we judge others 
correctly, then we will judge ourselves correctly. The strategy for correcting conscience then 
is to develop as spectators, cultivating what Smith calls the ‘amiable virtues’, which is the 
capacity to enter more fully into the situation of the agent so that we can form a more 
accurate judgment of what is proper in her situation.  
Smith himself does not appeal to this process of correcting our judgments of others as 
a means for correcting an erroneous conscience. However, this process is embedded into 
Smith’s account of moral development. Smith draws a distinction between how we develop 
as an agent and how we develop as a spectator. Given that conscience is us as spectators, not 
agents, we need to look to his account of the development of spectators to address how we 
are to improve conscience.  
Smith first points to this distinction between agents and spectators in describing how 
we resolve disagreements about what is proper:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 I think that this approach is mistaken. Though Smith is not explicit on this point, he seems to treat 
general rules as one of four distinct processes for forming moral judgments: “When we approve of any 
character or action, the sentiments which we feel, are, according to the foregoing system, derived from four 
sources, which are in some respects different from one another”!(TMS 7.3.3.16). The first two involve the 
sympathetic mechanism, the third is general rules, and the fourth is the beauty found in utility. The suggestion is 
that the way in which general rules form moral judgments is one that does not involve the sympathetic 
mechanism. It may be that our sense of duty, which is a sentiment, can be considered in using the sympathetic 
mechanism. However, general rules themselves are not sentiments, but rather principles from which we can 
derive more particular judgments through reasoning, not the imaginative process.!
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In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of sentiments between the 
spectator and the persons principally concerned, the spectator must, first of all, 
endeavour, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring 
home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the 
sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest 
incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of 
situation upon which his sympathy is founded (TMS 1.1.4.6).  
 
[A]s nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person 
principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the 
spectators. As they are continually placing themselves in his situation, and thence 
conceiving emotions similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly placing himself in 
theirs, and thence conceiving some degree of that coolness about his own fortune, 
with which he is sensible that they will view it (TMS 1.1.4.8).  
 
There are a couple points I want to highlight about this process. First of all, neither the 
spectator nor the agent is necessarily judging correctly about what is proper. The proper 
sentiment is often somewhere between what the agent feels and what the spectator feels:  
 
Two different sets of philosophers have attempted to teach us this hardest of all 
lessons of morality. One set have labored to increases our sensibility to the interests 
of others; another, to diminish that to our own. The first would have us feel for others 
as we naturally feel for ourselves. The second would have us feel for ourselves as we 
naturally feel for others. Both, perhaps, have carried their doctrines a good deal 
beyond the just standard of nature and propriety (TMS 3.1.3.8).110 
 
Smith does not favor the spectator’s sentiments over the agent’s, nor the agent’s over the 
spectator’s. The standard of propriety is to be found somewhere in between the two, in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Smith is reiterating a point he made earlier in TMS in which he stresses that propriety is found neither in the 
excessive self-love that agents tend to feel, nor the deficient benevolence that spectators tend to feel: “And 
hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our 
benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that 
harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour 
as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as 
we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us” (TMS 
1.1.5.5).!
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moderate sentiment that both the agent and spectator can agree to.111 We come to that 
standard through this process of both the spectator and agent adjusting their sentiments 
through the imaginative process. So it would be a mistake to think that only the agent comes 
to revise her errant moral judgment. Both the spectator and agent are correcting for their 
errant moral judgments through this interaction. 
 Second, though both the spectator and agent err in that they fail to feel what is proper 
to the situation, their errors are different in an important respect. The agent errs by failing to 
control her sentiments to what is proper to that situation. The spectator, on the other hand, 
errs by failing to fully account for and respond to all the details of the situation. Whereas the 
agent’s error is an error in self-control, the spectator’s error is an error in imagination. When 
the spectator enters into the situation of an agent, the spectator needs to imagine being in the 
same situation as the agent to come to the correct moral judgment. Doing so requires the 
spectator to hold the correct account of the situation, like the intent and actions of the people 
involved. It also requires the spectator to engage with the situation as the spectator actually 
would in such a situation. In other words, the spectator needs to fully immerse herself into 
this imaginative exercise, not only being aware of and correct about all the different 
situational factors, but also giving those factors due consideration in being affected by those 
factors to the proper degree.112 If the spectator fails in one of these respects, then the 
spectator will feel differently than she would if she were in such a situation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 For an excellent discussion of the similarities between Smith and Aristotle on the doctrine of the means, see 
Broadie’s!“Aristotle, Adam Smith and the Virtue of Propriety” (2010). Others have made similar points (see 
Berns 1994, Griswold 1999, Vivenza 2001, and Montes 2004. 
 Though Smith claims that propriety is often found somewhere between the sentiment of the agent and 
of the spectator, he does not, as Vincent Hope argues (Hope 1989), think that propriety is found in the 
consensus of spectators, evident in Smith’s discussion of the virtues as determined not by a consensus, but 
rather the few virtuous people who judge very differently from the general public (TMS 1.1.4 and 3.1.2).!
112 I want to reiterate that to immerse herself in an agent’s situation in this way does not entail that the spectator 
takes on the agent’s dispositions. The spectator continues to exercise her own faculties and principles in 
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 Finally, because of the difference in how they err, the spectator and agent correct their 
moral judgments differently. The agent is correcting for her initial moral judgment by 
entering into the situation of the spectator for the first time. The spectator, on the other hand, 
has already entered into the situation of the agent to form her initial moral judgment. So to 
correct the errant initial judgment, the spectator needs to enter into the situation of the agent 
more fully, accounting for “every little circumstance of distress”, “adopt[ing] the whole case 
of his companion with all its minutest incidents”, and “striv[ing] to render as perfect as 
possible, that imaginary change of situation”. The spectator simply has no other recourse, 
other than general rules, for correcting her initial moral judgment because there is no other 
way for the spectator to form a moral judgment. 
 This difference between how the agent and spectator correct for their moral 
judgments is also reflected in the different virtues:  
 
Upon these two different efforts, upon that of the spectator to enter into the 
sentiments of the person principally concerned, and upon that of the person 
principally concerned, to bring down his emotions to what the spectator can go along 
with, are founded on two different sets of virtues. The soft, the gentle, the amiable 
virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent humanity, are founded 
upon the one: the great, the awful and respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-
government, of that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of 
our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct 
require, take their origin from the other (TMS 1.1.5.1).  
 
The “amiable virtues” are virtues of spectators; they involve the spectators’ capacities to 
enter fully into the situation of an agent and feel closer to what the agent feels.113 The “awful !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
forming a judgment of what is proper to feel and do in the given situation. The immersion simply allows the 
spectator to more accurately imagine her own response to the given situation. !
113 An alternative interpretation of the “amiable virtues”!is that these virtues consist in the disposition of 
spectators to feel as the agent does: “How amiable does he appear to be, whose sympathetic heart seems to re-
echo all the sentiments of those with whom he converses, who grieves for their calamities, who resents their 
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and respectable” virtues, on the other hand, are virtues of agents; they involve the agents’ 
capacities for controlling their sentiments so that those sentiments are of a degree and kind to 
which impartial spectators find agreeable. Again, Smith does not favor one virtue over the 
other in attaining perfect propriety. Instead, he claims that the “perfection of human nature”, 
the “harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety”, 
is found where these two virtues meet. The agent arrives at this correct moral judgment by 
“restrain[ing] our selfish” passions, and the spectator does so by “indulg[ing] our benevolent 
affections” (TMS 1.1.5.5).114 
To be clear, the aim is not to simply come to an agreement between the spectator and 
agent, nor is the proper sentiment always found somewhere between the spectator and agent. 
It may be that the spectator is a virtuous person who meets the standard of “complete 
propriety and perfection” (TMS 1.1.5.9), and so feels the proper sentiment. Thus, only the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
injuries, and who rejoices at their good fortune!” (TMS 1.1.5.2). However, this interpretation is inconsistent 
with Smith’s views on virtues, which are dispositions that lead to proper sentiments. Agents generally do not 
feel the proper sentiment, and so if a spectator was disposed to feel as the agent feels, then the spectator would 
not feel the proper sentiment as well. Such is the case whenever a partial spectator sympathizes with the agent, 
like when parents sympathize with their children (TMS 3.1.3.13; 3.1.3.22) and when friends sympathize with 
friends (TMS 1.2.2.1).!
114 It seems possible under Smith’s theory that the spectator can correct his own sentiment by appealing to a 
more impartial spectator (as an agent might), rather than enter more fully into the situation of the agent. We 
might, for instance, appeal to a third party with no vested interest in matters of international conflict (Smith 
opens the door for such a possibility when he points out that our bias tends to be toward neighboring nations, 
not to ones more distant; see TMS 6.2.2.5). Alternatively, we might appeal to a virtuous person who displays 
universal benevolence (TMS 6.2.3.3). Similarly, the agent can correct her own sentiment by entering more fully 
into the situation of the spectator, and taking into deeper consideration the situation of that spectator (Smith 
does not discuss this possibility explicitly, but his theory does allow for such imaginative exercises). 
These alternative means of correcting for our sentiments seems to leave open the possibility for agents 
to correct errant sentiments by developing the amiable virtues, and for spectators to do so by developing the 
virtue of self-command. Thus, it seems that there is no virtue that is particular to the role of the spectator or the 
agent, as I have suggested. However, drawing such a conclusion is, I think, misguided. Smith’s point is not that 
the agent can only correct for her own sentiments by viewing herself from the situation of the spectator, or that 
the spectator can his own by entering more fully into the agent’s situation. Rather, these different virtues reflect 
the different barriers that agents and spectators tend to face in coming to the proper sentiment. The agent’s 
primary, though not only, barrier to proper sentiment is excessive self-love, which generally heightens her 
sentiments and so requires her to have greater control her sentiments. The spectator’s primary, though not only, 
barrier is his lack of awareness or understanding of the agent’s situation, which generally dampens his 
sentiments and so requires him to engage more fully with the agent’s situation. So there are virtues that seem 
better suited for agents, and those that seem better suited for spectators.  
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agent may need a correction of sentiment (or vice versa). Alternatively, the spectator might 
enter into the situation of the agent such that the spectator agrees with the agent even though 
the agent feels improperly. This is often the case when the spectator is partial towards the 
agent (e.g. TMS 3.1.3.22), or when an entire group is partial, e.g. toward its own nation, 
though in agreement with one another (see TMS 6.2.2.3). The goal then is not to come to an 
agreement for agreement’s sake. Rather, agreement is often, though not always, an indicator 
that one is closer to the proper sentiment.  
 Thus far, I have attempted to draw a distinction between spectators and agents in the 
way they err, as well as the ways they correct for those errors. This division, however, is a bit 
more complicated than I have presented it. In discussing the problem of self-deceit, it is clear 
that Smith is particularly worried about the role of self-love in distorting conscience’s 
judgments:  
 
The violent emotions which at that time agitate us, discolour our view of things…. 
every thing appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love (TMS 3.1.4.3, 
emphasis added). 
 
Nature, however, has not left this weakness, which is of so much importance, 
altogether without a remedy, nor has she abandoned us entirely to the self-delusions 
of self-love (TMS 3.1.4.7, emphasis added). 
 
This partiality, this excessive self-love, follows from the fact that though conscience only 
emerges if we place ourselves into the situation of a spectator, conscience and the agent are 
still one and the same. As a result, conscience tends to be biased, in the form of self-love, in 
favor of the agent. The problem is that Smith seems to leave the task of controlling self-love 
to the self-command, that results when we moderate our immediate emotional reaction to an 
event by incorporating our understanding of how others are reacting to it, where these 
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reactions are invariably less violent or forceful when uncolored by self-love. Little role is left 
for the amiable virtues to play in this arena. Though the amiable virtues might allow us to 
better comprehend and experience the situation of those with whom we are familiar, self-
command is what allows us to prevent excesses in our sentiments, particularly self-love. 
Smith frequently discusses the importance of self-control, the importance of taking the steps 
necessary to “humble the arrogance of [our] self-love, and bring it down to something which 
other men can go along with” (TMS 2.2.2.1; also see TMS 1.1.5.3). In doing this, we align 
our sentiments with those of an impartial spectator, who is without such bias (TMS 
1.1.5.4).115 Smith’s account of moral development emphasizes the importance of self-
command in affecting the proper degree of self-love (TMS 3.1.3.21-26). He argues that 
young children lack self-command, and thus feel whatever they do to violent degrees without 
any concern for the propriety of their feelings. However, a child is constantly exposed to 
others who fail to share her sentiments (either because the adults or peers in question are not 
directly affected by the situation provoking the child’s sentiments or not affected in the same 
way as is she) and actively disapprove of the child’s violent reactions. Out of a desire to 
avoid this form or censure and a desire to bring herself in harmony with the minds of her 
caretakers and friends, the child will learn to control her emotional reactions and avoid 
excessive sentiments and feelings, stemming, as they do, from an excessive self-love (TMS 
3.1.3.22). Even as adults, we need to continue develop a stronger self-command so as to 
avoid excessive sentiments for longer periods. Initially, we will continue to respond 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 According to D. D. Raphael, self-command is “essentially to feel for ourselves only what we see others can 
feel for us,”!for the agent comes closer to impartiality by viewing herself through the eyes of the spectator 
(Raphael 2007, 34). Raphael also points out that the first appearance of ‘impartial spectator’!occurs in the 
context of the virtue of self-command (TMS 1.1.5.4). For Raphael, there is a close connection between 
impartiality and self-command: self-command is the means by which we become impartial since we feel much 
closer to what an impartial spectator would. !
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immediately with improper sentiments. But as our self-command gets stronger, we become 
quicker at “checking” those immediate responses by more quickly considering how we 
would appear from an impartial stance (TMS 3.1.3.23-24). With practice and habituation, we 
begin to simply respond immediately the way that we would as impartial spectators. In a 
way, we no longer appeal to conscience to correct for our sentiments because we respond in 
the first instance as conscience would. It is only in this last stage that we have become the 
“man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man”, what Smith later refers to as 
“the virtuous person” (TMS 3.1.3.35), who is able to maintain control over his sentiments in 
“all occasions” (TMS 3.1.3.25):  
 
He has been in the constant practice, and, indeed, under the constant necessity, of 
modelling, or of endeavouring to model, not only his outward conduct and behaviour, 
but, as much as he can, even his inward sentiments and feelings, according to those of 
this awful and respectable judge. He does not merely affect the sentiments of the 
impartial spectator. He really adopts them. He almost identifies himself with, he 
almost becomes himself that impartial spectator, and scarce even feels but as that 
great arbiter of his conduct directs him to feel (TMS 3.1.3.25). 
 
The virtuous person does not need to “check” her immediate responses by appealing to 
conscience because her immediate responses are already aligned with consciences’. So the 
virtuous person is not suppressing who she is by overriding her initial responses with that of 
conscience; she is not replacing her judgments with those of conscience. Rather, she 
identifies with conscience in that she just responds to situations the way that conscience 
would. 
For Smith, however, self-command corrects for partiality in agents, not in spectators 
including conscience. In all his appeals to self-command, Smith focuses on our development 
as moral agents, not as spectators. As Raphael points out, Smith first stresses impartiality 
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“only when he came to theorize about the effect on the agent of the reactions of spectators” 
(Raphael 2004, 34; also see Shaver 2006).116 The agent, upon facing disagreement from 
spectators, aims to view herself with impartiality so as to correct her initial moral judgment. 
To do so, the agent needs to develop self-command, “a virtue of ‘the person principally 
concerned’ [i.e. the agent] and is the result of an endeavour [by the agent] to restrain natural 
emotion and to lower its pitch to that which the ordinary (not the especially humane) 
spectator feels by sympathy” (Raphael 2004, 34). In all other instances that Smith discusses 
self-command, he again stresses the self-command of agents in response to spectators, never 
the self-command of those spectators themselves (e.g. TMS 3.1.3.22-27, 6.1.1.11, 6.3.1.1-5). 
So it should be no surprise that the “great school of self-command” is a school for the agent, 
not for spectators. In this school, the agent “studies to be more and more master of itself” in 
response to her peers who “have no such indulgent partiality”, so that she can “gain their 
favour” and “avoid their hatred and contempt” (TMS 3.1.3.22). Given that self-command is a 
virtue developed by the agent, in response to spectators, self-command seems a more apt 
virtue for us as agents in response to the supposed impartial spectator. 
 Also, self-command cannot correct for conscience in cases of self-deception. Self-
deception blinds us from our own partiality: we believe ourselves to judge correctly when we 
do not. Hence, we are unaware that conscience has erred, that we have incorrectly judged 
what is proper to feel in the given situation. Hence, even if we have strong enough self-
command to moderate our sentiments to the proper degree, self-deception prevents us from 
being able to recognize that our sentiments are not proper in degree. In other words, we 
cannot directly address an errant conscience with self-command by identifying self-deception !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 “[W]hat noble propriety and grace do we feel in the conduct of those who, in their own case, exert that 
recollection and self-command which constitute the dignity of every passion, and which bring it down to what 
others can enter into!”!(TMS 1.1.5.3). !
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in the moment it occurs and producing a new, corrected moral judgment. We can reflect on 
conscience’s past moral judgments and recognize that we deceived ourselves. But we must 
do so after we are no longer deceiving ourselves. In the moment of self-deception, we have 
no means for identifying that deception since we are its victims.117  
 The process of correcting conscience by improving our judgments of others does not 
face the same problem of self-deception. The problem of self-deceit was that conscience 
judges incorrectly as a result of the infection of excess self-love, and we are unaware that 
conscience has made such an error. We can circumvent the problem of self-deceit by simply 
correcting for the infection of self-love, such that self-deception does not (or is less likely to) 
arise. The amiable virtues are essentially doing just that: they improve all our moral 
judgments by improving our general capacity as spectators, whether of others or of ourselves, 
to account for all the different features of the situation, including our relation to the agent, to 
come to a more accurate moral judgment. 
 So if I am correct, there is a sharp division between the roles of self-command and of 
the amiable virtues: self-command produces the proper sentiments and actions in the agent, 
and the amiable virtues produce correct moral judgments on the part of spectators. Given that 
conscience is our acting as spectator, not as agent, the virtues properly suited to improve 
conscience are the amiable virtues. This is not to say that self-command plays not role in the 
cultivation of conscience. As I will detail in the next section, the two set of virtues are 
intricately tied to one another, such that those with one set of virtues generally have the other. 
However, if we are to become better judges, we should not focus primarily on improving 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Hence, Smith presents the problem of self-deceit (in TMS 3.1.4) after his discussion of the development of 
self-command (in TMS 3.1.3).!
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self-command, but rather focus on improving the imaginative capacities that give rise to our 
moral judgments.  
 
3.5 How to Cultivate the Amiable Virtues 
So far, I have claimed that to improve the judgments of conscience, we need to improve as 
spectators, and that to improve as spectators, we need to cultivate the amiable virtues. Smith, 
unfortunately, does not provide any clear guide for how we are to acquire these virtues. He 
does discuss moral development generally (in TMS 3.1.3.21-28), in which he focuses on the 
virtue of self-command, and of the character of the different virtues (in TMS 1.1.5, 2.2.1-3, 
and all of TMS Part 6). Still, Smith’s account leaves us with some insight into how we can 
cultivate the specifically amiable virtues. In this section, I attempt to piece together different 
parts of TMS to describe at least one important way in which we can cultivate the amiable 
virtues: experience with diversity. Through experience with diversity, we gain a better 
understanding of the different influences on our own faculties and so can better account for 
these influences when we imaginatively enter into the agent’s situation. As a result, we come 
to a more accurate, more impartial moral judgment of others and ourselves. 
In TMS 1.1.4.6, Smith claims that spectator can come closer to feeling the proper sentiment 
when entering into the agent’s situation by: 
 
endeavour[ing], as much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to 
bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur 
to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest 
incidents; and strive to render as perfectly as possible, that imaginary change of 
situation upon which his sympathy is founded (TMS 1.1.4.6). 
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The amiable virtues, I argued, consist in the disposition to engage in this imaginative exercise 
perfectly, resulting in the proper sentiment and the correct moral judgment of the agent. But 
how do we attain this perfection? Smith does not say much about how to cultivate 
specifically the amiable virtues. However, in his discussion of the development of self-
command, he gives some clues as to how we are to attain the amiable, and all other, virtues.  
 Smith begins his discussion of the development of self-command by claiming that we 
obtain self-command “from that great discipline which Nature has established for the 
acquisition of this and of every other virtue; a regard to the sentiments of the real or supposed 
spectator of our conduct” (TMS 3.1.3.21, emphasis added). Smith thinks that not only self-
command but also “every other virtue” is attained by the appeal to “the sentiments of the real 
or supposed spectator”. The appeal to the sentiments of others does not mean that we align 
our sentiments with theirs or that we take their sentiments to be perfectly proper. As I argued 
before (in §3.4), proper sentiment is generally found somewhere between what the agent 
feels and what the spectator feels. Rather, we appeal to the sentiments of others to gauge the 
propriety of our own sentiments. We all suffer from the same blind spot when in comes to 
our sentiments, actions, character, and all other products of our faculties: they always present 
themselves to us as perfectly proper. As such, we cannot rely solely on our own judgment to 
determine when we are erring. We need to rely on those of others as a comparison point to 
bring to our awareness of the possibility that we might be in error. Their agreement confirms 
the propriety of our sentiments; their disagreement indicates the possibility that someone 
feels improperly.  
 The cultivation of virtues occurs primarily in the face of disagreement because 
disagreement indicates the need for someone to change their sentiments, change the 
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operation of their faculties. Disagreements do not indicate who feels improperly or the source 
of the improper sentiment. It is left to the agent and spectator to make those determinations. 
However, disagreement is necessary for both the agent and the spectator to begin considering 
whether she is the one feeling improperly and thus the source of this impropriety or whether 
the other party is to blame. 
 Smith first introduces this process of growth through disagreement in TMS 1.1.4.5, in 
which disagreement in sentiments leads the spectator to consider possible sources of this 
disagreement. The spectator might feel differently because of “the different degree of 
attention, which our different habits of life allow us to give”, or maybe because of “the 
different degree of natural acuteness in the faculty of the mind to which they are addressed” 
(TMS 1.1.4.2). Alternatively, the disagreement in sentiments may arise because the spectator 
“do[es] not view [the agent’s situation] from the same station” (TMS 1.1.4.5). We do not seek 
to correct our sentiments when we are in agreement because agreement merely confirms 
what we already feel. We only seek these possible sources of error when we face 
disagreement, when the propriety of our sentiments are put into doubt.  
 Smith presents this same process again in TMS 3.1.3.22-25, this time on the part of 
the agent’s cultivation of self-command. Infants do not develop any self-command because 
they are primarily in the care of parents who are apt to agree with the infant’s sentiments, 
with the exception of the infant’s anger (TMS 3.1.3.22). Once a child is old enough to attend 
school and interact with peers, who do not share the same penchant as parents to match the 
sentiment of the child, the child now faces disagreements and must learn to adjust her 
sentiments, thus entering the “great school of self-command” (TMS 3.1.3.22). Through the 
continual experience of facing such disagreements and resolving those disagreements by 
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adjusting their sentiments, children learn to better approximate the proper emotional reaction 
to the situations they face. Later in life, we become aware of our impropriety through 
disagreement with ourselves in the form of conscience, and adjust our sentiments in light of 
this disagreement to become the “man of real constancy and firmness” (TMS 3.1.3.25). At 
each stage, we turn to others for agreement or disagreement to help us determine whether we 
are feeling properly or not. Agreement confirms the propriety of our sentiments; 
disagreement indicates we may need to adjust them.  
 Disagreement alone, however, does not lead to the cultivation of virtues. We need 
some motivation for resolving these disagreements if we are to come to experience a better 
(or more proper) reaction to our triumphs and disappointments. Disagreements simply 
indicate that there are some differences between individuals that give rise to those 
disagreements, and without augmentation, the realization that our reactions disagree with 
those of another might do nothing more than give rise to moral disapproval of him or her. To 
cultivate virtues, we need to be motivated to change our sentiments in light of their 
differences with those of others. For Smith, the primary motive to do so is the pleasure of 
mutual sympathy: “[N]othing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling 
with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the 
appearance of the contrary” (TMS 1.1.2.1). This desire for mutual sympathy is quite strong: 
“A man is mortified when, after having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round 
and sees that nobody laughs at his jest but himself. On the contrary, the mirth of the company 
is highly agreeable to him, and he regards this correspondence of their sentiments with his 
own as the greatest applause” (TMS 1.1.2.1, emphases added).118 It is because we care so !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 The desire for mutual sympathy can vary in degree. This desire is not quite so strong when we are 
considering matters of taste. However, Smith is clear that when the situation deeply affects us, we have a strong 
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deeply about attaining this mutual sympathy that we do not leave disagreements as they are, 
but rather seek to resolve those disagreements by adjusting our sentiments to come to an 
agreement. 
 Finally, in the process of resolving disagreements, we need to be drawn towards the 
proper sentiment. A disagreement is resolved by coming to feel the same sentiment to the 
same degree. However, the correspondence of sentiments does not insure that we are both 
feeling properly. Two people can share in the same improper sentiment. For instance, if two 
people are prone to excessive rage, they may approve of each others’ rage, even when 
improper. Hence, Smith writes, “This natural disposition to accommodate and to assimilate, 
as much as we can, our own sentiments, principles, and feelings, to those which we see fixed 
and rooted in the persons whom we are obliged to live and converse a great deal with, is the 
cause of the contagious effects of both good and bad company” (TMS 6.3.1.17).119 Even 
whole populations are susceptible to improper sentiments when judging others. Hence, Smith 
distinguishes between praise, which may or may not be proper, and praise of that which is 
praiseworthy, which is proper. Spectators may praise the agent, grounded in their agreement 
in sentiment with the agent, even though the agent may not be deserving of that praise 
because her sentiment is improper.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
desire for mutual sympathy, even though that mutual sympathy is at the same time more difficult to attain: 
“With regard to those objects, which affect in a particular manner either ourselves or the person whose 
sentiments we judge of, it is at once more difficult to preserve this harmony and correspondence, and at the 
same time, vastly more important…. [I]f you have either no fellow-feeling for the misfortunes I have met with, 
or none that bears any proportion to the grief which distracts me; or if you have either no indignation at the 
injuries I have suffered, or none that bears any proportion to the resentment which transports me, we can no 
longer converse upon these subjects. We become intolerable to one another. I can neither support your 
company, nor you mine. You are confounded at my violence and passion, and I am enraged at your cold 
insensibility and want of feeling” (TMS 1.1.4.5). !
119 Smith presents the parallel case on matters of taste in TMS 5.1.1.2: “Where the conjunction is improper, 
custom either diminishes, or takes away altogether, our sense of the impropriety. Those who have been 
accustomed to slovenly disorder lose all sense of neatness or elegance. The modes of furniture or dress which 
seem ridiculous to strangers, give no offence to the people who are used to them.”!
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 So to cultivate virtues, we need to resolve disagreements in a way that draws the 
spectator and agent toward the proper sentiment. Commentators have recognized two key 
suggestions made by Smith on this point. One is the appeal to virtuous people, who feel the 
proper sentiment perfectly. We, who are not virtuous, do not agree perfectly in sentiment 
with virtuous people. However, the sentiments of virtuous people elicit feelings of wonder 
and surprise in us, which lead us to admire them (e.g. TMS 1.1.4.3, 1.2.1.12). This admiration 
leads us to want to be like them. The virtuous person becomes “the man who directs and 
conducts our own sentiments” (TMS 1.1.4.3). In seeking out the virtuous, we are not simply 
mimicking their sentiments, but rather attempting to exercise our faculties as they do. We 
admire how they “have attended to many things which we had overlooked” and “have 
adjusted them to all the various circumstances of their objects”. We feel wonder and surprise 
“at their uncommon and unexpected acuteness and comprehensiveness” (TMS 1.1.4.3).120 
Our admiration is for the way in which virtuous people come to the proper sentiment, in the 
way they attune to the details of the situation and account for them in coming to their moral 
judgments. Furthermore, the natural response to admiration is praise, and we naturally desire 
both to be praised and to be worthy of that praise (i.e. to have qualities deserving of praise, as 
the virtuous person has) (TMS 3.1.2).121 For all these reasons, we are naturally motivated to 
be like the virtuous person, the person who is perfectly proper in all situations, as spectator 
and as agent.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 Smith repeats these points on our admiration for aesthetic and intellectual virtues: “It is the acute and 
delicate discernment of the man of taste, who distinguishes the minute, and scarce perceptible differences of 
beauty and deformity; it is the comprehensive accuracy of the experienced mathematician, who unravels, with 
ease, the most intricate and perplexed proportions”!(TMS 1.1.4.3). !
121 Though people have a natural desire for both praise and praiseworthiness (TMS 3.1.2.1), they may vary on 
the degree to which they desire each: “In this respect, however, men differ considerably from one another. 
Some seem indifferent about the praise, when, in their own minds, they are perfectly satisfied that they have 
attained the praise-worthiness. Others appear much less anxious about the praise-worthiness than about the 
praise”!(TMS 3.1.2.28).!
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 Virtuous people can lead us toward the proper sentiments and the virtues. However, it 
is difficult to rely on virtuous people because there simply are not many, if any, of them. As 
Smith acknowledges, the genuinely virtuous person, the person with “complete propriety and 
perfection”, might be impossible to find, for “in those difficult situations, no human conduct 
ever did, or ever can come up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men must 
for ever appear blameable and imperfect” (TMS 1.1.5.9). The best we can hope for is to find 
someone who, though not perfectly proper, is closer to that perfection than what is commonly 
found in society. Moreover, even if we encounter those that are nearer to this perfect virtue, 
we can be led astray because our feelings of wonder and admiration are liable to corruption. 
Who we feel wonder and admiration for depends in part on our experiences, on the kinds of 
people we spend time with:  
 
The man who associates chiefly with the wise and the virtuous, though he may not 
himself become either wise or virtuous, cannot help conceiving a certain respect at 
least for wisdom and virtue; and the man who associates chiefly with the profligate 
and the dissolute, though he may not himself become profligate and dissolute, must 
soon lose, at least, all his original abhorrence of profligacy and dissolution of 
manners. The similarity of family characters, which we so frequently see transmitted 
through several successive generations, may, perhaps, be partly owing to this 
disposition, to assimilate ourselves to those whom we are obliged to live and converse 
a great deal with (TMS 6.3.1.17).122 
 
Smith admits that we often confuse praise with praise-worthiness. We confuse those who are 
virtuous from those who seem virtuous, and so end up admiring those that are not deserving 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 In this passage, Smith also indicates that biology may also contribute to our dispositions: “The family of 
character, however, like the family countenance, seems to be owing, not altogether to the moral, but partly too 
to the physical connection. The family countenance is certainly altogether owing to the latter” (TMS 6.3.1.17).!
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of such admiration (TMS 3.1.2). We “regard with foolish wonder and admiration” the 
“violence and injustice of great conquerors” who are far from virtuous (TMS 6.1.1.16).123 
 An alternative means of attaining the virtues is to appeal to impartial spectators. 
Smith repeatedly appeals to impartial spectators as the standard for the proper sentiment. For 
instance, when we feel the improper sentiment or the proper sentiment to an improper degree, 
Smith suggests that we seek out impartial spectators to adjust our sentiments to what is more 
proper: 
 
Are you in adversity? Do not mourn in the darkness of solitude, do not regulate your 
sorrow according to the indulgent sympathy of your intimate friends; return, as soon 
as possible, to the day-light of the world and of society. Live with strangers, with 
those who know nothing, or care nothing about your misfortune…. 
 
Are you in prosperity? Do not confine the enjoyment of your good fortune to your 
own house, to the company of your own friends, perhaps of your flatterers, of those 
who build upon your fortune the hopes of mending their own; frequent those who are 
independent of you, who can value you only for your character and conduct, and not 
for your fortune…. (TMS 3.1.3.39-40, emphases added). 
 
Smith’s suggestion in both cases is the same: spend time away from those who are partial, 
away from yourself (“solitude”), “intimate friends”, and “flatterers”, and instead spend time 
with “strangers” and “those who are independent of you”. In other words, seek out those who 
are impartial, who do not have any particular ties to you. Of course, in this passage, Smith is 
discussing how as agents, we need to seek out impartial spectators to adjust our sentiments. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 There is an additional danger in relying on the looser standard of propriety when we are judging ourselves. 
When we judge ourselves along the looser standard, we focus on how we compare to others, who might be less 
virtuous along this standard, we begin to lose sense of our weakness and imperfection. We become “assuming, 
arrogant, and presumptuous”!(TMS 6.3.1.27). This problem does not occur when we judge ourselves on the 
stricter standard of perfect propriety, since under this standard “the wisest and best of us all…!see nothing but 
weakness and imperfection”!(TMS 6.3.1.24). Thus, we find that the “wise and virtuous man directs his principal 
attention to the first standard; the idea of exact propriety and perfection”!(TMS 6.3.1.25), so as not to fall under 
excessive self-admiration. !
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However, the same process also helps spectators improve their judgments of others. By 
comparing our own judgments to those of impartial spectators, we become aware of any 
partiality we might have toward the agent and come to adjust our sentiments accordingly. 
Griswold stresses this aspect of Smith when he writes: 
 
To that end, we must learn how to sympathize properly, and therefore how to think 
imaginatively about another’s and our own situation. The imagination must be trained 
rightly. Judgment about the ethical course of action to be followed in a given situation 
requires imagination, since we must represent to ourselves possible courses of action, 
consider the intended effects of our choice on others and thus view the situation from 
their standpoint, and indeed review our own motivations from the standpoint of an 
impartial spectator (Griswold 1999, 214). 
 
We are not born with the disposition to judge others correctly. We learn to do so by 
improving our capacity to sympathize with others, by understanding how to assess the 
agent’s situation correctly by coming to the proper sentiment. And we learn to do so by 
appealing to “the standpoint of an impartial spectator” because one of the key errors we make 
as spectators is to allow our partiality to corrupt our moral sentiments. When we compare our 
sentiments as spectators to those of impartial spectators, we can begin to recognize how our 
sentiments might suffer from such corrupting influences. We use the impartial spectator’s 
viewpoint to learn how to account for our partiality when judging others. As we do when 
looking to virtuous people as moral guides, we learn not only what sentiment to feel and to 
what degree, but also how to evaluate the agent’s situation, how to imagine and sympathize 
with the agent, as the impartial spectator does. 
 Though I agree that impartial spectators can help us correct for our partialities when 
we judge others, they do little else for helping us improve as spectators. Appeal to impartial 
spectators is especially important for Smith because Smith treats partiality as the primary 
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source of errant moral judgments. Thus, he stresses the need to rely on impartial spectators 
throughout TMS, in all stages of moral development. However, it would be a mistake to think 
that partiality is the only source of errant moral judgments. As I argued earlier, there are 
several other sources of our improper sentiments as spectators, and it seems that impartial 
spectators are just as susceptible to these other sources of error as partial spectators. For 
instance, impartial spectators do not necessarily have better information about the agent’s 
situation simply in virtue of being an impartial spectator because they suffer from the same 
epistemological shortcomings as partial spectators. Also, they are not necessarily better at 
accounting for various inconsistencies in the operation of their own faculties because being 
impartial does not adjust for how aware you are of your present physical and emotional state. 
Finally, they do not help us account for the corrupting influences of fortune, custom, and 
fashion. Impartial spectators, like partial spectators, are just as susceptible to giving fortune 
too much weight in forming moral judgments, or failing to account for differences in custom 
in coming to a moral judgment. So though I accept the importance of appealing to impartial 
spectators given the significant impact of partiality on our moral judgments, I am also 
suggesting that the appeal to impartial spectators is very much incomplete. We need some 
other means of correcting for the other kinds of errors we make as spectators, errors that 
Smith is well aware of, if we are to cultivate the amiable virtues. 
 There is a crucial third means for attaining virtues, one that is consistent with Smith’s 
theory (though he does not suggest it): experience with diversity. Earlier, I argued that we can 
only gain awareness of the corruption of our own moral sentiments and those of others 
through disagreement. Yet each disagreement only brings to light some of the errors we 
make. For example, we might disagree in our moral judgment of the agent because I am a 
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close friend of the agent, whereas you are not. This disagreement brings to light a particular 
kind of partiality of which I was not aware of before: friendship. Yet it does not bring to light 
the other kinds of errors that I may often make. I might, for instance, also be biased toward 
people of a certain ethnicity or race in ways that others might not be. Until I encounter a 
disagreement with others arising from this particular kind of error, I will not be aware of my 
errant moral sentiment. But once I face such a disagreement, I am now prompted, as Smith 
suggests, to consider my sentiment from different perspectives, e.g. the person I may have 
offended or a third-party that is of neither my ethnicity nor the offended. Also, I might tend 
to form moral judgments hastily without considering all the facts of the situation. When this 
process leads to a disagreement with someone else, and that person points out some features 
of the situation that I have not considered, then I am prompted to reconsider my own 
judgment in light of this new information. I might also be prompted to correct for my 
tendency to overlook details of the situation by thinking more carefully about all the different 
facets of the case before coming to a judgment. So if we want to account for all the different 
kinds of errors in our moral judgments, we need to seek out a wide variety of disagreements 
with others. But we can only encounter such disagreement if we engage with people that 
differ in different ways, e.g. in partiality, in intellectual capacities, in fortune, in custom, in 
fashion. The more diversity we encounter, the more aware we become of how we, as well as 
others, err in moral judgments.  
 In seeking out people of different backgrounds, we need not necessarily distinguish 
between virtuous, impartial, and partial spectators. We can learn from disagreements with 
any person, including a partial spectator. For instance, Smith recognizes that sometimes 
partial spectators might be much closer to the proper sentiment than an impartial spectator 
! 155 
when judging the agent: “We expect less sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a 
friend: we cannot open to the former all those little circumstances which we can unfold to the 
latter” (TMS 1.1.4.9, emphasis added). Partial spectators might be more likely to agree with 
the agent in virtue of their relationship with the agent. However, because partial spectators 
also know the agent better, partial spectators are more likely to have information about the 
full circumstances that impartial spectators do not. As a result, partial spectators might in at 
least one way be more accurate than impartial spectators.  
 There is a danger that through repeated experience with partial spectators, we will 
develop dispositions that lead us away from the proper sentiment; their biases become our 
own. However, this danger is less of a worry if we diversify our experience because the 
differences in different partial spectators offset the effects of some particular partial 
spectator. We do not improve as spectators if we are exposed only to our parents who tend to 
be quite partial in their judgments toward us. However, if we are exposed to a range of 
different partial spectators, e.g. our parents, our friends, and our colleagues, each different in 
the particular degree of partiality and in talents and background, we will be less likely to be 
habituated to one particular kind of bias or one kind of error. What one spectator fails to 
account for, another does not. For instance, I may have one friend who is very attentive to 
details and so is able to recognize the finer details of an agent’s situation. Another friend may 
be better at recognizing the influence of fortune on our sentiments. Given the differences in 
the abilities of my different friends, my disagreements with each arise from different sources. 
With one friend, I become more aware of my failure to account for some detail of the 
situation, and with the other, I become more aware of my disposition to be influenced too 
much by fortune. So even though some people might feel more proper sentiments than 
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others, we can still learn something from the disagreements we have with any of them. Thus, 
by interacting with a range of different people who provide different insight into the 
operations of our faculties, as well as those of others, we begin to develop a richer 
understanding of the many ways we tend to err in our moral sentiments, and can adjust for all 
those errors.  
 Though Smith does not suggest or endorse this process of encountering diversity to 
cultivate amiable virtues, he does stress the importance of experience with various situations 
in moral development. For instance, as Griswold points out, Smith emphasizes the 
importance of literature in moral development, in both TMS and in WN124, in that literature 
allows us to navigate through the complexities of different situations, and in doing so, hone 
our capacities to imaginatively enter into the agent’s situation: 
 
Smith’s continual references to literature, especially tragedies, are surely meant to 
help us to grasp how so difficult an achievement as moral education is to be attained. 
For study of literature teaches us how ethically complex human situations can be, 
how to stretch the moral imagination so as to size up the relevant factors, how to 
carry on a conversation about the competing claims of the dramatis personae 
(Griswold 1999, 215). 
 
It is not simply engaging with any literature but literature that “makes visible to us different 
shades of ‘circumstance, character, and situation’ that no ‘casuistic rules’ could ever define” 
that leads us to improve as spectators (Griswold 1999, 216).125 We improve as spectators 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124!“Literature also plays an important and variegated role in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Not only plays, 
novels, and poems but tragedies, in particular, intrigue Smith. Together they completely overshadow his 
relatively rare references to properly philosophical texts (putting aside TMS VII). The notion that we are to 
understand literature and drama as sources for moral theory and moral education is clearly and strikingly 
evident in The Wealth of Nations as well (V.i.g.14-15)”!(Griswold 1999, 216).!
125 Here, Griswold is quoting Smith’s praise of Voltaire’s Mahomet as a source of moral instruction (TMS 
6.2.1.22).!
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because we are practicing how to engage with a range of different situations, each with its 
own unique set of factors to consider.  
 Smith himself seems to engage in this kind of moral development in his discussion of 
the influence of custom and fashion. In Part V of TMS, Smith begins with what appears to be 
disagreements in sentiments: what a person of one custom deems proper, a person of a 
different custom deems improper. We tend to judge inaccurately in such cases because we 
fail to account for how our custom and fashion influence our judgments of others. We 
recognize how we, or the other person, is influenced in this way when we disagree with one 
another (TMS 5.1.2.6). We resolve these disagreements by better understanding the other 
person’s customs, by better understanding the thoughts and sentiments from which these 
customs arose, by better understanding the utility of these customs and seeing the beauty in 
that utility, and so forth. Once we do, we can come to a more accurate moral judgment. 
Smith engages in this very process in his discussion of infanticide. We tend to disapprove of 
infanticide. Yet, there are certain customs that find infanticide perfectly permissible. Such a 
disagreement leads Smith to consider how such customs arose, from what sentiments and 
dispositions. Depending on what we come to find about the differences in customs, we may 
end up approving of the agent: 
 
The extreme indigence of a savage is often such that he himself is frequently exposed 
to the greatest extremity of hunger, he often dies of pure want, and it is frequently 
impossible for him to support both himself and his child. We cannot wonder, whether, 
that in this case he should abandon it. One who, in flying from an enemy, whom it 
was impossible to resist, should throw down his infant, because it retarded his flight, 
would surely be excusable; since, by attempting to save it, he could only hope for the 
consolation of dying with it (TMS 5.1.2.15). 
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In such cases, we find that the differences in custom are rooted in the same principle: people 
who share the proper degree of self-love and of concern for an infant may differ in their 
behavior if they differ sufficiently in their circumstances. Thus, though the practices of two 
communities might differ, we may nevertheless find that their sentiments align. Or 
alternatively, we might find that even after accounting for differences in custom, we find that 
the agent acts improperly because his customs are not rooted in the requisite concern:  
 
In the latter ages of Greece, however, the same thing was permitted from views of 
remote interest or conveniency, which could by no means excuse it…. When custom 
can give sanction to so dreadful a violation of humanity, we may well imagine that 
there is scarce any particular practice so gross which it cannot authorise. Such a thing, 
we hear men every day saying, is commonly done, and they seem to think this a 
sufficient apology for what, in itself is the most unjust and unreasonable conduct 
(TMS 5.1.2.15).126 
 
My point is that whether or not we agree with a particular custom, we cannot form an 
accurate moral judgment of an agent unless we take into account the customs under which he 
acts, how these customs differ from our own, and how our customs influence our moral 
judgments. It is a mistake to judge the agent as if he were acting under our customs when he 
is not. Our customs might distort our moral sentiments, or the agent’s customs might distort 
his moral sentiments and the actions that follow upon them. But without having some 
understanding of these different customs, what purpose they serve, what sentiments motivate 
those practices, and so forth, we will not be able to accurately judge the agent. And we can 
only come to such an understanding of other customs if we are exposed to them, so that we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Smith also engage in this process of encountering disagreements arising from difference in customs and 
correcting (or affirming) his moral sentiments with a better understanding of the customs of others, when he 
discusses the difference in custom among different professions (see TMS 5.1.2.5-6).!
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can at least make sense of the “particular turn or habit of imagination” they entrain (TMS 
1.2.2.1). 
  
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 The general focus of this discussion of Smith’s theory of moral development is on the 
role of self-command, general rules, and impartial spectators. Yet these three aspects of his 
account are limited in important ways. Self-command and the appeal to impartial spectators 
are necessary for the agent to feel and act properly, but unless we already judge correctly as 
impartial spectators, neither self-command nor their best, sincere attempts to be impartial will 
lead reflective agents toward from the proper sentiment. General rules are useful for 
promoting the proper course of action on matters of justice, but they are of little use in all 
other cases. Instead, I have argued that we need to improve as spectators by cultivating the 
amiable virtues. These virtues require us to do more than account for our own partiality; we 
need to account for errant beliefs about the situation of the agent we are judging, 
inconsistencies in the operations of our own faculties, and various biases (especially those of 
custom and ethnicity) that distort our moral sentiments. Only once we improve as spectators, 
will conscience, i.e. the supposed impartial spectator, serve as the proper moral guide.  
 My suggestion for cultivating the amiable virtues is to engage with a diverse range of 
people in different situations, to use the disagreements we face with others as a way to better 
understand how we come to our own moral sentiments. The benefit of this approach is that 
we can develop as spectators in many ways beyond impartiality. We can improve our 
attentiveness to the details of the agent’s situation. We can recognize the influence of custom, 
fashion, and fortune on our moral judgments. We can gain better awareness of the influence 
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of our current physical and emotional state on our moral judgments. By using others as a 
point of contrast, we are better able to understand ourselves as both spectators and agents. 
And with an improved self-awareness, we are better able to account for all the ways our 
faculties might lead us to an improper sentiment.  
 In some ways, my suggestion is similar to Hobbes’ prescription in Leviathan “nosce 
teipsum, read thyself”. Hobbes claimed that we can know about the faculties and principles 
of others by looking inward and reflecting on the operations of our own faculties and 
principles.127 However, my claim is that we need to look outward to others to gain a better 
understanding of ourselves. When we look inward toward ourselves, we are blind to our own 
errors. Conscience is especially susceptible to this blindness because we dislike judging 
ourselves negatively. So if we are to correct for an errant conscience, we need to rely on 
those around us, those who can provide different insight through their disagreements with us. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127!“[F]or the simultitude of the thoughts and passions of one man to the thoughts and passions of another, 
whosoever looketh into himself and considerth what he doth, when he doth think, opine, reason, hope, fear, &c, 
and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know, what are the thoughts and passions of all other men 
upon the like occasions”!(Leviathan Intro.3). !
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4 
 
 
The Authority of Conscience 
 
Conscience does not offer itself to shew us the way we should walk in, but it likewise 
carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide, the guide assigned us by 
the author of our nature: it therefore belongs to our condition of being, it is our duty, 
to walk in that path and follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we 
may not possibly forsake them with impunity. 
 
Bishop Joseph Butler from Fifteen Sermons 3.5 
 
There is a higher court than courts of justice and that is the court of conscience. It 
supercedes all other courts. 
 
Mahatma Gandhi from “A Puzzle and Its Solution”128 
 
 
Conscience is frequently characterized as having authority over us, as binding us to 
its commands such that we ought to obey them. However, it is not always clear what this 
authority consists in. There are several features of our phenomenological experience of 
conscience that are often associated with conscience’s authority. We feel compelled to act in 
accordance with conscience’s dictates, and when we fail to do so, conscience torments us, 
especially through feelings of guilt and remorse. Conscience can also speak in different 
“volumes”, from prodding us incessantly to remaining silent. Even when conscience speaks 
loudly, we may struggle to obey it. We feel torn about what to do, and at times are willing to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 M. A. Gandhi. “A Puzzle and Its Solution” in The Gandhi Reader, ed. Homer A. Jack (1994, 194).!
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act against our own conscience. Finally, conscience presents itself as the moral authority, as 
the final word on what is right or wrong to do. This experience of conscience has led to 
characterizing conscience as the internal representative of God or the innate awareness of the 
moral law.  
There have been different attempts at explaining the authority of conscience. Aquinas 
and Bonaventure, for instance, thought conscience’s authority is derived from God: 
conscience simply presents us with God’s dictates applied to particular situations through 
practical reasoning. Since we ought always to obey God, we ought always to obey 
conscience. Butler, on the other hand, argued that conscience has authority in virtue of its 
very position and function as the judging faculty. So we ought to obey conscience for the 
constitution of human nature demands that we do. Others, like Mill and Freud, grounded 
conscience’s authority in its motivational force: conscience is authoritative insofar as it is 
efficacious in bringing about action in accordance with its dictates. Thus, we ought to obey 
conscience only to the degree that we feel compelled to do so.  
Smith, however, is not very clear on what it is for conscience to be authoritative, even 
in the chapter of TMS titled “Of the influence and authority of conscience”. But given some 
similarities between passages in Smith’s TMS and Butler’s Fifteen Sermons, several 
commentators have suggested that Smith adopts Butler’s account of conscience’s authority: 
conscience ought to be obeyed because it was placed in the position of authority, the position 
to rule, within the human constitution for it is the only faculty that judges all others. In this 
chapter, I argue that this interpretation is mistaken. Unlike Butler, Smith does not view 
authority as distinct from mere power. Rather, authority is a particular kind of power: the 
power to procure obedience through respect resulting from the distinction of rank. 
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Conscience has such an authority because we recognize conscience as a superior moral 
judge, i.e. respect it. The degree to which we ought to obey conscience, then, is dependent on 
the strength of this respect we have for conscience. 
Smith, however, fails to capture what is central to our experience of conscience as 
authoritative: conscience presents itself as the moral guide, as the final judge of what is 
proper. It is the voice of God or the moral laws written in our hearts, regardless of how 
motivated we are to obey it. Hence, even when we act against conscience, we always do so 
believing that we are acting improperly. So it is not that we recognize conscience as a better 
judge; rather, we cannot view conscience as anything but the best judge. Still, I believe 
Smith’s theory can account for why conscience must be viewed as the moral guide. Since 
conscience is an exercise of the agent’s faculties, the agent is committed to conscience’s 
judgments the same way she is committed to her own judgments. Because there is no other 
means for the agent to judge other than the use of her own faculties, all her judgments seem 
correct to her. So the agent cannot dismiss conscience’s judgments as mistaken because they 
are her own judgments and thus will always seem correct to her. 
 
4.1 Butler and Smith on the Authority of Conscience 
 Commentators have been long aware of the similarities between Smith’s and Butler’s 
account of conscience. In particular, people frequently note the similarities between Butler’s 
Fifteen Sermons 2.14-15 and Smith’s TMS 3.1.5.5: 
 
Thus that principle, by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own 
heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have 
some influence…. [Y]ou cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without 
taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, 
that is, of the faculty itself: and , to preside and govern, from the very economy and 
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constitution of man, belongs to it…. [T]hat this faculty was placed within to be our 
proper govenour; to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of 
action (Sermons 2.14-15). 
 
[Our moral faculties] carry along with them the most evident badges of this authority, 
which denote that they were set up within us to be the supreme arbiters of all our 
actions, to superintend all our sense, passions and appetites, and to judge how far 
each of them was either to be indulged or restrained…. No other faculty or principle 
of action judges of any other…. But it is the peculiar office of those faculties now 
under our consideration to judge, to bestow censure or applause upon all the other 
principles of our nature…. It belongs to our moral faculties, in the same manner to 
determine when the ear ought to be soothed, when the eye ought to be indulged, when 
the taste ought to be gratified, when and how far every other principle of our nature 
ought either to be indulged or restrained. What is agreeable to our moral faculties, is 
fit, and right, and proper to be done; the contrary wrong, unfit, and improper. The 
sentiments which they approve of, are graceful and becoming: the contrary, 
ungraceful and unbecoming. The very words, right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful, 
unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases those faculties (TMS 3.1.5.5). 
 
Butler is stressing a point he argues for in Sermons 1-3. The very idea of conscience contains 
within it “judgement, direction, superintendency” over the other faculties. Thus, conscience 
is the “proper govenour” of our other faculties, and so ought to be obeyed. In this sense, 
conscience has an authority distinct from mere power, since conscience ought to be obeyed 
regardless of whether or not conscience can procure obedience from the other faculties. The 
passage from TMS seems to echo these very points. Our moral faculties, and only those 
faculties, “superintend” and “judge” the other faculties. Thus, they seem to have been “set up 
within us to be the supreme arbiters” over the other faculties.129 They have authority over the 
other faculties in virtue of their role or position as the judge of the other faculties. 
 The similarity between these passages have led some commentators to argue that 
Smith thinks conscience ought to be obeyed because of its place within human nature as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 Haakonsen points out this similarity Between Butler and Smith in a footnote in TMS 3.1.5.5. Also see Brown 
(1994), Darwall (1999), Forman-Barzilai (2010), Raphael (2007).!
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judging faculty. Stephen Darwall, for instance, makes this point explicitly in a footnote in his 
article “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith” (1999): 
 
But why should we follow conscience? What gives judgments of propriety their 
authority? Here Smith follows closely Butler’s idea that conscience’s authority is tied 
up with the ancient (stoic) doctrine that virtue “consists in following nature” (S 
Preface.13). It “cannot be doubted,” Smith writes, that our “moral faculties… were 
given us for the direction of our conduct in this life” and “were set up within us to be 
the supreme arbiters of all our actions” (TMS 3.1.5.5). By fashioning us in this way, 
nature (or God) promulgates the rules these faculties recognize, including 
prominently the rules of justice, as “laws.” Conscience is God’s “viceregen[t]… 
within us,” so its “torments” inherit God and nature’s authority (TMS 3.1.5.6). 
(Darwall 1999, 150).130  
 
According to Darwall, then, Smith thinks that we ought to obey our conscience because 
conscience was placed in the position of authority over our other faculties. Conscience is our 
governor, our superintendent, our director, our authority figure which is to be obeyed, in 
virtue of what it is, i.e. a judging faculty.  
 Darwall’s claims are buttressed by another similarity between Butler and Smith. 
Smith at one point refers to conscience as “reason”: “It is reason, principle, conscience, the 
inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct” (TMS 
3.1.3.4). Recall that Butler used ‘reason’ and ‘conscience’ interchangeably; they referred to 
one and the same judging faculty. Butler therein identifies conscience with Plato’s account of 
that faculty. Smith seems to support this identification by stating that Plato “very properly 
called” the judging faculty “reason” (TMS 7.2.1.3), the faculty that shares the same role as 
Smith’s conscience: it is that faculty “by which we judge of the propriety and impropriety of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 More recently, similar interpretations of Smith on conscience’s authority have been made by Khalil (2005) 
and Özler and Gabrinetti (2013). !
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desires and affections” (TMS 7.2.1.3) and to bring the passions that are “too vehement” to the 
proper degree, as determined by that faculty (TMS 7.1.2.44). 
 Furthermore, like Plato (and Butler), Smith claims that virtue consists in conscience 
exercising control over the various passions. In TMS 3.1.3, Smith provides a detailed picture 
of a person developing from a child with little self-command to a virtuous person, who 
exercises the greatest of self-command. The virtuous person is someone for whom 
conscience is ever-present, controlling the passions and bringing them down to the proper 
degree. Thus, insofar as we ought to be virtuous, we ought to let conscience be our guide and 
control all our sentiments. Smith’s account seems to be a mirror image of Plato’s, in which 
the virtues consist in the passions operating “under the direction of reason”, in reason 
“check[ing] and restrain[ing] the inferior and brutal appetites” (TMS 7.2.1.7; also see TMS 
7.2.1.8-9).131 
 Given the similarities between Smith, Butler, and Plato, it is tempting to view Smith 
as endorsing the view that conscience is by nature the rightful ruler over the other faculties. 
That is, conscience ought to be obeyed, regardless of the strength of its motivating force. It is 
good/right/proper that our sentiments align with conscience’s, for virtue consists in each of 
the different parts of human nature “confin[ing] itself to its proper office, without attempting 
to encroach upon that of any other” and conscience’s, or reason’s, proper office is to 
command the other faculties.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 Fleischacker relies on Smith’s identification of conscience with reason to draw a comparison between Smith 
and Kant: “If we recall…![Smith’s] rhetorical identification of ‘reason’!with ‘principle’!and ‘conscience,’!it will 
be clear that ‘reason’!for him is analogous to what Kant would call ‘judgment,’!specifically ‘determinant 
judgment’: it determines which specific situations or feelings belong under which general rule of propriety” 
(Fleischacker 1991, 266). Though an interesting proposal, it seems more likely that given Smith’s knowledge of 
Plato and Butler, he is using the term ‘reason’!in the same sense as Plato and Butler, which is not the same as 
judgment in Kant’s sense. For Plato and Butler, the operation of conscience need not involve any determination 
of what general rule applies to a particular situations. !
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4.2 Distancing Smith from Butler: Smith on Conscience and “Moral Faculties” 
 There are, however, reasons for distancing Smith from Butler on the authority of 
conscience. For one, though Smith does use ‘conscience’ and ‘reason’ interchangeably, and 
gives conscience the role that Butler (and Plato) give to reason, Smith also explicitly denies 
that conscience is itself a faculty, at least in Butler’s sense: 
 
The word conscience does not immediately denote any moral faculty by which we 
approve or disapprove. Conscience supposes, indeed, the existence of some such 
faculty, and properly signifies our consciousness of having acted agreeably or 
contrary to its directions (TMS 7.3.3.15).  
 
Conscience is not, strictly speaking, a faculty in Butler’s sense: it is not one of several parts 
of the human constitution.132 Rather, conscience is our awareness of our having acted 
properly or not. Conscience “supposes… the existence of some such faculty”, whatever that 
faculty may be, since there must be some faculty that produces the immediate motivations 
and thoughts that are the objects or targets we judge when engaging our consciences. 
However, conscience is not one of the various powers of the mind. It is a product of those 
powers and faculties that we use to evaluate ourselves, but it is not itself a separate power or 
proper object of evaluation. 
 Furthermore, the faculty on which conscience is founded is not itself a distinct moral 
or judging faculty. Smith, like Hume, is committed to the sympathetic mechanism as the 
source of moral judgments:  
 
[T]here is no occasion for supposing any new power of perception which had never 
been heard of before: Nature, they imagine, acts here, as in all other cases, with the 
strictest economy, and produces a multitude of effects from one and the same cause; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 Given his view that conscience is not itself a faculty, Smith is committed to rejecting an important part of 
Plato’s theory of the parts of the soul.!
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and sympathy, a power which has always been taken notice of, and with which the 
mind is manifestly endowed, is, they think, sufficient to account for all the effects 
ascribed to this peculiar faculty (TMS 7.3.3.3).133 
 
The sympathetic mechanism is our capacity to enter into the situation of another person and 
imaginatively feel as we would from that same situation. This mechanism explains how we 
come to form moral judgments of others and ourselves (in the form of conscience), so it is a 
capacity by which we judge. However, unlike Butler’s conscience, the sympathetic 
mechanism is not a power of the mind distinct from the passions. Rather, the sympathetic 
mechanism is an exercise of our passions, achieved through acts of the imagination. We 
imaginatively enter the situation of another, and we feel from this imagined situation: “we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments… and thence form some idea of his 
sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike 
them” (TMS 1.1.1.2, emphasis added). The sympathetic mechanism is not distinct from our 
appetites and passions. Rather, the sympathetic mechanism is engages our appetites and 
passions. It compares our sentiments with those of others. Even when these mechanisms are 
engaged in their role as conscience and so directed upon our own sentiments and actions, 
they require that we divide ourselves to compare our sentiments as conscience to our 
sentiments as agent. So even if the sympathetic mechanism is the faculty by which we judge, 
“to bestow censure and applause upon all the other principles of our nature” (TMS 3.1.5.5), it 
is not one that is independent of the appetites and passions, as Butler claimed it to be.  
 Furthermore, Smith does not give authority to conscience or to the sympathetic 
mechanism, but instead to moral faculties (TMS 3.1.5.5). His use of the plural form of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 This passage comes in the context of Smith’s presentation of moral theories that claim sympathy is the origin 
of all moral sentiments (e.g. Hume’s moral theory).!
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‘faculty’ is not an accident. Smith thinks that there are four different sources of moral 
judgments, and not all of them involve the exercise of the sympathetic mechanism:  
 
When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel, are, 
according to the forgoing system, derived from four sources, which are in some 
respects different from one another. First, we sympathize with the motives of the 
agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefits of his 
actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules 
by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider such 
actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the 
happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty 
from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-contrived machine” 
(TMS 7.3.3.15-16).134 
 
The first two sources of moral judgments directly rely on the sympathetic mechanism: 
through the sympathetic mechanism, the spectator is able to enter into the situation of the 
agent (or recipient), and imaginatively feel what the spectator would from the agent’s 
situation. The spectator compares that imagined sentiment with the sentiment of the agent (or 
recipient) to judge what is proper or meritous. The third source, however, does not rely 
directly on the sympathetic mechanism. We form general rules through the faculty of 
reason135, through induction on our past moral judgments. These past judgments were 
formed using the sympathetic mechanism, but the general rules themselves are not. Similarly, 
the fourth source does not use the sympathetic mechanism directly. We do not approve of a 
system of behavior because we sympathize with the happiness of those who benefit from 
such a system. We approve of a system because we find beauty in the utility and perfection !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 This passage reflects Smith’s general agreement with Hume on the mechanisms by which we judge 
sentiments, actions, and character proper or improper, virtuous and vicious (see THN 3.3.1.27-30). The one 
point of disagreement is that whereas Hume claims we approve of systems because it is useful (see Hume’s 
account of justice as an artificial virtue in EPM Section 3), Smith claims that we approve of systems because we 
find what is useful to be beautiful (TMS Part IV). For more on similarities and differences in the moral theories 
of Hume and Smith, see Martin (1990), Morrow (1923), Raphael (1972/3), and Ross (2010).  
135 In this context, Smith seems to use “reason”!to refer strictly to theoretical reason, not to practical reason.!
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displayed in that system, which is formed from the “love of system”, from the regard to “the 
beauty of order, of art and contrivance” (TMS 4.1.1.11).  
 The different sources of our moral judgments indicates that there is no one particular 
distinct faculty responsible for our moral judgments. We may in the first instance have to 
rely on the sympathetic mechanism to form moral judgments. However, there are several 
different faculties that can give rise to our moral judgments. ‘Moral faculties’ is referring to 
all of these different faculties that give rise to moral sentiments, including imagination, 
reason, and love of systems. For instance, reason, which forms general rules through 
inductive inferences, also forms moral sentiments by deducing what is proper through these 
general rules. Thus, it should not be too surprising that Smith gives authority to moral 
faculties in the chapter titled “Of the influence and authority of general rules” (TMS 3.1.5). 
Smith gives authority to all faculties that gives rise to moral sentiments, including reason, 
which does so by means of formulating general rules. He does not give authority exclusively 
to the sympathetic mechanism, or conscience, or general rules; rather, he gives authority to 
all of the faculties responsible for them. 
 
4.3 Distancing Smith from Butler: Smith on “Authority” 
The most crucial difference between Butler and Smith is, I argue, lies in their views 
on what authority is. In Sermons, Butler stresses the distinction between authority and mere 
power. Power is the motivating force of the various parts of human nature. If the passions 
exert more force than reason or the appetites, then the agent will act on those passions. For 
Butler, authority is distinct from motivating force. Authority demands obedience, regardless 
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of the beliefs and desires of the person commanded. Thus, for Butler, reason is the faculty 
that ought to be obeyed, even if the other faculties disregards, or overpowers, reason. 
Smith, I believe, does not endorse this sharp distinction between power and authority. 
For Smith, authority is a special kind of motivating force, not something distinct from it. 
Authority is the power to procure obedience from others through subjugation. This 
subjugation is not necessarily achieved with threats or coercion, but rather through the 
natural sentiment of respect, i.e. reverence in recognition of some distinction in rank. So 
authority is essentially dependent on the subjugated, because authority only exists if the 
subjugated acknowledges the distinction of rank and experiences the accompanying desire to 
obey those of higher rank. Authority is given by the subjugated through the natural desire to 
obey those of higher rank; it is not taken by the authority figure through force. So in claiming 
that conscience has authority, Smith is merely claiming that conscience has the capacity to 
procure obedience from the agent through the agent’s own recognition that conscience is of a 
higher rank than the faculties that give rise to thoughts, motives and actions impugned by 
conscience and the agent’s consequent desire to obey conscience (or repent for past actions) 
in response to that recognition. 
My interpretation of Smith on authority does not find any clear support in TMS, in 
which Smith rarely uses the term ‘authority’, much less describe it in any detail.136 However, 
Smith provides an extensive discussion of authority in Lectures on Jurisprudence and Wealth 
of Nations. In LJ, Smith argues that government does not obtain its authority through the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 Smith only uses the term ‘authority’!on a few occasions in TMS, most notably the chapter titles “Of the 
influence and authority of conscience”!(TMS 3.1.3) and “Of the influence and authority of the general rules of 
morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity”!(TMS 3.1.5). Interestingly, he only speaks of 
the influence of fortune and the influence of custom and fashion. Yet, it becomes clear in his discussions in WN 
and LJ, as we shall see, that at least fortune does confer authority. !
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forming of contracts (LJA v.116-119).137 Instead, our obligation to the government, i.e. the 
“principle or duty of allegiance” is founded on two principles: the “principle of authority” 
and principle of “common or generall interest” (LJA v.119).138 Smith describes the principle 
of authority as follows:  
 
[W]e see that every one naturally has a disposition to respect an established authority 
and superiority in others, whatever they be. The young respect the old, children 
respect their parents, and in generall the weak respect those who excell in power and 
strength. Whatever be the foundation of government this has a great effect (LJA 
v.119). 
 
Authority is founded on a natural disposition to respect “established authority” and the 
“superiority in others”.139 Respect, for Smith, is the reverence we naturally feel towards 
others with certain superior qualities. It is a certain regard we give others in recognition of 
their superiority in these respects. It is through respect of what is represented as superior in 
some way that authority is established. An older person has authority in virtue of the greater 
respect that she is given on account of her supposed greater wisdom (WN 5.1.2.7). A 
commander has authority over a military officer because the officer acknowledges the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 In this section, Smith presents several cases that can be construed as a contract between the government and 
its citizens. I present one notable case: “Again, of all the cases where one is bound to submit to the government 
that of an alien comes the nearest to a voluntary or tacit contract. He comes into the country not asleep but with 
his eyes open, inlist(s) himself under the protection of this government preferably to all others; and if the 
principle of allegiance and obedience is ever founded on contract it must be in this case. Yet we see that aliens 
have always been suspected by the government, and have always been laid under great dissabilities of different 
sorts and never have any trust or employment in the state; and yet they have shewn more strong and evident 
signs of an inclination to submit to the government than any others; and the obligations they are under to 
obedience are to those of a native subject as that of one who voluntarily enlists into the fleet compared to that of 
a pressed man. So that upon the whole this obedience which every one thinks is due to the sovereign does not 
arise from any notion of a contract” (LJA v.118-119, emphasis added).  
138 For our purposes, we need not be concerned with the principle of “common or generall interest”. For more on 
Smith’s principle of “common or generall interest” and its relation to the principle of authority, see Khalil (2005, 
63-65). !
139 “Established authority”!refers to those who are in a higher position within an established system of rank, e.g. 
king, lords. “Superiority in others”!refers to four sets of superior qualifications, outlined in WN: [1] “the 
superiority of personal qualification, of strength, beauty, and agility of body; of wisdom and virtue; of prudence, 
justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind”; [2] “the superiority of age”; [3] “the superiority of fortune”; and [4] 
“the superiority of birth”!(WN 5.1.2.5-9). !
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superiority of the commander with regard to both military prowess (a “natural” basis for 
respect) and institutional power (a form of respect arguably grounded in the soldier’s self-
interest or fear of punishment). This authority depends upon or constitutively involves the 
respect the officer affords his commander. When the authority is natural, or unquestioned, the 
officer “submits, without reluctance, to the authority of a superior by whom he has always 
been commanded” (WN 5.1.2.9). Because a person has authority in virtue of the respect that 
others give her, authority is ultimately dependent on the responses of people to those they 
know or believe to have superior qualifications: 
 
A man of rank and fortune is, by his station, the distinguished member of a great 
society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend 
to every part of himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the 
respect which this society bears to him. He dares not do anything which would 
disgrace or discredit him in it; and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that 
species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society 
prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune (WN 5.1.3.12, emphasis added). 
 
A person with authority “attend[s] to every part of his conduct”, and “dares not do anything 
which would disgrace or discredit him” because in doing so, he would lose the respect of 
others, and so lose his natural authority. In the case of the military officer, “when another 
family, in whom [the officer] had never acknowledged any such superiority, assumes a 
dominion over them” (WN 5.1.2.9, emphasis added), the officer does not obey, or at least 
does not obey out of respect for the family. 
There are two kinds of respect, and two corresponding kinds of authority: natural 
authority and derived authority.140 Natural authority originates from our natural dispositions 
to form distinctions in rank and respect people of certain qualities, like the distinction in age !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 These are my terms, not Smith’s. !
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and in virtue. We do not need some established system of rank for one to have natural 
authority over another. For instance, Smith recognizes the natural authority that teachers, in 
virtue of their “superior virtue and abilities”, have over their pupils:  
 
If the opinion of their own utility could not draw scholars to them, the law neither 
forced anybody to go to them, nor rewarded anybody for having gone to them. The 
teachers had no jurisdiction over their pupils, nor any other authority besides that 
natural authority which superior virtue and abilities never fail to procure from young 
people towards those who are entrusted with any part of their education (WN 
5.1.2.44). 
 
The authority granted teachers is distinct from any political authority they might be granted 
over their students by the law or any benefits students imagine they can receive through 
learning from the teacher.141 Rather, it is an authority arising solely from the natural 
disposition to give respect to those the student know or believe to be more virtuous or skilled 
than they. Similarly, Smith describes how judicial authority is, in its earlier stages, a kind of 
natural authority: a “great shepherd or herdsman” who has “natural authority over all the 
inferior shepherds or herdsmen” can, as a result of this superiority, “naturally procure him 
some sort of judicial authority” (WN 3.1.5.12).  
 Derived authority, however, originates from our habituation to some established 
order, like a government or church hierarchy.  Unlike natural authority, derived authority 
involves an acceptance of (and with that respect for) the established ranking, independent of 
our natural dispositions to rank people higher or lower based on certain qualities. Thus, we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 We may tend to give greater respect to those with qualities that are more useful to us, e.g. the person of 
superior wisdom (who can teach us) or the person of superior strength (who can protect us). However, we do 
not respect others in virtue of the usefulness of those qualities, evident in our respect for people who display 
such qualities but do not benefit us in any way. We might obey the teacher because we find the teacher’s 
instruction beneficial for us, but that obedience does not necessarily mean we respect the teacher or that the 
teacher has any authority over us. We simply obey because we find it in our self-interest. 
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can have no natural disposition to respect the lazy, incompetent prince who is the heir to the 
throne, but may still give that prince derived authority through our recognition of the 
established order, which ranks the prince above all others except the king.142  In some cases, 
there might be a natural authority that is later replaced with derived authority. For instance, 
though a father has natural authority over his child, the father can be granted additional 
authority or lose authority by the state:  
 
The power of the father over his children was at first, in Rome, altogether absolute. 
His authority extended to three different heads: 1st, he had the power of life and death 
over his children; 2ndly, that of selling him; and 3rdly, that every thing which was 
acquired by him was to belong to the father, he being considered as incapable of 
property. But these powers seem to have been pretty soon mitigated, in the same 
manner as that which the husband had over his wife (LJA iii.81). 
 
Similarly, judicial authority is initially a kind of natural authority (see discussion above on 
WN 3.1.5.12; also see LJA iv.22). Thus, the judge was someone who the disputing parties 
both respected in virtue of some natural superiority. However, when it becomes more and 
more difficult to resolve disputes, we simply appoint someone who is now granted authority 
independent of whether or not the disputing parties respect that particular person. Rather, the 
respect is given to the established order, which places the judge in the position to resolve 
differences, and this authority begins to extend beyond any degree of respect that is naturally 
conferred on the judge (LJA iv.15-16).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 In the example of the military commander earlier, the military commander might have one kind of authority 
(natural or derived) without the other. The commander can, for instance, punish the disobedient officer in virtue 
of the commander’s derived authority (as commander), even if the commander lacks any natural authority (e.g. 
lacks military prowess). Or the officer might obey the commander out of respect for the commander’s rank 
within the military system even if the officer lacks any natural respect for the commander (e.g. questions the 
commander’s judgments).  
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Though in WN 5.1.2 and LJ, Smith discusses authority in the context of political 
systems, he seems to be presenting his more general view of what it is to have authority, both 
natural and derived. Consider the range of examples he gives in WN and LJ:   
 
[i]  older-younger (e.g. WN 5.1.2.7; LJA iii.78-87) 
[ii]  husband-wife (e.g. LJA iii.1-87) 
[iii]  landlord-tenant (e.g. WN 1.11.1.36) 
[iv]  clergy-congregation (e.g. WN 5.1.3.12) 
[v]  educator-student (e.g. WN 5.1.2.17; 5.1.2.41; 5.1.2.44) 
[vi]  master-servant (e.g. WN 4.7.1.3; LJA iii.87-147) 
[vii]  ruler-subject (e.g. WN 1.4.1.5; 3.2.1.12; 3.3.1.2; 3.3.1.10-12; LJA iii.122) 
[viii]  judge-judged (e.g. WN 3.1.5.12) 
[ix]  mother country-colony (e.g. WN 4.7.1.2) 
 
Some of these examples are of political authority (e.g. ruler-subject, judge-judged, mother 
country-colony) in which the relations between superior and subordinate exist within an 
established system of governance. However, many of these examples of authority are devoid 
of any political system or relations. For instance, an older sibling has authority over a 
younger one, the parent over the child, the elder in the community over the younger, 
independent of the recognition or existence of any political system (unless families and 
communities are thought of as polities). In a community without any recognized system of 
rule, the older person will have authority over the younger because, according to Smith, the 
younger has a natural disposition to respect the elder. These distinctions arising from 
distinction in age may contribute to the formation of political systems, e.g. established 
system of seniority, but they need not, and can operate independently of any political system. 
The same holds for a range of other relationships: husband-wife, clergy-congregation, 
educator-student, and virtuous-nonvirtuous. In all these relations, Smith speaks of one having 
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authority over the other independent of any political order. Moreover, he does not claim that 
they necessarily lead to the formation of a political order. 
 Respect is not simply an admiration for the qualities (including that of holding a 
position within a system of rank) in another. Respect is a motive to obey someone or 
something out of admiration for the superiority one believes another has in the area at issue. 
Thus, in respecting another, we place the other person in a higher rank than ourselves in the 
relevant respect.143 Additionally, in making these distinctions of rank, we place people in an 
authority-to-subordinate relationship. For instance, Smith writes of the superiority of birth 
and fortune: 
 
Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally set one man 
above another. They are the two great sources of personal distinction, and are, 
therefore, the principal causes which naturally establish authority and subordination 
among men (WN 5.1.2.11, emphasis added). 
 
Rank is an ordering of individuals from most superior to least. It is not simply recognition of 
differences in qualifications, but recognition of status or position in relation to others in 
virtue of those differences in qualifications. To be of a higher rank is to be in a position 
above another, and the establishing of one person over another just is to establish one person 
as authority and another as subordinate. There can be multiple authorities of different degrees 
based on rank. For instance, for common citizens, both the clergy and the civil magistrate can 
have authority over us, because common citizens recognize the superiority of both. Yet in 
some cases, the clergy has stronger authority over those citizens than the civil magistrate: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 With “plain and palpable quality” like superiority of age, there is “no dispute” about the ranking (WN 
5.1.2.7), but with the “invisible” qualities like qualifications of the mind, the ranking is “always disputable, and 
generally disputed” (WN 5.1.2.6). 
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But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it 
suggests conquer all other fears. When the authorized teachers of religion propagate 
through the great body of the people, doctrines subversive of the authority of the 
sovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that [the prince] 
can maintain his authority (WN 5.1.3.17). 
 
Though the civil magistrate maintains some authority through the threat of physical force, the 
clergy are respected more by the people and so are given greater authority.  
 Furthermore, to place a person in a position of authority is to enter into a relationship 
of obedience with that person, in which the person of higher rank, i.e. the person of authority, 
commands and the person of lower rank, i.e. the subordinate, obeys. Thus, in a system of 
rank, the person of authority demands with an expectation that the subordinate obeys, and the 
subordinate finds it proper to obey: 
 
One is born and bred up under the authority of the magistrates; he finds them 
demanding the obedience of all those about him and he finds that they always submit 
to their authority; he finds they are far above him in the power they possess in the 
state; he sees they expect his obedience and sees also the propriety of obeying and 
unreasonableness of [dis]obeying (LJA v.119-120). 
 
The expectation of obedience by both parties is built into the nature of the authority-
subordinate relationship because that the superior person ought to be obeyed is built into the 
notion of respect: “Respect and deference to the monarchy, the idea they have that there is a 
sort of sinfullness or impiety in dissobedience, and the duty they owe to him, are what chiefly 
influence them” (LJA v.121). This is not to claim that the subordinate will always obey. The 
subordinate has a natural disposition to obey those whose authority they acknowledge, but 
the degree to which the subordinate will depend on all the other motives present in the 
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subordinate in a given situation.144 However, the subordinate will always consider the 
obedience to a recognized authority proper. Without this consideration, there is no authority-
subordinate relationship. 
A possible worry for Smith is that we seem to be able to give respect to one another 
without ranking one above another, without entering into this authority-subordinate 
relationship. For instance, my colleague and I have a mutual respect for one another, though 
we both recognize each other to be of more or less equal intellectual abilities, and in no way 
view our relationship as that between an authority and a subordinate. Similarly, two fierce 
competitors seem to be able to respect one another without ever recognizing the other as 
superior in any way.  
Smith does not address the possibility of mutual respect, and it is unclear how Smith 
would address it. But given his commitment to the claim that respect involves some 
recognition of superior quality or rank, one possible response is that our mutual respect might 
be founded on recognition of different superior qualities, or rank along different systems. 
Even if my colleague and I view one another as equal in intellectual capacities (and even 
experts in the same area of study), I respect my colleague in that I recognize her as capable of 
providing deep insight that I might not come to myself, and vice versa. Because I recognize 
this capacity that I may not have, I give my colleague due consideration.145 We can also 
account for mutual respect among equally talented competitors in this manner. Two 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 For instance, Smith recognizes utility as one motive for someone to obey another. However, he is clear that 
obedience out of a recognition of rank is independent of motives of utility. Hence, he writes: Nature would 
teach us to submit to them for their own sake, to tremble and bow down before their exalted station, to regard 
their smile as a reward sufficient to compensate any services, and to dread their displeasure, though no other 
evil were to follow from it, as the severest of all mortifications (TMS 1.3.2.3).We obey because of our 
“admiration for the advantages of [superior people’s] situation”, i.e. our respect for the other person’s higher 
rank, not because of “any private expectations of benefit from their good-will”!(TMS 1.3.2.3). !
145 For the same reason, I do not give the same kind of consideration to someone who I believe lacks the 
capacity to provide any insight beyond what I am already capable of obtaining myself. 
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competitors might recognize they are equally talented in playing a particular sport, but 
recognize that they are talented in different ways. Or they might be equally talented in every 
respect, but they also recognize one another as ranked above all others. Thus, they might 
recognize each other’s superior talents in relation to others (and so show each other respect 
on those grounds), but not in relation to one another.146 This line or response can also explain 
how individuals can be in an authority-subordinate relationship in one setting but not in 
another. For instance, if you and I are friends, but I am also your employer, then I am your 
authority in the context of a workplace setting, but not your authority outside of work. 
Likewise, my expectation that you obey, and your recognition that you should obey, only 
exists within the work setting.147 
 To summarize, in Smith’s picture, to say that a person “has authority” or “is in a 
position of authority” is to claim that such a person stands in a particular relation to those that 
she has authority over:  she has the capacity to procure the obedience of those who are 
disposed to obey out of respect, out of the recognition of (or belief in) her superiority in some 
important respect. The superior person may not be able to garner the obedience of the 
subordinate at all times, but the subordinate is motivated to some degree to obey because the 
subordinate always recognizes the superior as someone that is to be obeyed (at least on those 
matters on which the superior is a recognized authority). Thus, authority is a kind of 
motivating force, one that arises from respect, from the recognition of the superiority of 
another. More important for our purposes, Smith’s recognition of natural authority suggests !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Smith might have had such considerations in mind when he speaks of “respect of our equals” and “rank and 
credit among our equals” in TMS 6.1.1.3-4. It is clear that the rank and respect is with regards to distinctions in 
fortune, character, and conduct. However, it is unclear what Smith means by “equals”. One possibility is that 
they are equals in their recognized position within society, e.g. citizens, or equals in age, which is the way 
Smith uses “equals” in describing the moral development of children (see TMS 3.1.3.22). 
147 My primary aim here is to give a plausible interpretation of Smith on authority. Admittedly, this account of 
mutual respect needs further explication, and may not accord with what some mean by ‘mutual respect’ (e.g. 
respect for one another as human beings).  
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that authority is not granted solely in virtue of one’s rank, position, or role. For Butler, one 
can have authority in virtue of one’s position or role, regardless of the subordinate’s beliefs 
or motivation (e.g. the passions ought to obey reason regardless of whether the passions 
submit to reason or whether the agent with those passions feels motivated to act in 
accordance with reason). However, for Smith, authority is inextricably tied to the 
subordinate’s motivations because authority depends on the subordinate’s respect and 
disposition to obey. The authority cannot be an authority without having this particular kind 
of influence over its subordinate. 
 
4.4 Smith on the Authority of Conscience 
 As I have interpreted Smith, to have authority is to have a particular kind of power or 
influence over another: the power to gain the respect of others, which is to have the 
recognition of rank, i.e. the recognition as someone whom it is proper to obey. Smith, I 
believe, understands the authority of conscience, as well as all other moral faculties, in the 
same way. The agent respects her conscience, and in doing so, the agent gives conscience 
authority, recognizing conscience as something that is to be obeyed. Conscience’s authority, 
then, is akin to the virtuous person’s authority. Just as someone gives respect (and so 
authority) to a virtuous person by ranking the virtuous person as a moral superior, an agent 
gives respect (and so authority) to conscience by ranking conscience above one’s other 
motives, faculties and thoughts as a moral superior. 
 Though Smith does not explicitly make any such claim, he presents the correction of 
moral judgments in a manner that suggests that they occur along a system of rank. In the first 
three parts of TMS, Smith presents the correction of our moral judgments in stages: the agent 
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corrects her judgments by first appealing to spectators (TMS 1.1.4), then to more virtuous 
people (TMS 1.1.5), then to conscience (TMS 3.1.1-3), and finally to general rules of 
morality (TMS 3.1.4-5). One way to understand this progression is as a description of moral 
development, a description of how we rely on different tools at different times in our 
development to form our moral sentiments. Yet Smith also suggests that some ways of 
coming to our moral judgments are better than others, where “better” is measured in terms of 
accuracy of a certain sort. For instance, though no one has ever lived up to the standard of 
perfect propriety, we are able to recognize that the conduct of some comes closer to that 
perfection than the conduct of others. Thus, in attempting to judge accurately by appealing to 
others, we are better off adjusting our sentiments in response to the judgment of the person 
closer to this perfection than one farther from it. We are essentially recognizing the 
superiority in character of some over others, including ourselves, when we are attempting to 
correct for our errant moral judgments. Though we might initially rely on any spectator, with 
experience we begin to differentiate between the characters of others and begin to identify 
some as better guides, better exemplars of virtues, for directing our own sentiments.  
 Smith appears to have something like our appeal to the virtuous person in mind when 
he speaks of the superiority of conscience as a moral judge. Conscience is generally in a 
better position to judge accurately than the agent and other partial parties. Because 
conscience views the situation as an impartial spectator would, it is able to make a “proper” 
comparison between the interests of different parties and thus come to a more accurate moral 
judgment: 
 
[I]t is only by consulting this judge within, that we can ever see what relates to 
ourselves in its proper shape and dimensions; or that we can ever make any proper 
comparison between our own interests and those of other people (TMS 3.1.3.1). 
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It is from him only that we learn the real littleness of ourselves, and of whatever 
relates to ourselves, and the natural misrepresentation of self-love can be corrected 
only by the eye of this impartial spectator. It is he who shows us the propriety of 
generosity and the deformity of injustice; the propriety of resigning the greatest 
interests of our own, for the yet greater interests of others, and the deformity of doing 
the smallest injury to another, in order to obtain the greatest benefit to ourselves (TMS 
3.1.3.4). 
 
Conscience has the advantage of viewing the agent’s situation from a position that avoids 
certain “misrepresentations”. As a result of this advantage, conscience is a better judge of 
what is proper than the agent and any other partial parties. 
 Furthermore, conscience also has access to information that other spectators do not, 
especially the agent’s sentiments. Whereas others need to infer the agent’s sentiments, 
conscience has more immediate access to the agent’s sentiments because conscience and the 
agent are one and the same person. Hence, Smith recognizes that conscience is more likely to 
praise what is praiseworthy (what actually deserves praise), than other spectators, even 
impartial ones who more often praise what does not deserve it. In arguing this, Smith 
recognizes that conscience is in some ways a better judge of what is proper than other 
spectators, and even the public-at-large. It is conscience that corrects for the errors of other 
spectators, not the other way around: 
 
If the man without should applaud us, either for actions which we have not 
performed, or for motives which had no influence upon us; the man within can 
immediately humble that pride and elevate the mind which such groundless 
acclamations might otherwise occasion, by telling us, that as we know that we do not 
deserve them, we render ourselves despicable by accepting them. If, on the contrary, 
the man without should reproach us, either for actions which we never performed, or 
for motives which had no influence upon those which we may have performed; the 
man within may immediately correct this false judgment, and assure us, that we are 
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by no means the proper objects of that censure which has so unjustly been bestowed 
upon us (TMS 3.1.2.32).  
 
Because of these advantages, conscience generally comes to more accurate moral judgments, 
and so aligns itself more closely with the virtues. Hence, Smith describes the motive to obey 
conscience as the “love of what is honourable and noble, of grandeur, and dignity, and 
superiority of our own characters”, as opposed to the love “of our neighbour” or “of 
mankind” (TMS 3.1.3.4). In attempting to attain the virtues, we look to conscience, and not to 
our neighbors or other people, because we are essentially recognizing conscience as a 
superior moral guide. 
 Smith treats the general rules of morality in a similar fashion in relation to 
conscience. We recognize that even conscience is not immune to perversion (TMS 3.1.4.1). 
Hence, we need a safeguard for when conscience does err. Though limited to matters of 
justice and action, the general rules of morality can provide these safeguards, preventing us 
from forming inaccurate moral judgments as a result of our heightened passions in the given 
moment (TMS 3.1.4.7; 3.1.4.12). Again, we do not arbitrarily rely on general rules as one of 
many ways of forming our moral judgments. We use general rules as a means for correcting 
“the misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our 
particular situation” because we recognize it as superior to conscience in forming moral 
judgments. And unlike in his discussion of conscience, Smith is explicit that the influence of 
the general rules is rooted in our respect, our reverence, for them: 
 
[T]hat reverence for the rule which past experience has impressed upon him, checks 
the impetuosity of his passion, and helps him to correct the too partial views which 
self-love might otherwise suggest, of what was proper to be done in his situation. If 
he should allow himself to be so far transported by passion as to violate this rule, yet, 
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even in this case, he cannot throw off altogether the awe and respect with which he 
has been accustomed to regard it (TMS 3.1.4.12, emphases added). 
 
More importantly, these rules have influence over us because we give them authority by 
recognizing them as proper and just. We are the ones laying down these rules for ourselves as 
“inviolable”, “to abstain from them upon all occasions” (TMS 3.1.4.12). And it is our regard 
for these rules that constitute our very sense of duty or obligation toward those rules (TMS 
3.1.5.1). Furthermore, we give these rules greater respect than we give conscience. Unlike 
conscience, the general rules are given “sacred regard”, and our reverence for them is “still 
further enhanced by an opinion… that those important rules of morality are the commands 
and laws of the Deity” (TMS 3.1.5.3). Thus, we regard the general rules as superior to 
conscience, that when the two come to competing judgments from the two, we regard the 
general rules to be that which we are to obey, not conscience, because we give the general 
rules greater respect.  
 What we find in Smith, then, is that we do not treat all means of forming moral 
judgments in the same way. We recognize some moral judges as better than others. We do so 
with others, differentiating them based on how closely they come to the standard of perfect 
propriety. We also do so with the different ways we form our own moral judgments: general 
moral rules are superior to conscience, and conscience is superior to ourselves as agents. In 
forming these distinctions, we are recognizing rank in the ways we form moral judgments. 
And as I argued earlier, to recognize rank is to respect, and the higher the rank, the greater 
the respect. Thus, the greatest respect, as Smith emphasizes, goes to the general rules of 
morality, and the next greatest to conscience.  
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 To be clear, my claim is not that certain means of correcting our moral judgments are 
actually better than others. Rather, my claim is that we as agents acknowledge a ranking in 
the different ways of forming and correcting our moral judgments. Impartial spectators are 
superior to partial ones. Conscience is superior to other spectators. General rules of morality 
are superior (in matters of justice and action) to conscience. We do not correct our moral 
sentiments that arise through these different means arbitrarily. Rather, we appeal to some to 
correct others because we recognize some as superior to others in the realm of moral 
judgment. Conscience falls within this ranking. For Smith, it is superior as a moral judge to 
other spectators, both partial and impartial, but not superior to the general rules of morality 
on matters of justice and action. My suggestion, then, is that Smith treats conscience as 
having the same kind of authority over the agent that the virtuous person has over those who 
respect her. Just as we recognize the virtuous person as a superior moral judge, we recognize 
our conscience as a superior moral judge. We recognize conscience as having higher rank 
than other spectators and ourselves as agents. In doing so, we give conscience respect, and so 
authority over us. As with all other authority, the degree of authority depends on the degree 
of respect given. The more we respect conscience, the more authority conscience has over us 
(and the more influence we give it).  
 
4.5 Why Should I Obey My Conscience? 
 Thus far, I have presented Smith’s account of what conscience’s authority consists in. 
Though interesting in its own right, we are ultimately interested in giving an explanation of 
what this authority is because we want to identify what justifications there are, if any, for 
obeying conscience. We want to know whether we should obey our conscience, and if so, 
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why we ought to do so. This question of justification Why should I obey my conscience? is 
ultimately what Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Butler were attempting to address.148 Their 
accounts of the nature of conscience’s authority were merely aimed at addressing why we 
should always obey conscience.  
 Though Smith does not seem interested in addressing the question of justification, his 
account does provide one response to this question: we ought to obey conscience insofar as 
we respect conscience, i.e. insofar as we recognize conscience as a superior. The very 
authority that conscience has is dependent on the degree to which we respect conscience. To 
respect something is to subordinate oneself to another, to make another a superior over 
oneself.149 To enter into such a relationship is nothing more than to recognize another, i.e. the 
superior, as something to be obeyed. Hence, in virtue of respecting conscience, we have 
already settled the matter of whether or not we ought to obey conscience: since we respect 
conscience, we view it as that which is to be obeyed. 
 The question of justification, then, simply does not make sense for the agent who 
already respects conscience. Since the agent already gives respect to conscience, she has 
already subordinated herself to conscience as something to be obeyed. The reason for 
obeying conscience thus is embedded in the sentiment of respect. We have an obligation to 
obey conscience because we oblige ourselves to conscience by respecting it. The question of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 I am drawing on Korsgaard’s discussion of the normative question “Why should I be moral?”!in Sources of 
Normativity (Korsgaard 1996, 9). According to Korsgaard, this question is seeking some justification, not 
description, for being moral. Similarly, the question “Why should I obey my conscience?”!is seeking a 
justification for our acting as conscience demands. A mere description of how conscience operates alone will be 
insufficient. Hence, Bonaventure and Aquinas tried to ground our reason for obeying conscience in our 
commitment to God’s commands, and Butler in our commitment to our human nature.!
149 As noted earlier, it is possible to respect another along one particular quality or system of rank, but not in 
another, and so give another authority in some respects (or in certain contexts) but not in others. The difficulty 
with conscience is that it is recognized as a superior in conscience’s only role: that of a moral judge. Thus, it 
seems less likely, though not impossible, that the agent and conscience can have mutual respect for one another.  
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justification only makes sense for someone who has already lost respect for conscience.150 
This is, I believe, what is occurring when we accept Freud’s account of conscience. If Freud 
is correct and conscience is nothing more than an internalization of parents and society, then 
we have respect for conscience only to the degree that we have respect for parents and 
society. If we do not respect our parents and society, then we have no respect for conscience. 
Conscience, in that case, seems to have little weight in our moral life; we do not feel 
obligated to it at all, we do not appeal to it for any moral guidance, and we dismiss its 
judgments as nothing more than a feeling or product of experience. It is for such a person that 
the question “Why should I obey conscience?” makes sense, and for whom the question 
needs an answer. 
 It is possible that the agent obey conscience for reasons other than respect. For 
instance, an agent might recognize that her conscience issues judgments that often align with 
the judgments of the general public. Because the agreement of the general public can provide 
various advantages (e.g. in business transactions, in avoiding public humiliation or 
condemnation), the agent might act in accordance with conscience to gain those advantages. 
However, there is a difference in obeying conscience out of respect and obeying conscience 
for pragmatic reasons. When we obey conscience out of respect, we are recognizing 
conscience as a superior. But we do not necessarily have to give any such recognition to 
conscience when we are acting for pragmatic reasons. Because there is no such recognition, 
the agent is not obeying conscience as an authority. And once we exclude conscience’s 
authority from the question of justification, then we are not providing the reason for obeying 
conscience that is central to our experience of conscience. Conscience is no longer presumed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
150 H. A. Prichard defends this view in response to the question “Why should we be moral?” nicely in “Does 
Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind, 21 (1921): 21-37.   
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to be something that is to be obeyed, but rather reduced to a tool whose instrumental value 
must first be assessed before we have any reason for obeying it. This is not to deny that these 
instrumental reasons can serve as a justification for obeying conscience. What I am claiming 
is that these instrumental reasons fail to account for the kind of justification that seems most 
important to our experience of conscience: we take it for granted, we presume, that 
conscience is something to be obeyed. We generally do not obey conscience because we find 
it to be useful, nor do we obey it because we want to avoid feelings of guilt. We do not 
appeal to such reasons because such reasons do not map onto our experiences of feeling 
obligated to conscience. So though these instrumental reasons may give some reason for 
obeying conscience, they fail to capture the kind of reason that is central to our relationship 
with our conscience: conscience presents itself as something to be obeyed in virtue of what it 
is, not in virtue of what it is useful for.  
  
4.6 Problem for Smith: Conscience as The Moral Authority 
 In many ways, Smith’s account fares well when compared with our experience of 
conscience. We experience conscience as a moral guide, as that which directs us to the 
proper sentiment and action. For Smith, we view conscience as a moral guide because we 
recognize it as a better moral judge, and so rank it above us such that we appeal to it as a 
source of more accurate moral judgments. Conscience also speaks to us in different volumes: 
sometimes, it is a strong motivating force while at other times it is a mere whisper. For 
Smith, the difference in volume is accounted for by the degree of respect we give conscience. 
The weak person who does not give conscience much respect experiences a much quieter 
(sometimes absent) conscience, while the virtuous person who gives conscience the utmost 
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respect experiences the pangs of conscience more forcefully or with greater frequency.151 
Finally, even when we feel we ought to obey conscience, we often fail to do so. For Smith, 
we can and do disobey conscience because conscience is simply one of a range of motivating 
forces. Sometimes, our self-love might be a stronger motivating force than conscience, 
especially if we do not give conscience much respect. Other times, we might give greater 
respect to something other than conscience, like the general rules of morality. 
 Still, there is one key feature of our experience of conscience that Smith fails to 
capture: conscience is often seen as the moral judge, not merely a better judge. This feature, I 
believe, is at the core of our experience of conscience as authoritative. When we speak of 
conscience as having authority over us, we do not simply mean that conscience is a strong 
motivating force, or that it is a useful moral guide. Rather, conscience makes a demand on us 
that we have difficulty ignoring. It is not simply someone we respect, like a virtuous person, 
issuing a command; it is the voice of God or of moral law. It is not simply a moral guide; it is 
the moral guide. Though we might, upon reflection, come to question the accuracy of 
conscience’s moral judgments, we are compelled to accept conscience’s judgments as 
accurate in the moment we experience conscience. In this way, conscience imposes itself on 
us, and we have difficulty denying its commands, even when we ultimately decide to act 
against it. Thus, as Bonaventure and Aquinas noted, whenever we act in the belief that we are 
doing something wrong.  
 This feature of conscience is altogether absent in Smith’s account of conscience’s 
authority. Because Smith grounds authority in the sentiment of respect, conscience does not 
have this special place as the moral authority except for those who give conscience the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Freud also pointed out that the virtuous person has a much stronger, louder conscience, and as a result, feels 
guilt and remorse with greater intensity than someone who is far from virtuous (Freud 1930).!
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highest respect. Yet as even Smith recognized, there are few people who hold conscience in 
such high regard that they are able to never “forget for one moment the judgment which the 
impartial spectator would pass upon [their] sentiments and conduct” (TMS 3.1.3.25). The 
common person gives conscience some respect, but not the highest degree, and so is not as 
strongly influenced by it as he might be (TMS 3.1.3.23-24). Furthermore, Smith claims that 
we general give the highest respect (“sacred regard”) to the general rules of morality, not 
conscience, and that it is these general rules that are elevated to the status of the commands 
of God: 
 
This reverence is still further enhanced by an opinion which is first impressed by 
nature, and afterwards confirmed by reasoning and philosophy, that those important 
rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity (TMS 3.1.5.3, emphasis 
added). 
 
So even though most adults give conscience some respect, this respect, and the 
corresponding authority, is not elevated to the status of the voice of God. Its authority falls 
below the authority of the general rules of morality. So in moments of conflict between the 
judgments of conscience and these general rules, we take the general rules to be the authority 
on what is proper, and disregard conscience as errant.  
 Moreover, under Smith’s account, we seem to be able to deny conscience’s demands 
on us more easily than we generally experience. Since conscience’s authority is grounded in 
our sentiment of respect, we can break away from our obligation to conscience by losing 
respect for it. We can essentially take away conscience’s authority by changing our 
sentiments toward it. This process seems possible when we are observing the conscience of 
others. But we have a much more difficult time doing so with our own conscience. This is 
evident, I think, when there is a conflict between our conscience and the general rules of 
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morality. Suppose I come across a serial child rapist who is so clever that he is able to get 
away with his crimes every time. I have that person cornered, and am deciding whether or 
not to kill him. I might hold a general rule, e.g. do not murder, in high regard. Yet in that 
moment, my conscience judges that it is proper to kill this person, given the kind of harm he 
will continue to inflict. Setting aside whether my conscience is erring or not, I will have a 
difficult time convincing myself that conscience is mistaken, even if I decide to follow the 
general rule. Conscience continues to torment me, even though I try to convince myself that I 
did what is proper by following the general rule. This torment is not simply feelings of guilt 
or remorse; this torment is rooted in a person’s difficulty if not inability to accept the 
propriety of what she has done in acting against conscience, is proper. However, if we decide 
to act in accordance with conscience, even though doing so breaks the general rule, we have 
a much less difficult time convincing ourselves that what we have done is proper. We might 
still feel some doubt as to the propriety of what we did, but we do not experience the same 
kind of torment that we would experience when violating conscience.  
 My point is that we have difficulty denying the superiority of conscience to even the 
most widely endorsed rules of conduct. We treat it as the unique moral authority, as the voice 
of God, as the final judge of what is proper, in a way that we do not treat any other moral 
guide. We can more easily disagree with the judgments of a virtuous person or even a highly 
regarded moral rule than we can with conscience. Conscience seems to hold a special place 
as the moral authority, and its place as this authority does not seem to be a matter of degree. 
There is something unique about our relationship with our own conscience that makes it 
difficult for us to disassociate ourselves from its judgments.  
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4.6 An Alternative: The Authority of Conscience as Commitment to Self 
There is, I believe, an alternative account of the authority of conscience present in 
Smith’s theory, though not endorsed by Smith himself, that can account for our experience of 
conscience as the moral authority. According to Smith, conscience is our judging ourselves 
as an impartial spectator. Central to his account is that conscience’s judgments are our own. 
These judgments are formed by the exercise of our faculties and principles, not those of any 
other. They are our judgments, not the judgments of others. Hence, we are committed to 
conscience’s judgments in a way that we are not committed to others’ judgments. When 
another person forms a moral judgment, we have yet to agree or disagree with that person’s 
judgment. However, if we form a moral judgment, we are, in forming that judgment, agreeing 
with it because we cannot see our own faculties as anything but proper in our exercising 
those faculties. It is this blind spot that we have to our own faculties that leads to self-
deception. And it is this blind spot that leads to our inability to see conscience’s judgments as 
anything but correct.152  
This is not to say that we cannot recognize the errors of our own faculties. For 
instance, when we are presented with repeated examples of how others’ consciences have 
erred, we might come to doubt the reliability of our own conscience as a moral judge !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 I have been influenced here by the works on first-person authority by Korsgaard (in ethics) and Moran (in 
epistemology). However, my claim that we are committed to our own faculties is not the stronger Kantian claim 
that both Korsgaard and Moran make. For Korsgaard, I commit myself to my judgment of propriety by taking a 
deliberative stance, i.e. asking myself “What should I do?”, and settling the question of what to do by deciding 
on what to do (Korsgaard 1996). Similarly, for Moran, I commit myself to my beliefs by taking a deliberative 
stance, i.e. asking myself “What should I believe?”, and settling the matter by forming a belief (Moran 2001). I 
am claiming neither. I am reiterating Smith’s claim that we have no other way to judge other faculties than by 
using our own: “Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another…. I 
neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them”!(TMS 1.1.3.10). We are limited by our 
faculties as a matter of empirical fact. This limitation includes the formation of beliefs and moral judgments of 
others and of ourselves. The commitment I am referring to, then, is not to ourselves in virtue of taking this 
deliberative stance, but rather to our faculties in virtue of our having used these faculties to form our beliefs and 
judgments. Thus, I have the same commitment to my passive sentiments arising from my faculties about which 
I cannot deliberate.!
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(because we recognize that our faculties are susceptible to the same errors as those of others).  
Jonathan Bennett presents a range of cases in which we might do so: the conscience of 
Heinrich Himmler, Jonathan Edwards, and Huck Finn. All three people have conscience that 
issued (what we now know or believe to be) incorrect moral judgments, i.e. they were all in 
the grips of a “bad morality”.153 Similarly, we can question our own conscience if we reflect 
back on our conscience’s prior judgments and find that we now disagree with most of them. 
Under such considerations, we might begin to question the accuracy of our own conscience 
as it operates now. Moreover, this phenomenon seems quite common, evident in the little 
credence that some people give to conscience.  
Smith also recognized that we disagree with our own faculties, for instance, when we 
adjust our sentiments because we find them improper in light of disagreement with others 
(TMS 1.1.4.8; 3.1.1.3). We also find our visual faculties inaccurate at times in measuring the 
size of objects (TMS 3.1.3.2). We can also recognize and be “mortified” when we realize that 
we have, though unintentionally, misled someone because of some error in our judgment, 
memory, or reasoning (TMS 7.4.1.27). If these errors occur frequently, then we might also 
lose confidence in the faculty, as we find it to be unreliable. For this reason, we sometimes 
seem to appeal to others rather than our conscience:  
 
The agreement or disagreement both of the sentiments and judgments of other people 
with our own, is, in all cases, it must be observed, of more or less importance to us, 
exactly in proportion as we ourselves are more or less uncertain about the propriety of 
our own sentiments, about the accuracy of our own judgments (TMS 3.1.2.16).  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 Bennett describes “bad morality”!as “a morality whose principle I deeply disapprove of. When I call a 
morality bad, I cannot prove that mine is better; but when I here call any morality bad, I think you will agree 
with me that it is bad; and that is all I need”!(Bennett 1974, 123-4). Himmler judged it proper to exterminate the 
Jews. Huck judged slavery of some to be proper. Edwards thought it proper to torture sinners for eternity. As 
was with Bennett, for my purposes, all I need is that in all these instances we would find these moral judgments 
(of Himmler, Huck, and Edwards) to be incorrectly formed by their consciences. !
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Smith admits that we can be more or less certain, more or less confident, in the accuracy of 
our judgments of ourselves, i.e. conscience’s judgments. We can doubt the accuracy and 
reliability of conscience in the same way we can with all our other faculties. If so, then it 
seems we do not have such a strong commitment to our own faculties. We can disregard it if 
we find them to be mistaken or unreliable. So it might seem that Smith may have been 
correct to say that the authority of conscience depends on the respect we give it. Once we 
lose respect for conscience, say by frequently disagreeing with its judgments, conscience 
loses its authority. 
I accept the possibility that we do not accept our own faculties to be accurate. 
Furthermore, the variance in our confidence in our own judgments can account for how 
conscience seems to speak to us in different volumes. When we are confidence in 
conscience’s judgments, we have a more difficult time denying that we ought to obey 
conscience and are more willing to obey conscience in the face of public opposition.154 
However, when we do not have great confidence in conscience’s judgments, we tend to, as 
Smith claims, rely on other people or other means for confirmation. Conscience’s judgments, 
in such cases, are given little weight, and we might be more willing to disregard and disobey 
conscience’s judgments as mistaken (TMS 3.1.2.24).  
However, there is another sense in which we are deeply committed to the accuracy of 
our faculties. Though we might be able to question the accuracy of conscience in our 
reflecting on it, we do not do so in our exercising of them. Consider the kinds of cases in 
which we come to doubt our conscience. We doubt our conscience when we face 
disagreements with others and are now prompted to reconsider our initial judgment. We !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Smith provides a parallel case of mathematicians who “have the most perfect assurance, both of the truth and 
of the importance of their discoveries” and so are “very indifferent about the reception which they may meet 
with from the public” (TMS 3.1.2.20). 
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doubt our conscience when we find that this faculty tends to be unreliable in others or in 
ourselves, evident in prior (errant) judgments. We doubt our conscience when we accept that 
our conscience originates from an unreliable source (e.g. if I adopted Freud’s account of 
conscience and believed my parents and society to be vicious people). In all such instances, 
we are reflecting on and reevaluating our prior moral judgments. We are not committed to 
our own faculties, but more specifically, we are not committed to our own faculties as they 
operated in forming those prior judgments. However, we still retain a commitment to our 
own faculties, but this commitment is to our faculties in reevaluating our prior judgments or 
current inclinations, not to our faculties that gave rise to these prior judgments or current 
inclinations. We are only forced to regard our faculties as operating properly as we exercise 
those faculties, not in the operations or outputs of these faculties upon which we reflect. 
Consider Smith’s discussion of our initial judgments of the size of objects at a distance:  
 
As to the eye of the body, objects appear great or small, not so much according to 
their real dimensions, as according to the nearness or distance of their situation…. In 
my present situation an immense landscape of lawns, and woods, and distant 
mountains, seems to do no more than cover the little window which I write by, and to 
be out of all proportions less than the chamber in which I am sitting (TMS 3.1.3.2).  
 
I find my initial judgment of the size of objects to be proper. But then I reevaluate that initial 
judgment by “transporting myself, at least in fancy, to a different station… and thereby form 
some judgment”, some new judgment, of their proportions. We have essentially exercised our 
faculties again from a different situation, and in doing so, we replace our prior judgment. We 
replace because we are committed to the new judgment, not the old; we deem the new 
judgment proper and the old not. Smith parallels this kind of reevaluation with our appeal to 
conscience. We as agents initially form a judgment that we believe to be proper, even if it is 
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distorted by the “selfish and original passions of human nature” (TMS 3.1.3.3). We then 
reevaluate that judgment and replace it with the judgment we formulate from the situation of 
an impartial spectator, i.e. as conscience. We find our judgment as agent to be improper 
because we are now committed to a contrary judgment we have formed as conscience. 
Because we override our judgments as agent in our reevaluating them, we view conscience 
(and not the agent) as the moral authority.  
Still, even if we have such a commitment to conscience in our exercising of it, we are 
able to reevaluate conscience’s judgments by judging as agent. After conscience issues a 
judgment of what is proper, we as agent need to decide what to do in light of conscience’s 
judgments, just as we do in light of other spectators’ judgments. Hence, we are able to ask 
whether or not we should obey conscience at all.155 And when we are faced with evidence 
that conscience is not a reliable source of moral judgments or that it does not judge correctly 
in this particular situation, we are genuinely questioning whether conscience is a moral 
authority (much less the moral authority), whether its commands are something that we 
should obey.  
I think this picture is mistaken. Though I do not deny that we can view our 
conscience as something other than the moral authority, we can only do so when we 
disassociate ourselves from our own conscience. In other words, to doubt our conscience, we 
need to view it the same way we view the conscience of others: as something distinct from 
us, who doubt conscience. To illustrate what I have in mind, consider how we judge !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Generally, this kind of situation is presented as a conflict between our knowledge of what is proper and our 
passions. For both Butler and Smith, we might accept conscience as judging correctly, but struggle about what 
to do because we are motivated by other passions, namely self-love. Bonaventure and Aquinas saw these cases 
as cases of akrasia, in which we know what is right to do, namely what conscience judges to be proper, and yet 
do otherwise because of our other desires. But understood as such, there is no doubt about conscience’s 
authority. Conscience is still viewed as the moral authority, and the agent as unable (or unwilling) to obey that 
authority because of the strength of other motives. 
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ourselves in the standard case. We divide ourselves into spectator and agent, and we as 
spectator form a moral judgment of us as agent. When we as spectator judge us as agent to 
have felt or acted improperly, we are claiming that the agent’s judgment about what is proper 
was mistaken. It might seem as if what I am describing is a case in which we as conscience 
are disassociating ourselves from our faculties as agents. As Smith describes, we as 
conscience are judging us as agents just as we would judge others (TMS 3.1.1.6). However, 
there are two different ways in which we as spectator can view ourselves as agents. The 
standard case is one in which we view the agent as one with us in this special relationship 
that is distinct from our relationship with friends, family, colleagues, and strangers. We view 
the agent’s sentiments and actions as our sentiments and actions. In this sense, we as 
spectator identify or associate ourselves with the agent. Alternatively, we can, with some 
effort, view the agent as distinct from us, on par with a friend, a family member, a colleague, 
or a stranger. The agent is someone we used to be, or not who we genuinely or authentically 
are (e.g. when under the influence of alcohol or under extremely stressful situations). When 
we view the agent in this manner, we are disassociating ourselves from the agent. The same 
distinction arises when we as agent are responding to our conscience. We can associate 
ourselves with our conscience, viewing it as one with us, or we can disassociate ourselves 
from our conscience, viewing it as distinct from us.  
When we consider cases in which we doubt conscience, it seems we are able to do so 
because we disassociate ourselves from our conscience. For instance, when we doubt our 
conscience because we doubt the conscience of others, we are viewing our conscience the 
way we view the consciences of other people: as the operations of faculties distinct from our 
own. Similarly, when we question our conscience based on how our conscience operated in 
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the past, we are viewing our past conscience as distinct from who we are now. That past 
conscience was who I used to be, before I took ethics courses and trained my conscience. 
When we associate with conscience, it becomes much more difficult to deny that conscience 
is the authority. Why is this so? In associating with conscience, we are accepting the 
conscience’s judgments as our own, as the operations of our faculties. And as I stated earlier, 
all of our faculties appear to us to be proper. Thus, in associating ourselves with conscience, 
we are essentially accepting conscience’s judgments to be accurate; we are accepting 
conscience as the moral authority.  
If I am correct, then it makes no sense to ask whether we should obey our conscience 
because in our associating ourselves with our conscience, we already recognize conscience as 
the moral authority, as the proper moral guide, as that which we ought to obey. Questioning 
whether we should obey conscience only makes sense once we disassociate ourselves from 
conscience. However, when we disassociate ourselves from conscience in this way, we are 
no longer describing the kind of phenomenon that is of interest to us. Once we view 
conscience on par with the conscience of others, we do not experience conscience as “pangs” 
from within or the voice of God in us because we have lost the connection to conscience that 
makes it a part of us. In a way, we no longer experience conscience. 
What about cases in which we lack confidence in our own judgments? Such instances 
are not ones of reflection or reevaluation of the prior exercises of our faculties. Rather, we 
seem to lack confidence in our faculties in the midst of our exercising them. We form a moral 
judgment as conscience, but lack very much confidence that we have judged correctly (TMS 
3.1.2.16). In those moments, we seem to lack much, if any, commitment to conscience, and 
are open to conscience’s being mistaken. 
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There is, however, a way to address this worry. When we lack confidence in our 
judgments of ourselves, we are not questioning the accuracy of conscience in the way that we 
do when we evaluate our conscience’s prior judgments. Instead, we are unsure about what 
our conscience’s judgment is. As Smith puts it, we seek out the opinions of others in these 
cases because we are “more or less uncertain about the propriety of our own sentiments” 
(TMS 3.1.2.16). Our “sentiments” here is our sentiments as agents, which we are attempting 
to assess. So when Smith claims that we are unsure about “the accuracy of our own 
judgments”, he means that we are unsure about whether or not our sentiments as agents were 
proper and to what degree. We are not unsure in the same way that we are unsure about our 
prior judgments. When we are unsure about our prior judgments, we are not questioning what 
our prior judgments were. Our uncertainty is whether or not that judgment was accurate. 
However, when we are unsure about the propriety of our own sentiments, we are unsure 
about what to judge in the first place. In other words, we are unsure what conscience’s 
judgments are, what our faculties determine to be the proper sentiment. Thus, we do not lack 
commitment to our own conscience, but rather, we simply do not know what our conscience 
judges so there is no judgment to commit to. 
 My suggestion, then, is that our commitment to our own faculties is a commitment to 
the present exercising of those faculties. When judging as agents, we are committed to the 
accuracy or excellence of our faculties as agents, finding our sentiments to be proper even 
when they are distorted by self-love. When judging as conscience, we are committed to the 
accuracy or excellence of our faculties as conscience, not to our faculties as agent. We cannot 
have a divided commitment to self because we can only exercise our faculties from one 
perspective at a time. We cannot exercise our faculties simultaneously as both agent and as 
! 201 
conscience. Moreover, this account can explain why it is that we experience conscience as 
the moral authority. Though we as conscience and we as agents are equally committed to our 
own faculties, there is an important difference: we generally appeal to conscience to 
reevaluate the judgments of the agent, but we generally do not appeal to the initial reactions 
we experience as agents to reevaluate the judgments of conscience. When we appeal to 
conscience, we are committed to the accuracy of conscience over that of the agent. However, 
when we are agents, we are not committed to the accuracy of our judgments over that of 
conscience; we simply form and are committed to our judgments. This difference is not a 
difference in our respect for us as agents and for us as conscience. Rather, the difference is 
rooted in conscience’s being the means by which we evaluate ourselves as agents. For Smith, 
we cannot evaluate ourselves except through this imaginative exercise of entering into the 
situation of another, whether it is actual spectators or conscience. This process is similar to 
Hume’s account of how we correct our moral judgments through reflection, through 
imagining ourselves in the situation of other spectators to evaluate ourselves as agents (see 
THN 3.3.1.15, 3.3.3.2). We evaluate ourselves by turning our own faculties in upon 
ourselves. However, in doing so, we are committing ourselves to our faculties in this 
reflective process, not to our faculties as they have operated in us in forming those immediate 
reactions that constitute our perspectives as agents.156 Moreover, because there is no other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 The reflective process I am describing is different from what Korsgaard calls ‘reflective endorsement’, 
which she attributes to Hume: “The reflective endorsement theorist tries a new tact. Morality is grounded in 
human nature. Obligations and values are projections of our own moral sentiments and dispositions. To say that 
these sentiments and dispositions are justified is not to say that they track the truth, but rather to say that they 
are good. We are the better for having them, for they perfect our social nature, and so promote our self-interest 
and our flourishing”!(Korsgaard 1996, 91). Reflective endorsement involves an approval of the system as a 
whole, e.g. system of appealing to conscience, system of belief-formation. But the kind of reflection I am 
considering involves a commitment to the operation of our faculties in that given moment, not to the system that 
gives rise to that particular judgment. !
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means for judging our own faculties, it will always be conscience to which we are committed 
whenever we are debating between our judgments as agent and our judgments as conscience. 
 
4.7 Huckleberry Finn and Our Commitment to Self 
 Let me close my discussion by providing an alternative explanation of Huck’s acting 
against his conscience in Mark Twain’s classic The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. After a 
lengthy journey with Jim, Huck decides to help Jim escape in spite of his conscience. 
According to his conscience, he ought not to have helped Jim escape. In his words:  
 
That was where it pinched. Conscience says to me: ‘What had poor Miss Watson 
done to you [referring to himself], that you could see her nigger go off right under 
your eyes and never say one single word? What did that poor old woman do to you, 
that you could treat her so mean? Why, she tried to learn you your book, she tried to 
learn you your manners, she tried to be good to you every way she knowed how. 
That’s what she done’ I got to feeling so mean and so miserable I most wished I was 
dead (The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn Chapter 16). 
 
Huck’s conscience tells him it is wrong to let Jim escape. However, Huck ultimately decides 
to act against his conscience. What is interesting is Huck’s thoughts and feelings in justifying 
his actions after he acts against conscience: 
 
“They went off and I got aboard the raft, feeling bad and low, because I knowed very 
well I had done wrong, and I see it warn’t no use for me to try to learn to do right; a 
body that don’t get started right when he’s little aint got no show — when the pinch 
comes there ain’t nothing to back him up and keep him to his work, and so he gets 
beat. Then I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on; s’pose you’d a done right 
and give Jim up, would you felt better than what you do now? No, says I, I’d feel bad 
— I’d feel just the same way I do now. Well, then, says I, what’s the use you learning 
to do right when it’s troublesome to do right and ain’t no trouble to do wrong, and the 
wages is just the same? I was stuck. I couldn’t answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn’t 
bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever comes handiest at the time 
(The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn Chapter 16). 
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Huck concludes that in this case, he would feel bad regardless of what he did, and so there 
was no use in considering what conscience demands. He is essentially dismissing the 
authority of conscience: conscience is not any kind of moral authority and should have no 
weight in our decisions of what to do.157 
 Jonathan Bennett interprets Huck in this scene as undergoing a conflict between 
conscience and feelings of sympathy toward Jim.158 According to Bennett, Huck’s 
conscience is clear in judging it wrong to help Jim escape. But because Huck sympathizes 
with Jim, Huck decides to help Jim escape: “sympathy wins over morality” (Bennett 1974, 
126). Like Bonaventure and Aquinas, Bennett treats Huck’s case as a conflict between 
conscience, which the agent accepts as correct, and sentiments that motivate the agent to act 
against conscience: 
 
Huck doesn’t weigh up pros and cons: he simply fails to do what he believes to be 
right — he isn’t strong enough, hasn’t ‘the spunk of a rabbit’. This passage in the 
novel is notable not just for its finely wrought irony, with Huck’s weakness of will 
leading him to do the right thing, but also for its masterly handling of the difference 
between general moral principles and particular unreasoned emotional pulls (Bennett 
1974, 127).159  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 As Bennett points out, Huck repeats this claim that conscience is not to be obeyed or given influence later in 
Chapter 33: “It don’t make no difference whether you do right or wrong, a person’s conscience ain’t got no 
sense, and just goes for him anyway. If I had a yaller dog that didn’t know no more than a person’s conscience 
does, I would poison him. It takes up more room than all the rest of a person’s insides, and yet ain’t no good, 
nohow.”!
158 By “sympathy”, Bennett is referring to “every sort of fellow-feeling, as when one feels pity over someone’s 
loneliness, or horrified compassion over his pain, or when one feels a shrinking reluctance to act in a way which 
will bring misfortune to someone else”!(Bennett 1974, 124). Sympathy, as Bennett understands it, is not the 
same as moral judgments, including judgments of what is proper, but rather a particular kind of feeling distinct 
from moral judgments.!
159 Similarly, Anders Schinkel (2011) interprets Huck as experiencing a conflict between moral language and 
moral feelings. My response to Bennett (to follow) also applies to Schinkel. !
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The problem with Bennett’s interpretation is that Huck’s conscience is not so much issuing 
moral judgments as eliciting feelings of sympathy: sympathy for Miss Watson. Conscience, 
in this case, is not an application of some general rule or principle about stealing. Rather, 
conscience seems to present Huck with a series of consideration, namely what Miss Watson 
had done for him—considerations which seem to call for the kind of gratitude incompatible 
with aiding the “theft” of her “property.” Conscience is making Huck consider features of the 
situation that he had not considered before, and eliciting feelings of guilt at the thought of 
harming Miss Watson. But what Huck undergoes when conscience speaks to him is no 
different from what Huck undergoes when Jim speaks of his plans to free his wife and 
children. There is, in other words, no difference in what conscience is doing and what Jim is 
doing. Conscience is not issuing moral judgments while Jim is himself feeling sympathy. 
Both Jim and his conscience are eliciting feelings of sympathy and feelings of guilt. 
Bennett’s account does not seem to fully capture the dilemma that Huck faces. Huck 
is having trouble deciding whether or not to obey his conscience, but this case is not so much 
a conflict of what he knows to be right and what he desires to do. Huck feels equally bad 
about helping and not helping Jim. Thus, this is not a case of a sentiment overpowering our 
knowledge of what is right. Rather, what Huck’s case demonstrates is how we frequently 
identify with, and then disassociate ourselves from conscience. Conscience is clear on what 
he must do: do not help Jim escape for doing so will harm Miss Watson who does not 
deserve that harm. But Huck also hesitates to act as conscience demands, not simply because 
he “feels bad”, but because his “feeling bad” indicates to him that he is doing something bad. 
In other words, he is able to step away from himself as conscience and in doing so come to 
question whether he should obey conscience. He is engaged in a battle with himself: “I was 
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fidgeting up and down the raft, abusing myself to myself” (emphasis added). This abuse was 
occurring both ways. When Huck associated himself with conscience, he abused Huck as 
agent. When Huck disassociated himself from conscience, he abused Huck as conscience. 
And ultimately, when Huck decides that there is no use giving any credence to conscience, 
Huck can do so only because he is now severing all ties to his own conscience. His 
conscience is no longer his, but rather something external to himself that influences him, the 
same way that the words and actions of others impact him.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! 206 
Works Cited 
 
Andrew, Edward G. 2001. Conscience and Its Critics: Protestant Conscience, Enlightenment  
Reason, and Modern Subjectivity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
 
!! 1999. “Hobbes on Conscience within the Law and without”. Canadian  
Journal of Political Science 32: 203-335 
 
Bennett, Jonathan. 1974. “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn”. Philosophy 49: 123-134.  
 
Berns, Lawrence. 1994. “Aristotle and Adam Smith on Justice: Cooperation Between  
Ancients and Moderns?” The Review of Metaphysics 48: 71-90. 
 
Braun, Harald and Vallance, Edward, eds. 2004. Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern  
Europe, 1500-1700. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Broad, C. D. 1940. “Conscience and Conscientious Action”. Philosophy 15: 115-130. 
 
Broadie, Alexander. 2010. “Aristotle, Adam Smith and the Virtue of Propriety”. The Journal  
of Scottish Philosophy 8: 79-89. 
 
!! 2006. “Sympathy and the Impartial Spectator” in The Cambridge Companion  
to Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brown, Vivienne. 1994. Adam Smith’s Discourse. London: Routeledge. 
 
Butler, Joseph. 1736/2006. The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the  
Constitution and Course of Nature in The Works of Bishop Butler, ed. David E. 
White. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. 
 
!! 1729/2006. Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel in The Works of Bishop  
Butler, ed. David E. White. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. 
 
Campbell, T. D. 1971. Adam Smith’s Science of Morals. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and  
Littlefield. 
 
Carrasco, Maria A. 2008. “Adam Smith on Morality, Justice, and the Political Constitution of  
Liberty”. The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6: 135-156. 
 
!! 2004. “Adam Smith’s Reconstruction of Practical Reason”. The Review of Metaphysics  
! 207 
58: 81-116. 
 
Cohen, Rachel. 1997. “The Common Point of View in Hume’s Ethics”. Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Reseach 54: 827-850. 
 
Conscience, n. OED Online. September 2011. Oxford University Press. 28 August 2014  
<http://www.oed.com.ezp1.villanova.edu/view/Entry/39460?rskey=Y73I9p&result=1
#eid>. 
 
Darwall, Stephen. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”, 1640-1740.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
!! 1999. “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith”. Philosophy and Public  
Affairs 28: 139-164. 
 
Evensky, Jerry. 1987. “The Two Voices of Adam Smith: Moral Philosopher and Social  
Critic”. History of Political Economy 19:.447-468. 
 
!! 2005. Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on  
Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Feldman, Karen. 2006. Binding Words: Conscience and Rhetoric in Hobbes, Hegel, and  
Heidegger. Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Fleischacker, Samuel. 1999. A Third Concept of Liberty: Judgment and Freedom in Kant and  
Adam Smith. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
!! 1991. “Philosophy in Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith”. Kant-Studien  
82: 249-269. 
 
Fleischacker, Samuel & Brown, Vivienne. 2010. “Introduction” in The Philosophy of Adam  
Smith: The Adam Smith Review, vol. 5, eds. Vivienne Brown and Samuel 
Fleischacker. New York: Routledge. 
 
Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. 2010. Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
!! 2006. “Smith on ‘connexion’, culture and judgment” in New Voices on Adam Smith,  
e.d. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser. New York: Routledge. 
 
! 208 
Freud, Sigmund. 1930/1989. Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey. New  
York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co. 
 
Fuss, Peter. 1964. “Conscience”. Ethics 74: 111-120. 
 
Goldman, Alvin I. 1989. “Interpretation Psychologized”. Mind and Language 4:161-185. 
 
!! 2006. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of  
Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Gordon, R. M. 1986. “Folk Psychology as Simulation”. Mind and Language 1: 158-171. 
 
!! 1995. “Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator”. Ethics 7: 727-742.  
 
Greene, Robert A. 1991. “Synderesis, the Spark of Conscience, in the English Renaissance”.  
Journal of the History of Ideas 52: 195-219. 
 
Griswold, Jr., Charles. 1999. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Grusec, Joan E. 2006. “The Development of Moral Behavior and Conscience from  
Socialization Perspectives” in Handbook of Moral Development, eds. Melanie Killen 
and Judith Smetana. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Haakonssen, Knud. 1790/2002. “Introduction” in The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam  
Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
!! 1981. The Science of a Legislator. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hanley, Ryan Patrick. 2009. Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Heilbroner, Robert L. 1982. “The Socialization of the Individual in Adam Smith”. History of  
Political Economy 14: 427-439. 
 
Hill, Lisa. 2001. “The Hidden Theology of Adam Smith”. European Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought 8: 1-29. 
 
Hill, Jr., Thomas E. 1998. “Four Conceptions of Conscience” in Integrity and Conscience,  
! 209 
eds. Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams. New York: New York University Press. 
 
!! 2002. Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press.  
 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1640/2008. The Elements of Law, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
!! 1651/1994. Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett. 
 
Hope, Vincent M. 1989. Virtue by Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume  
and Adam Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hume, David. 1751/1998. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L.  
Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
!! 1739/2000. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. D. F. Norton & M. J. Norton. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. 1788/1997. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
!! 1785/1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
!! 1797/1996. Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
!! 1793/1998. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. A. Wood and G. D.  
Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kelly, Kevin T. 1967. Conscience: Dictator or Guide? Wimbledon, London: Geoffrey  
Chapman Ltd. 
 
Kennedy, Gavin. 2008. Adam Smith: A Moral Philosopher and His Political Economy. New  
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Keppler, Jan Horst. 2010. Adam Smith and the Economy of the Passions. New York:  
Routledge Press. 
 
! 210 
Khalil, Elias L. 2005. “An Anatomy of Authority: Adam Smith as Political Theorist”.  
Cambridge Journal of Economics 29: 57-71. 
 
!! 2009. “Self-deceit and self-serving bias: Adam Smith on ‘General Rules’”. Journal of  
Institutional Economics 5: 251-258. 
 
Kleer, Richard A. 1995. “Final Causes in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments”.  
Journal of the History of Philosophy 33: 275-300. 
 
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1973. “The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral  
Judgment”. The Journal of Philosophy 70: 630-646.  
 
!! 1981. The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice.  
San Francisco: Harper & Row. 
 
Koops, W., Brugman, D., & Ferguson, T. J. 2010. “The Development of Conscience:  
Concepts and Theoretical and Empirical Approaches” in The Development and 
Structure of Conscience, eds. Koops, Brugman, Ferguson, and Sander. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
 
Korsgaard, Christine. 1999. “The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in  
Hume’s Ethics”. Hume Studies 25: 3-41. 
 
!! 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Langston, Douglas. 2001. Conscience and Other Virtues. University Park, PA: The  
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
Lewis, C. S. 1960. Studies in Words. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lyons, William. 2009. “Conscience – An Essay in Moral Psychology”. Philosophy 84: 477-
494. 
 
Macfie, A. L. 1967. The Individual in Society: Papers on Adam Smith. London: George  
Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
 
Martin, Marie, A. 1990. “Utility and Morality: Adam Smith’s Critique of Hume”. Hume  
Studies 16: 107-120. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. 1863/1998. Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp. Oxford: Oxford University  
! 211 
Press. 
 
Montes, Leonidas. 2004. Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of Some Central  
Components of His Thought. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Moran, Richard. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press.  
 
Nanay, Bence. 2010. “Adam Smith’s Concept of Sympathy and its Contemporary  
Interpretations” in The Philosophy of Adam Smith: The Adam Smith Review, vol. 5, 
eds. Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker. New York: Routledge. 
 
O’Brien, Wendell. 1991. “Butler and the Authority of Conscience”. History of Philosophy  
Quarterly, 8: 43-57. 
 
Otteson, James. 2002. “Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Morals”. Archiv für Geschichte der  
Philosophie 84: 190-211. 
 
Oxley, Julinna C. 2011. The Moral Dimensions of Empathy: Limits and Applications in  
Ethical Theory and Practice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Özler, Sule and Gabrinetti, Paul A. 2013. “A Known World: An Analysis of Defenses in  
Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments” in The Adam Smith Review, vol. 8, 
ed. Fonna Forman-Barzilai. New York: Routledge. 
 
Paton, H. J. 1979. “Conscience and Kant”. Kant-Studien, 70: 239-251. 
 
Penelhum, Terence. 1985. Butler. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
 
Potts, Timothy. 1980. Conscience in Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Prichard, H. A. 1912. “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 21: 21-37. 
 
Raphael, D. D. 1949. “Bishop Butler’s View of Conscience”. Philosophy 24: 219-238. 
 
!! 1972/3. “Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility”. Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society New Series 73: 87-103. 
 
!! 1975. “The Impartial Spectator” in Essay on Adam Smith, eds. Andrew S. Skinner and  
! 212 
Thomas Wilson. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
!! 2007. The Impartial Spectator. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rick, Jon. 2007. “Hume’s and Smith’s Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances”. The  
Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 5: 135-158. 
 
Ross, Ian Simpson. 2010. The Life of Adam Smith, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ryle, Gilbert. 1940. “Conscience and Moral Convictions”. Analysis 7: 31-39. 
 
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 2010. “Sentiments and Spectators: Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral  
Judgment” in The Philosophy of Adam Smith: The Adam Smith Review, vol. 5, eds. 
Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker. New York: Routledge. 
 
Schinkel, Anders. 2011. “Huck Finn, Moral Language and Moral Education”. Journal of  
Philosophy of Education 45: 511-525. 
 
Schliesser, Eric. 2011. “Reading Adam Smith after Darwin: On the Evolution of  
Propensities, Institutions, and Sentiments”. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 77: 14-22. 
 
!! 2008. “Review of D. D. Raphael (2007) The Impartial spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral  
Philosophy and Leonidas Montes (2004) Adam Smith in Context.” Ethics 118: 569-
575. 
 
Shaver, Robert. 2006. “Virtues, Utility, and Rules” in The Cambridge Companion to Adam  
Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Smith, Adam. 1795/1980. Essays on Philosophical Subjects. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press. 
 
!! 1776/2007. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  
Petersfield, Hampshire: Harriman House Ltd.  
 
!! 1976/1982. Lectures on Jurisprudence, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G.  
Stein. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, Inc. 
 
!! 1790/2002. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press. 
! 213 
 
Stout, Lynn. 2011. Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press. 
 
Stueber, Karsten. 2009. “The Ethical Dimension of Folk Psychology?” Inquiry 52: 532-547. 
 
!! 2006. Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Sturgeon, Nicholas L. 1976. “Nature and Conscience in Butler’s Ethics”. The Philosophical  
Review 85: 316-356. 
 
Vivenza, Gloria. 2001. Adam Smith and the Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Weber, Dominique. 2010. “Thomas Hobbes’s Doctrine of Conscience and Theories of  
Synderesis in Renaissance England”. Hobbes Studies 23: 54-71. 
 
